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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Court reverses Appeal Board ruling on an entitlement to reinstate benefits as of date claimant returned LIBC-760 form to employer, as benefits were in suspension status because of a judge’s prior decision, not for claimant’s failure to return the form.

Kenneth P. Marinack v. City of Pittsburgh (WCAB), et al.; No. 1161 C.D. 2022, No. 1163 C.D. 2022; filed July 12, 2024; Judge McCullough

August 1, 2024

by Francis X. Wickersham

This case involves multiple intertwined rounds of litigation. The claimant was a firefighter who sustained injuries in May 2004, when he fell in a stairwell while pulling down a ceiling in a burning building. The employer issued a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP) for a left shoulder rotator cuff tear and aggravation of degenerative disc disease in the low back. 

In 2008, the employer filed a petition to suspend benefits as of September 16, 2008, alleging the claimant had retired and voluntarily removed himself from the workforce. The petition was granted by the workers’ compensation judge, but the Appeal Board reversed on appeal, concluding that evidence showed the employer had fired the claimant. 

The Commonwealth Court affirmed, and the employer filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. That court had just decided the case of City of Pittsburgh v. WCAB (Robinson II), 67 A.3d 1194 (Pa. 2013), which established a new framework for voluntary withdrawal from the workforce cases. Based on that decision, the case was ultimately remanded to the workers’ compensation judge to make findings regarding the claimant’s separation from the workforce. This time, the judge dismissed the suspension petition, and the Board affirmed, as did the Commonwealth Court.

Meanwhile, in 2010, the employer filed another suspension petition, alleging the claimant had been self-employed as a handyman since his injury. The claimant also filed a review petition, alleging an incorrect description of injury and seeking to add the neck from a 2009 motor vehicle accident that caused “increased” neck problems and increased back problems, leading to low back surgery. 

In litigation before the judge, the employer offered forms LIBC-750 and 760 completed by the claimant. LIBC forms from January 2011 reflected earnings from May to December 2009, but forms thereafter were inconsistent as to earnings during this period. Although the claimant testified that he did not work after December 2009, financial records introduced by the employer suggested otherwise, and the judge suspended the claimant’s benefits as of June 2009. According to the judge, a suspension of benefits was fully justified as the claimant was not credible as to providing information regarding his self-employment, as directed by the judge. The judge also dismissed the claimant’s review petition, finding the evidence insufficient and noting that a report from low back surgery performed in March of 2011 did not address causation. The decision was affirmed on appeal to the Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court.

Then, in 2016, the claimant filed a reinstatement petition, alleging a worsening of his condition as of March 17, 2011, the date he underwent low back surgery. At a hearing before the judge in connection with this petition, the claimant gave employer’s counsel a completed LIBC-760 form dated June 22, 2018, indicating that he was not currently employed or self-employed and had been self-employed from May 1, 2009, to December 1, 2009. The judge denied claimant’s reinstatement petition on the basis that it had already been addressed by the judge in the prior decision and was, therefore, barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. However, the judge also found that the claimant met the requirement of reporting information, via the LIBC-760 form presented to employer’s counsel at the hearing, as of November 20, 2018. The Board affirmed the decision on appeal. However, it remanded the case to the judge for findings as to whether benefits should be reinstated as of November 20, 2018, based on the claimant’s production of the LIBC-760 form on that date. On remand, the judge ordered the reinstatement. The Board affirmed on appeal. 

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board relative to the claimant’s request for reinstatement of benefits as of March 17, 2011, agreeing that res judicata barred his claim. According to the court, the claimant was well aware of the worsening of his low back injury during the prior proceeding and, therefore, should have litigated it during that time. However, the court reversed the Board’s decision reinstating the claimant’s benefits on the date that the LIBC-760 form was returned. The court noted that in the most recent round of litigation, the claimant never asserted that his benefits should be reinstated because he returned the LIBC form, and he never argued that the return of the form cured the suspension. According to the court, in the prior case, the judge found that a suspension of benefits was justified because he did not think the claimant was telling the truth about his earnings during the relevant period, and the return of the form nine years later, with the same information previously rejected by the judge, did not cure anything. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 8, August 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.