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Legal Updates for New Jersey Public Entity & Civil Rights

Attorney General Role Limited to Cases Alleging Tortious Damages

Legal Updates for New Jersey Public Entity & Civil Rights, December 10, 2024

December 10, 2024

In Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office v. Office of the Atty General, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the Office of the Attorney General’s (OAG) denial of the petitioner’s request for representation in a legal action in lieu of prerogative writs filed by a retired deputy police chief. The Superior Court found the respondent’s duty to defend arose from the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA) as he was only charged with defending a state employee to the extent required under N.J.S.A. § 59:10A-1. The TCA mandates a defense only in tort actions seeking damages, and the respondent had discretionary authority in other cases. In this case, the former police chief’s claim did not seek tort damages; therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the OAG’s discretionary denial of the petitioner’s request for representation.

The petitioner, Township of Marlboro Police Department, received a complaint regarding its Deputy Police Chief, Frederick Reck. As mandated by the Internal Affairs Policies and Procedures (“IAPP”) and the Attorney General’s directive, the petitioner initiated an internal investigation into the allegations, and two were sustained against Reck. He then elected to retire in lieu of proceeding through a disciplinary hearing.

Reck’s written agreement memorializing retirement included a provision whereby he retained the right to challenge findings made by the petitioner relating to the investigation. In June of 2023, Reck’s counsel requested a copy of the formal procedures by which he could challenge the report and a copy of the petitioner’s complete investigation report. The petitioner responded that Reck was precluded from challenging its findings through the administrative process post-retirement pursuant to Section I.E. of Directive 2019-6.

Reck then filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, against the petitioner, requesting de novo review of the findings in the report. Specifically, he alleged the petitioner improperly sustained two allegations charged against him and that the petitioner never identified the particular administrative process by which he could challenge the findings of the report as demanded.

The petitioner forwarded a copy of Reck’s complaint to the OAG with a letter requesting representation in accordance with Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001). The OAG denied the petitioner’s request for representation, positing the duty only obligates the OAG to provide defense and indemnification to employees when they are being sued in civil actions seeking damages for conduct that is tortious and/or violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As a result of Reck’s complaint, self-titled as an action in lieu of prerogative writs, sought only non-statutory equitable remedies and did not assert any claims for monetary damages, the OAG determined it was not required to provide a defense.

The Appellate Division found the OAG is only charged with defending a state employee to the extent required under N.J.S.A. § 59:10A-1, which provides that “the Attorney General shall, upon a request of an employee or former employee of the State, provide for the defense of any action brought against such State employee or former State employee on account of an act or omission in the scope of his employment.” However, the court found the OAG’s duty to defend solely arises from the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. § 59:1-1 to -12-3. The legislative mandate only applies in the context of civil actions seeking damages for tortious conduct. Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 431 (1999). 

It’s important to be aware that the decision to represent an employee in any action not arising under the TCA falls within the discretion of the OAG. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 59:10A-3 is characterized as “a catch-all” provision which permits the OAG to “cover actions not arising under the [TCA], including civil actions not seeking damages, as well as criminal actions.” However, the OAG is only charged with defending a state employee to the extent required under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1. See Helduser v. Kimmelman, 191 N.J. Super. 493, 508 (App. Div. 1983) (emphasis added). As such, the OAG is not mandated to defend in cases other than those which fall under the TCA. 

As the action in lieu of prerogative writs did not seek damages for tortious conduct, the Appellate Division affirmed the OAG’s discretionary denial of the petitioner’s request for representation. 


 

Legal Updates for New Jersey Public Entity & Civil Rights, December 10, 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.