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Case Law Alerts

Anger, Guns and Squirrels Create Problems Begetting Problems - En Banc Pennsylvania Superior Clarifies Collateral Estoppel Effect of Criminal Conviction

Rogers v. Thomas, --- A.3d ---, 2023 PA Super 31, 2023 WL 2319342 (Mar. 2, 2023) (en banc)

April 1, 2023

by Shane Haselbarth

Lloyd Thomas, who had some history of mental instability, was to watch his father’s property, which included a small gun shop. The property is in a rather remote part of Susquehanna County (even Google Maps can’t find the address listed in the court’s opinion). Noticing squirrels disturbing the birdfeeder, which Thomas had previously installed for his father, he decided to shoot (at) them with a pistol. At the same time, Joshua Rogers was driving near the home. A bullet hit Rogers’ car, sending things downhill from there.

Rather than contact police, Rogers—who was prohibited from having access to a firearm—armed himself and went with a friend to Thomas’s father’s home. The duo parked the car so as to block the sole drive up to the house. They then split up to approach the house from either side via the woods. Thomas saw them and armed himself. Rogers “shoved a shotgun in [Thomas’s] face,” whereupon Thomas shot him twice. Rogers’ friend came from the gun shop wielding a shotgun and “showed no fear” as he walked directly toward Thomas. Thomas therefore shot the friend also. Both Rogers and the friend died, and Thomas was convicted of voluntary manslaughter at a trial.

In the civil suit by Rogers’ estate for wrongful death, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s partial summary judgment motion, holding the conviction barred Thomas from re-litigating his intent in shooting Rogers. However, the summary judgment did not establish Thomas’s “liability,” and so the question of Rogers’ comparative negligence was tried. The jury found Rogers “100% comparatively negligent,” and judgment was entered for Thomas.

Conducting a scholarly review of the jurisprudence governing admission of issues in civil trials that were litigated in criminal trials, the en banc Superior Court concluded that the criminal conviction established, conclusively, that Thomas (a) intentionally killed Rogers and (b) labored under no reasonable belief that it was necessary. However, “it did not conclusively establish that he was liable for civil damages,” which can only be “awarded after establishing causation,” including comparative negligence. Even if the criminal conviction conclusively established duty and breach—that is, negligence per se—it did not establish all the elements of a tort claim for negligence, which includes causation. The issue of causation for both Thomas and Rogers was properly submitted to the jury, and its finding of more-than-50% comparative negligence was affirmed.
 
Be not dismayed, you who are retained to represent civil defendants with a criminal conviction for the very incident giving rise to the civil case. The conclusive effect of the conviction may not cover all the elements of the tort claim, thus, leaving a path to victory open to you. 
 

Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.