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William J. Murphy

Portrait of William J. Murphy

William (Bill) practices solely in the firm's Workers' Compensation Department. He has 10 years of experience in defending clients in workers’ compensation matters. Throughout his career, Bill has represented insured and self-insured entities, including those in the retail, restaurant, grocery, transportation and manufacturing industries.

Bill has built his practice based upon zealous advocacy, meticulous attention to detail, and frequent communication with both clients and adversaries to bring each case to a prompt and satisfactory conclusion.  

Bill is an active member of the New Jersey legal community. He serves as a volunteer Court Appointed Special Advocate, and provides pro bono services for St. Anne's Center, a women's shelter in Phillipsburg, New Jersey.

A graduate of St. Peter's University, Bill received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Theology and Philosophy with a minor in history. During his undergraduate studies, Bill was a member of several honor societies and received an award as outstanding member of his graduating class. Bill subsequently earned his juris doctor from Rutgers Law School. While attending Rutgers, he was the founding president of the St. Thomas More Society and the ABA Representative for the Student Bar Association.

Results

Dismissals on the Rise! Our New Jersey Workers’ Compensation attorneys are successful in precluding litigation

Lela Eke received a Dismiss Without Prejudice for Lack of Prosecution, after filing a Motion to Dismiss in response to numerous discovery requests that remained unanswered. At the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel was unable to provide an explanation for the delay. We argued that keeping the case open to give them more time to respond to our discovery and Motion would be prejudicial against us, and the Court granted our Motion. Jessica Gordon received a dismissal for lack of prosecution in a case where the claim was denied with ongoing request for medical treatment, but there had been no report from the Petitioner to support the request and no demand was made in lieu of litigation. William Murphy successfully obtained an order for dismissal for a claim involving a workplace assault. In the case, the Petitioner alleged injuries to their neck, back, chest, and right hand following an assault at work. After the Petitioner missed multiple independent medical exams scheduled by the employer, we filed a motion to dismiss this claim for lack of prosecution. The judge of compensation granted the motion. Rachel Ramsay-Lowe was successful in defending a case where the Petitioner was not complying with discovery requests and did not appear for Respondent’s permanency evaluation. We filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution and the Court entered the dismissal Order. Kristy Salvitti was successful in obtaining an Order for Dismissal where the  Petitioner had filed a Reopener of a Clam Petition relative to a prior permanency award arguing that disability to his right shoulder, thoracic and lumbar spine had increased to permanent and total disability. If successful, Petitioner would receive lifetime related medical treatment and 450 weeks to life of his temporary total disability rate.  However, following oral argument that Petitioner failed to timely prosecute the claim, the Reopener Petitioner was dismissed.

Obtained Dismissal with Prejudice in Complex Workers’ Compensation Case

We obtained orders for dismissal, with prejudice, where four New Jersey medical providers alleged they were entitled to additional monies for medical treatment provided in New Jersey to a New York resident. The underlying accident involved a laborer who resided in New York, worked in New York and sustained the injuries in New York. Four medical providers filed medical provider claims against the employer in New Jersey, seeking more than $800,000 from the employer for treatment rendered in relation to this accident. We filed motions to dismiss these claims for lack of jurisdiction, asserting there were insufficient contacts with the state of New Jersey to establish jurisdiction. The judge of compensation ruled in favor of the employer, dismissing the four medical providers’ applications with prejudice.  

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Don’t Waive Goodbye to Your Section 40 Lien Rights

June 30, 2026

Key Points: Under NJ workers’ compensation law, employers can assert a lien upon third-party actions for any medical and indemnity benefits paid. The employers are free to compromise or waive this lien. The Appellate Division found that a carrier cashing a check for less than the full lien amount, but accompanied by a letter stating this payment was full and final payment of the lien, constituted an agreement to waive the remainder of the lien.  A chief concern of the workers’ compensation system in New Jersey has always been prevention of double recovery, in which an injured worker would obtain a “windfall” by receiving compensation from both a workers’ compensation claim and a third-party suit. In order to avoid this, the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the respondent with a lien against third-party proceeds. Known as the “Section 40 lien,” the respondent can assert a lien based on the medical and indemnity benefits it has issued for the workers’ compensation claim. The lien can be collected upon two-thirds of the third-party recovery, minus $750.00 for the costs of suit.  As with most liens, a Section 40 lien can be negotiated. Employers will sometimes agree to compromise or, in some cases, even waive the lien.  In the recent unpublished case of Tomaselli v. Petco, 2026 WL 585448 (N.J. Super. App. Div. April 3, 2026), the Appellate Division addressed a dispute as to whether an employer’s Section 40 lien had been compromised. In the case, the petitioner was employed as a store manager at Petco (insured by Sedgwick).  On December 23, 2017, he was collecting shopping carts in the store’s parking lot when a car backed into him, causing injuries to his lower back. Since the petitioner was injured by a third-party tortfeasor in the course of his employment, he filed both a workers’ compensation claim against Petco and a suit against the driver. The third-party suit ended with a settlement of $85,000 in underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits and $15,000 in third-party settlement. At the time of resolution of the civil claim, Sedgwick had paid a total of $177,084.30 in benefits ($90,351.50 in medical and $86,732.80 in indemnity). This amount was not exhaustive, as the  petitioner was still undergoing treatment and the costs would continue to increase. At that point, Sedgwick was entitled to recoup over $65,000.00 from the third-party settlement.  However, in the spirit of compromise, they sent the petitioner a letter indicating that they would accept $33,333.33 from the UIM award and $15,000.00 from the third-party settlement.  The petitioner’s lawyer sent a check to Sedgwick for $33,333.33 with a letter stating the check “represents full and final payment of any outstanding worker's compensation lien, in connection with the above-referenced claim." The check was cashed by the carrier.   The workers’ compensation matter subsequently went to trial and ended with a judgment from the judge of compensation finding a percentage of permanent disability and further concluding that Sedgwick’s acceptance of the check for $33,333.33 with the aforementioned letter constituted an agreement to resolve the lien for only that amount. On appeal, Sedgwick argued that the mere act of cashing a check did not constitute a waiver of its Section 40 lien rights. The Appellate Division ruled that it did. They stated that Sedgwick was clearly aware of its rights to recover the full amount allowable under their Section 40 lien, and that “[b]y accepting and endorsing the check, Sedgwick clearly and unequivocally conveyed its intent to accept $33,333.33 as full and final payment of any outstanding workers' compensation lien.” While this is an unpublished opinion and therefore not binding, it will likely have persuasive authority for judges of compensation going forward.  The impact of this case is significant. At most corporations, the high volume of checks received in the mail are sorted, endorsed, and deposited by an accounts receivable department or comparable business unit. However, in this opinion, the Appellate Division is ascribing significant decision-making authority to the action of one who is likely not a corporate officer, but a clerk.  What are some actions that carriers can take to safeguard their Section 40 liens and prevent an unintentional waiver of same? The first is to enact policies requiring supervisory approval before any check pertaining to a Section 40 lien repayment is deposited. Systems should be enacted which will lead to any check pertaining to Section 40 lien repayment being flagged, and requiring a supervisor to review and approve before it is deposited.  If there is no language on the check or accompanying paperwork indicating anything about “full and final” or “resolution” or “waiver” or any other terms to that effect, the check can be deposited without issue. If there is such language, consultation should be made with the workers’ compensation adjuster, defense counsel, or another designated party that can verify the full amount of the carrier’s Section 40 lien and determine whether any negotiated amounts have been agreed to by the carrier.If the check with such language is in the full amount (or the negotiated amount, if applicable), the check can then be deposited. If the check is for a lesser amount, it should be immediately sent back with a letter copying all pertinent parties, stating that the carrier is entitled to (state the full dollar amount of entitlement) and does not agree to accept a lesser amount.  The carrier should then ask the addressee to advise whether they will be re-sending the proper amount or whether further legal action will be required. A second suggestion would be to designate that such checks need to be sent to defense counsel. This would task the carrier’s legal team with the job of verifying that endorsement of the checks does not unintentionally cause a waiver of lien rights. After review, the defense counsel can then pass the check on to the carrier or send back to the addressee, as the situation requires.  A third cautionary step would be to issue a notice to petitioner’s attorney, indicating that the carrier is asserting its full lien rights under N.J.S.A. 35:15-40 and that going forward, the carrier does not consent to any compromise of its full entitlement unless noted in a formal agreement signed by both parties. While the service of this document by itself would be helpful, it would be optimal for it to be signed by petitioner’s attorney. Since the carrier is normally asked to produce a ledger showing the amount of its Section 40 lien, petitioner’s attorney should be told that production of the requested ledger will only be made upon receipt of the notice with their (the attorney’s) signature.    The Tomaselli opinion has exposed a vulnerability in respondent’s rights to assert their full Section 40 liens they are entitled to under law. The carriers are entitled to recoup monies spent on medical and indemnity benefits. They should act with great care to ensure that entitlement isn’t lost through error. William J. Murphy is in our Roseland office.  He can be reached at (973) 618-4129 or at wjmurphy@mdwcg.com.

New Jersey Law Journal

Marijuana Legalization and Workplace Risk: What New Jersey Employers Need to Know

May 21, 2026

While the legalization of recreational marijuana usage poses a risk of increased work-related accidents for younger workers, employers can work to curb this increase by investing in education, effective drug policies, and employee assistance programs.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.