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Defense Digest

Don’t Waive Goodbye to Your Section 40 Lien Rights

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2026

June 30, 2026

by William J. Murphy

Key Points:

  • Under NJ workers’ compensation law, employers can assert a lien upon third-party actions for any medical and indemnity benefits paid.
  • The employers are free to compromise or waive this lien.
  • The Appellate Division found that a carrier cashing a check for less than the full lien amount, but accompanied by a letter stating this payment was full and final payment of the lien, constituted an agreement to waive the remainder of the lien. 

A chief concern of the workers’ compensation system in New Jersey has always been prevention of double recovery, in which an injured worker would obtain a “windfall” by receiving compensation from both a workers’ compensation claim and a third-party suit. In order to avoid this, the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the respondent with a lien against third-party proceeds. Known as the “Section 40 lien,” the respondent can assert a lien based on the medical and indemnity benefits it has issued for the workers’ compensation claim. The lien can be collected upon two-thirds of the third-party recovery, minus $750.00 for the costs of suit. 

As with most liens, a Section 40 lien can be negotiated. Employers will sometimes agree to compromise or, in some cases, even waive the lien. 

In the recent unpublished case of Tomaselli v. Petco, 2026 WL 585448 (N.J. Super. App. Div. April 3, 2026), the Appellate Division addressed a dispute as to whether an employer’s Section 40 lien had been compromised.

In the case, the petitioner was employed as a store manager at Petco (insured by Sedgwick).  On December 23, 2017, he was collecting shopping carts in the store’s parking lot when a car backed into him, causing injuries to his lower back. Since the petitioner was injured by a third-party tortfeasor in the course of his employment, he filed both a workers’ compensation claim against Petco and a suit against the driver.

The third-party suit ended with a settlement of $85,000 in underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits and $15,000 in third-party settlement.

At the time of resolution of the civil claim, Sedgwick had paid a total of $177,084.30 in benefits ($90,351.50 in medical and $86,732.80 in indemnity). This amount was not exhaustive, as the  petitioner was still undergoing treatment and the costs would continue to increase. At that point, Sedgwick was entitled to recoup over $65,000.00 from the third-party settlement.  However, in the spirit of compromise, they sent the petitioner a letter indicating that they would accept $33,333.33 from the UIM award and $15,000.00 from the third-party settlement. 

The petitioner’s lawyer sent a check to Sedgwick for $33,333.33 with a letter stating the check “represents full and final payment of any outstanding worker's compensation lien, in connection with the above-referenced claim." The check was cashed by the carrier.  

The workers’ compensation matter subsequently went to trial and ended with a judgment from the judge of compensation finding a percentage of permanent disability and further concluding that Sedgwick’s acceptance of the check for $33,333.33 with the aforementioned letter constituted an agreement to resolve the lien for only that amount. On appeal, Sedgwick argued that the mere act of cashing a check did not constitute a waiver of its Section 40 lien rights.

The Appellate Division ruled that it did. They stated that Sedgwick was clearly aware of its rights to recover the full amount allowable under their Section 40 lien, and that “[b]y accepting and endorsing the check, Sedgwick clearly and unequivocally conveyed its intent to accept $33,333.33 as full and final payment of any outstanding workers' compensation lien.”

While this is an unpublished opinion and therefore not binding, it will likely have persuasive authority for judges of compensation going forward. 

The impact of this case is significant. At most corporations, the high volume of checks received in the mail are sorted, endorsed, and deposited by an accounts receivable department or comparable business unit. However, in this opinion, the Appellate Division is ascribing significant decision-making authority to the action of one who is likely not a corporate officer, but a clerk. 

What are some actions that carriers can take to safeguard their Section 40 liens and prevent an unintentional waiver of same?

The first is to enact policies requiring supervisory approval before any check pertaining to a Section 40 lien repayment is deposited. Systems should be enacted which will lead to any check pertaining to Section 40 lien repayment being flagged, and requiring a supervisor to review and approve before it is deposited. 

  • If there is no language on the check or accompanying paperwork indicating anything about “full and final” or “resolution” or “waiver” or any other terms to that effect, the check can be deposited without issue.
  • If there is such language, consultation should be made with the workers’ compensation adjuster, defense counsel, or another designated party that can verify the full amount of the carrier’s Section 40 lien and determine whether any negotiated amounts have been agreed to by the carrier.
    • If the check with such language is in the full amount (or the negotiated amount, if applicable), the check can then be deposited.
    • If the check is for a lesser amount, it should be immediately sent back with a letter copying all pertinent parties, stating that the carrier is entitled to (state the full dollar amount of entitlement) and does not agree to accept a lesser amount.  The carrier should then ask the addressee to advise whether they will be re-sending the proper amount or whether further legal action will be required.

A second suggestion would be to designate that such checks need to be sent to defense counsel. This would task the carrier’s legal team with the job of verifying that endorsement of the checks does not unintentionally cause a waiver of lien rights. After review, the defense counsel can then pass the check on to the carrier or send back to the addressee, as the situation requires. 

A third cautionary step would be to issue a notice to petitioner’s attorney, indicating that the carrier is asserting its full lien rights under N.J.S.A. 35:15-40 and that going forward, the carrier does not consent to any compromise of its full entitlement unless noted in a formal agreement signed by both parties. While the service of this document by itself would be helpful, it would be optimal for it to be signed by petitioner’s attorney. Since the carrier is normally asked to produce a ledger showing the amount of its Section 40 lien, petitioner’s attorney should be told that production of the requested ledger will only be made upon receipt of the notice with their (the attorney’s) signature.   

The Tomaselli opinion has exposed a vulnerability in respondent’s rights to assert their full Section 40 liens they are entitled to under law. The carriers are entitled to recoup monies spent on medical and indemnity benefits. They should act with great care to ensure that entitlement isn’t lost through error.

William J. Murphy is in our Roseland office.  He can be reached at (973) 618-4129 or at wjmurphy@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

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Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.