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Legal Updates for New Jersey Public Entity & Civil Rights

Appellate Division Rejects Plaintiff’s Extraordinary Circumstances Explanation under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act

Presented by the Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group

January 6, 2021

by Matthew J. Behr

In Anthony v. Newark Housing Authority, A-1618-19T2 (December 31, 2020), the plaintiff was walking within a Newark Housing Authority complex when she tripped, fell and broke her leg. For five months she was unable to work, drive and could not “complete basic tasks of living.”            

Five months after the incident, she consulted an attorney who advised her she could not help her because of “some 90-day rule,” as explained by the plaintiff to the court. Months later, she consulted another attorney, who filed a motion for leave to file late notice of a tort claim pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). The motion was filed ten months after the plaintiff broke her leg. In support of the motion, the plaintiff and her daughter submitted certifications asserting the plaintiff could not work, drive or perform basic tasks of living following surgery. The trial judge granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had established extraordinary circumstances. The defendant appealed that finding.           

The Appellate Division reversed and analyzed the reasons set forth by the plaintiff to determine if she had satisfied the burden to show extraordinary circumstances as to why she did not file a tort claims notice within 90 days of the incident pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9. The court must undertake a case-by-case analysis to determine if the injuries were severe and debilitating enough to have a consequential impact on the ability of a claimant to file a notice of claim. D.D. v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 213 N.J. 130 (2013).            

In reversing, the Appellate Division found that a broken leg did not constitute extraordinary circumstances. The plaintiff did not provide any information as to how the injury prevented her from working or what basic task of living she was unable to perform. The plaintiff did not provide to the court any information that she was physically or psychologically unable to seek legal advice within the 90 days. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to submit any medical evidence that she lacked the mental capacity to consult an attorney.

The TCA is a powerful defense for public entities and public employees; in particular, the requirement of a claimant to file within 90 day of an incident. It is important to consult an attorney regarding all available defenses under the TCA if your public entity or your public employee has been sued. Please do not hesitate to contact me to discuss any issue under the TCA. I can be reached at 856-414-6048 or you can email me any question at mjbehr@mdwcg.com.

 

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.