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Defense Digest

Court Affirms Strong Liability Protections for Rideshare Companies Under Florida Law

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Sophia E. D. Philor

Key Points:

  • Florida law treats rideshare drivers as independent contractors when statutory conditions are met.
  • The law in effect on the date of the accident controls liability analysis. 
  • Isolated complaints and traffic citations are generally insufficient to prove negligent hiring. 

A Florida appellate court recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lyft, highlighting the liability protections available to rideshare companies under Florida’s Transportation Network Company statute. In Abner v. Lyft Florida, Inc., 422 So.3d 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, held that Lyft could not be held liable for injuries caused by one of its drivers, rejecting claims for both vicarious liability and negligent hiring and retention.

The case arose from an accident on July 5, 2017, where a Lyft driver collided with a motorcyclist, causing serious injuries. At the time, the driver was providing a prearranged ride through Lyft’s digital platform. The injured motorcyclist’s guardian sued both the driver and Lyft. While claims against the driver were settled, the claims against Lyft continued.

The plaintiff argued Lyft was responsible in two ways: the driver was acting as Lyft’s employee or agent at the time of the accident, and that it was negligent in hiring and retaining the driver. Lyft moved for summary judgment, relying on Florida’s Transportation Network Company statute, section 627.748, Florida Statutes (2017), which had taken effect just days before the crash.

The plaintiff argued the statute should not apply because the driver had been approved to drive for Lyft before it went into effect. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Florida law applies the statute in effect when the cause of action accrues. In negligence cases, that is the date of the accident. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sheffield, 266 So. 3d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Since the accident occurred after the statute became effective, the statute governed the claims against Lyft.

Under section 627.748(9), a rideshare driver is considered an independent contractor, not an employee, if certain conditions are met. These conditions include allowing drivers to set their own hours, permitting work on competing rideshare platforms, not restricting other business or employment, and confirming independent contractor status in writing. Lyft presented evidence that these conditions were satisfied, including the driver agreement and testimony from its corporate representative.

The plaintiff argued that the driver did not qualify as an independent contractor because the agreement allegedly limited other work. The court disagreed, finding that the agreement only limited the driver’s activities while actively providing rides through the Lyft platform. Outside of those times, the driver remained free to pursue other employment or business activities. The agreement explicitly confirmed the driver’s discretion to work or not work. The court noted this is consistent with prior Florida cases recognizing rideshare drivers as independent contractors. McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225-226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

Since the driver qualified as an independent contractor, Lyft could not be held vicariously liable for the driver’s alleged negligence. Florida law generally holds that companies are not responsible for the negligent acts of independent contractors when they do not control how the work is performed. Stander v. Dispoz-O-Prods., Inc., 973 So. 2d 603, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

The plaintiff also claimed Lyft was directly liable for negligent hiring and retention, citing a speeding citation, a reckless driving citation, and two negative passenger complaints. The court found this evidence insufficient. Under the statute, disqualification is triggered by certain criminal convictions, and not merely by citations. The driver’s reckless driving incident was only a citation, and a single moving violation did not meet the statutory threshold for disqualification. The passenger complaints were similarly inadequate: one was a vague two-star review with no explanation, and the other involved a single passenger reporting unsafe driving. Given the hundreds of rides the driver had safely completed, the court considered this evidence isolated and minimal.

The limited evidence led the court declining to broadly define negligent hiring claims against transportation network companies. Instead, it resolved the case narrowly, emphasizing judicial restraint. The court explained that if evidence is insufficient to survive a directed verdict at trial, it cannot survive summary judgment. CG Tides LLC v. SHEDDF3 VNB, LLC, 388 So. 3d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021).

For insurance professionals, Abner v. Lyft Florida, Inc. reinforces the protections Florida law provides to transportation network companies. It highlights the importance of applying the law in effect on the date of loss, confirming independent contractor status, and assessing the sufficiency of evidence for negligent hiring claims. It also demonstrates how Florida’s summary judgment standard can resolve weak claims early, reducing exposure and defense costs. The appellate court ultimately affirmed summary judgment in Lyft’s favor.

Sophia works in our Fort Lauderdale, FL office. She can be reached at (954) 233-3026 or SEPhilor@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.