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Defense Digest

Decision Requiring Strict Compliance with §627.7152 Provides Insurance Carriers With Another Tool to Combat Litigation of Assignment of Benefit Claims

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Danielle N. Robinson

Key Points:

  • As of July 1, 2019, pursuant to Florida Statute §627.7152, there are specific guidelines that an assignment of benefits (AOB) must adhere to.
  • Statute requires that an AOB must be in writing and executed, contain a provision that allows for rescission without a penalty, and include a written itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services to be performed by the service provider.
  • Statute also specifies that an AOB may not have penalties or fees for cancellation, processing or administration.

In The Kidwell Group, LLC, d/b/a Air Quality Assessors of Florida v. United Property & Casualty Insurance Company, the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld a dismissal of a breach of control suit brought by an assignee. The court found that an estimate attached to the complaint from five days after the date the AOB was executed did not satisfy the requirement that the Assignment contain a written itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services to be performed.

On June 15, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appel upheld a lower court’s dismissal of a breach-of-contract suit brought by an Assignment of Benefit (AOB) holder (assignee) because the AOB was invalid and unenforceable. Under Florida law, a valid AOB allows an assignee (such as water remediation companies, roofers and contractors) to receive benefits under a policyholder’s insurance policy in exchange for providing services or repairs relating to the policyholder’s property damage claim. Due to the increase in the number of entities seeking to provide services pursuant to an AOB, many Florida homeowners unwittingly engaged repair providers and executed AOBs in exchange for their services. Many times, after an AOB had been obtained from the policyholders, assignees subsequently, and often unilaterally, expanded the scope of the services to be provided or changed the prices for their services. Additionally, many companies began to take advantage of homeowners by offering a multitude of tests, assessments and evaluations, ostensibly related to their property damage claims, in an effort to obtain an AOB and bill their insurance carriers for the costs. As a result, Florida insurance carriers began seeing an ever-increasing tidal wave of assignee-related claims for questionable services and excessive amounts. This influx in claims ultimately translated into an influx of litigation between assignees and insurance carriers.

In an effort to curb this rampant litigation, the Florida Legislature passed §627.7152, detailing the specific guidelines an AOB must adhere to in order to be valid and enforceable. The law went into effect on July 1, 2019. The Statute requires that an AOB:

(1) be in writing and executed by and between the policyholder and the service provider;

(2) contain a provision that allows the policyholder to rescind the AOB without a penalty within a certain time;

(3) contain a provision requiring the service provider to provide a copy of the AOB to the policyholder’s insurance carrier;

(4) contain a written, itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services to be performed by the service provider;

(5) relate only to specific types of repairs and services at the property;

(6) specifically notify the policyholder that they are giving up rights under their insurance policy which may result in litigation; and

(7) contain a provision requiring the service provider to protect the policyholder from any resulting liabilities, costs or losses.

In addition to indicating what an AOB must have, the Florida Legislature also specified what an AOB may not have, including penalties or fees for cancellation, processing or administration. Under the statute, an AOB that does not comply with these requirements is deemed to be invalid and unenforceable. Section 627.7152 also requires an assignee to provide the policyholder and the insurance carrier with a written notice of its intent to initiate litigation at least 10 business days before filing a lawsuit. The statute holds assignees’ feet to the fire by requiring that an AOB conform to specific, concrete, and uniform requirements or be deemed unenforceable.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Kidwell demonstrates just how strictly assignees will have to comply with §627.7152. In Kidwell, the AOB was deemed invalid and unenforceable because it was not in strict compliance with the requirements laid out in 627.7152. The court held that the AOB did not contain an itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services to be performed, as required by law. In Kidwell, the plaintiff argued that it satisfied the requirements of § 627.7152 by providing the policyholder with an invoice dated five days after the AOB was signed. However, the court determined that a post-dated, unsigned invoice did not comply with the requirement that the AOB contain a per-unit cost estimate of the services to be performed and was, therefore, invalid.

In one of the first appellate rulings on this aspect, the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Kidwell has paved the way for other jurisdictions to reach the same decisive conclusion. It is the intent of the legislature that Statute 627.7152 will prevent assignees from potentially deceiving policyholders and insurance carriers by seeking reimbursement for inflated estimates and unnecessary repairs. The Kidwell decision’s strict enforcement of the statue will hold entities to account for their duplicitous tactics.

In an effort to get around the statute, Kidwell and other entities have argued that 627.7152 should not be applied retroactively to any claims on insurance policies issued prior to July 1, 2019, the effective date of the statute. However, the Second District Court of Appeal recently rejected that argument when it issued its opinion in The Kidwell Group, LLC d/b/a Air Quality Assessors of Florida a/a/o Robert and Maureen Mucciaccio v. American Integrity Insurance Company of Florida, 347 So.3d 501 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept. 16, 2022). There, the court found that the assignee has no rights to an insured claim until it executes a valid AOB with the policyholder. Therefore, the law in effect on the date the parties executed the AOB controls, not the law in effect when the insurance policy was issued. As a result, the court held that Florida Statute 627.7152 applied to Kidwell’s AOB as it was executed after the statute’s July 1, 2019, effective date.

As is clear from both of the recent Kidwell cases, the trend is to hold the assignee accountable and ensure they are providing reasonable services at reasonable costs. Strict compliance with Florida Statute §627.7152 for any AOB executed after July 1, 2019, will be required.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.