.

Defense Digest

Dealing With Snow in Summer

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025

September 1, 2025

by Steven M. Sess

Key Points:

  • Landlords should ensure that their leases are clear regarding who has the responsibility for snow and ice removal. 
  • If a lease is ambiguous, the landlord could face liability should a slip and fall occur due to slippery conditions caused by snow and ice. 
  • The lease should indicate who has the responsibility for snow and ice removal, as well as specifically state what areas that responsibility applies to. 

When most people think about summer, thoughts of taking a trip to the beach, heading to the nearest amusement park, or cooking burgers on the grill likely come to mind. But if you are a landlord, you should take some time in the summer to prepare for the snow. Snow brings with it the potential for slippery conditions that could cause a slip and fall which could ultimately lead to being sued. Many landlords may feel that they do not need to be concerned about snow and ice because they believe that their leases address the responsibility for snow and ice removal, but that may not be the case if a lease does not sufficiently place this responsibility on the tenant. Here are some “blasts” of ice and snow from the past that illustrate this point and provide some present-day, summer guidance for landlords.

In Stuski v. Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Development, 162 A.3d 1196 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed premises liability in the context of a slip-and-fall incident, holding that a property owner leasing to the City was not liable because the lease clearly assigned maintenance duties, including snow and ice removal, to the tenant. The plaintiff, a City worker, slipped and fell in the parking lot where he parked his car. He brought a negligence action against the property owner, who was leasing the property to the City, which included the parking lot where the plaintiff fell. 

Pivotal to the landlord’s success was the fact the lease was clear regarding the duties of both parties. The lease clearly put the responsibility for snow and ice removal on the City and was specific as to the locations where the City was responsible for snow and ice removal. The lease was supported by email communications in which the City acknowledged that it would be responsible for snow and ice removal. There was also deposition testimony that only City workers were ever observed removing snow from the parking lot.

In deciding the case, the court noted that liability is not premised merely on ownership but, rather, on possession and control. When an owner leases out parts of a building, the landlord is responsible for those areas not specifically leased or in absence of a contrary provision in the lease. The court determined that the lease was clear regarding the City’s duty to remove snow and ice from the parking lot and that the property owner could not be held liable for the fall. 

The key for landlords is to make sure that their leases are not ambiguous regarding who is responsible for snow removal. For example, in Eisbacher v. Maytag Corporation, 2017 WL 947606 (Pa. Super. Mar. 9, 2017), the court determined there was a genuine question regarding who controlled an area and, therefore, who was responsible for the removal of snow and ice that caused an injury. 

The lease in Eisbacher made the landlord responsible for snow removal of the common areas, parking areas, loading areas, and roadways. A drawing was included in the lease that indicated what areas of the property were considered common areas. There was also a contract with a snow removal service. The incident in question involved a trailer drop lot, which was not indicated as a common area in the drawing that was included with the lease. The tenant of the property had the ability to move trailers in the drop lot. 

The court determined that it was unclear who had the authority to request that the snow removal company come to the property to plow. Since the lease was not clear on who had control of the drop lot and the responsibility for ensuring snow and ice were removed from that lot, the court determined that it was ultimately up to the jury to determine who had control over the drop lot; therefore, neither the landlord nor the tenant could escape potential liability. 

In Schouppe v. Upright, 2019 WL 6701763 (Pa. Super. Dec. 9, 2019), the court again addressed whether a lease was ambiguous regarding who had the responsibility for snow and ice removal. Therein, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a patch of snow and ice on land that was leased to a post office. The lease provided a detailed list of the areas that the post office agreed to furnish and pay for snow removal. The lease made the landlord responsible for snow removal for the roof, as well as maintenance and repair of all common areas. The plaintiff claimed that the lease could not be used to shield the landlord from liability because the landlord had the responsibility for maintenance and repair of the area where the fall occurred. 

The court determined that the lease was clear regarding the post office’s responsibility for snow and ice removal where the fall occurred. While the landlord had the responsibility for repairs, there was not a dangerous condition prior to the post office’s taking possession of the property. Once again, the clarity of the lease prevented the landlord from being liable for an injury caused by snow and ice when the tenant was responsible for their removal. 

A lease is an important document that should provide both parties with a clear picture of their rights and responsibilities. If the intent of the lease is for the tenant to be responsible for the removal of snow and ice, the lease should clearly indicate that. Thus, should an accident occur due to the tenant’s negligence in failing to properly remove the snow and ice, the landlord will not face potential liability due to ambiguity in the lease. 

While dealing with snow in the summer may not be the first thing a landlord may think about, it could prevent issues when the snow falls in the winter. 

Steven is a member of our Casualty Department. He can be reached at (717) 651-3527 or SMSess@mdwcg.com. 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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