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Commonwealth Court Rules the Security Fund Is Not Subject to Attorney‑Fee Assessments

Randall E. Parrish v. Yeager Supply, Inc. (WCAB); No. 443 C.D. 2024; filed February 5, 2026; by Judge Cohn Jubelirer

March 1, 2026

by Francis X. Wickersham

In this case, the claimant and employer settled a 1998 work injury by Compromise and Release agreement. The employer agreed as part of the settlement, they would continue to pay for future medical treatment. Later, the employer filed a request for utilization review as to the  chiropractic treatment the claimant received. The treatment was found to be partially reasonable and necessary. The claimant then filed a UR petition, challenging the UR determination.

The Security Fund indicated at the first hearing on the petition that they were the entity involved in the matter, and asserted that since it is not an insurer as defined by the Act, it is not subject to an assessment of attorney’s fees under the case of Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania), 266 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2021). The WCJ granted the petition and concluded that although the employer’s contest was reasonable, an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate under the humanitarian purposes of the Act. The employer was ordered to pay claimant’s counsel an attorney’s fee, pursuant to Lorino. The Fund filed an appeal with the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which reversed the WCJ as to the Lorino fees award. The claimant then appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the board, stating that when an employer has established a reasonable basis for contest, the language of Section 440 of the Act gives the WCJ discretion to refuse an award of attorney’s fees that are otherwise discretionary. The court also said that the Fund is not an “insurer” under Section 440(a) of the Act and therefore cannot be assessed with attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the court held that the WCJ had no authority to order such an award against the Fund, regardless of the reasonableness of employer’s contest.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.