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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Delaware Supreme Court Again Reverses Judge, Litigants Still Pay

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 5, May 2026

May 1, 2026

by Linda L. Wilson

In 2022, the Delaware Supreme Court, en banc, reversed a decision of Superior Court Judge Karsnitz in a pro hac vice matter, writing that “[b]oth the tone and the explicit language of the Superior Court’s memorandum opinion and order suggest that the courts’ interest extended beyond the mere propriety and advisability of Wood’s continued involvement in the case before it.” Page v. Oath Inc., 270 A.3d 833 (Del. 2022), 2022 WL 162965 at *3.  Two of the justices that decided Page recently heard and decided Red House Motors v. Bayly, No. 234, 2025, 2026 WL 568964 (Del. Mar. 2, 2026), again reversing a decision of Judge Karsnitz.

The law is clear that, in workers’ compensation matters, the board is the finder of fact.  If a board decision is appealed, the reviewing court is required to defer to the factual findings of the board, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.  Unfortunately, some judges seek to substitute their factual findings for those of the board, often resulting in significant litigation expenses for the parties.

Such was the case of Red House Motors v. Bayly.  This case initially came before the board as a coverage matter.  Robert Bayly was a sole proprietor of several businesses.  The employees of the businesses were covered by workers’ compensation insurance.  After being injured at work, Bayly sought workers’ compensation benefits, which were denied by the carrier because Bayly was not considered an employee and had not paid for additional coverage for sole proprietors.  The board, agreeing with the carrier, found that, as a factual matter, Bayly never elected additional sole proprietor coverage.  Bayly appealed the board decision.  Contrary to the factual findings of the board, Judge Karsnitz concluded that they should have found that Bayly “orally” elected sole proprietor coverage.  He then reversed and entered judgment for Bayly.  The carrier appealed.

The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the decision because the Superior Court is not free to make its own factual findings contrary to those of the board when there is substantial evidence to support the board’s conclusions.  Here, the board explained why, based on the record, it concluded as a factual matter that Bayly did not elect sole proprietor coverage and that those findings are entitled to deference.  Unfortunately, while the board decision was eventually upheld, the litigants still had to bear the expense of extra litigation.   

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.