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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

DE Supreme Court affirms Board’s decision that the claimant failed to meet his burden to prove he sustained a permanent impairment to the cervical spine that was causally related to an accepted work accident.

Shipmon v. State of Delaware, (No. 261, 2021 - Decided Apr. 1, 2022)

May 1, 2022

by Benjamin K. Durstein

On August 3, 2017, Mr. Shipmon sustained compensable injuries when he fell off a stool while employed as a constable at Delaware Technical Community College. He later filed a DACD petition that alleged that he sustained a 22% permanent impairment to the cervical spine as a result of the work accident, based on the opinions of Dr. Stephen Rodgers. In defense, the employer relied on the opinions of Dr. Stephen Fedder, who testified that Mr. Shipmon did not sustain any permanent impairment as a result of the work accident.

Following a hearing, the Industrial Accident Board issued a decision that concluded the claimant failed to meet his burden to prove that he sustained a permanent impairment of his neck. The Board reasoned that Dr. Rodgers’ opinion was not credible or consistent with the claimant’s actual level of function for several reasons, including that Dr. Rodgers did not review the only post-accident MRI study; the doctor refused to consider any apportionment of permanency to acknowledged preexisting issues without a legitimate rationale; Mr. Shipmon’s own testimony regarding his function was inconsistent with such a high rating; and Dr. Rodgers testified he would not provide a lower permanency rating even if he learned that the claimant was doing “cartwheels and handstands.”

Importantly, the Board suggested that, although it did not believe the claimant qualified for a zero percent rating (consistent with the opinion of the employer’s expert, Dr. Fedder), it would not award permanency benefits because Dr. Rodgers’ testimony failed to carry the burden to prove his 22% rating. The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision, and that judgment was appealed again to the Delaware Supreme Court.

On appeal, the claimant’s primary contention was that the Board erred as a matter of law when it declined to award him permanent impairment benefits while simultaneously finding that he “suffered permanent limited function.” The Supreme Court rejected the claimant’s argument that the Board is permitted to unilaterally assign a specific degree of permanent partial impairment in the absence of any supporting evidence. The court explained that the Board “should not . . . make a determination that a permanent partial impairment is of a certain degree when there is no evidence in the record to support that finding.” The court further determined that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.
 

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.