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Dual Jurisdiction Dispute Leads Delaware Board to Restore Claimant’s Disability Benefits

William Hasset v. Amick Farms, LLC, IAB No. 1562391 (Dec. 2025)

March 1, 2026

by Linda L. Wilson

In this case, the employer, Amick Farms, has offices in Maryland and Delaware. The claimant lives in Delaware and was hired to work out of employer’s Delaware office in February of 2020. His job was to deliver chicken feed, which he did to farms in Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. The claimant sustained work injuries on November 29, 2021, December 5, 2022, September 29, 2023, and January 7, 2025. Medical and disability benefits were paid for all of the claims, pursuant to Maryland law.

As permitted by Maryland law, seven months after the most recent work injury, the employer ceased making disability payments based on the advice of its medical expert. In response, the claimant filed a petition to determine compensation due with the Delaware Industrial Accident Board and a motion for reinstatement of benefits.

At an evidentiary hearing on the motion for reinstatement of benefits, the employer argued that Maryland and Delaware have dual jurisdiction and because Maryland was selected, the claimant should not be permitted to forum shop on issues as they arise. The employer also argued that there is no Delaware agreement to enforce.

The board did not determine whether there was dual jurisdiction. Rather, it noted that it has the authority, as agreed upon by the parties, to address matters properly before it in the context of the now admittedly appropriated filed Delaware workers’ compensation action. The board then went on to find that, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, there is an implied agreement to pay disability benefits, and that those benefits were impermissibly unilaterally terminated before the claimant agreed he was capable of returning to work. The board therefore ordered the reinstatement of disability payments. 

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.