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Defense Digest

Adequate Notice Requires More Than the Delivery of a Policy

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

Key Points:

  • Supreme Court of Idaho on December 31, 2024, reversed and remanded district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of builder who asserted negligence claims against its insurance company and sought damages for the insurance agent’s failure to include the real property at issue in renewal of insurance policy. 
  • In BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2024 WL 5250025 (Idaho 2024), court held, once coverage is procured, an agent can be deemed to be acting as an agent of the insurer when the agent promises to renew a policy, and that something more than the delivery of an insurance policy is required to satisfy notice of policy change. 

A recent decision from the Supreme Court of Idaho on December 31, 2024, reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a builder who asserted negligence claims against its insurance company and sought damages for the insurance agent’s failure to include the real property at issue in the renewal of the insurance policy. 

In BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2024 WL 5250025 (Idaho 2024), BrunoBuilt asserted claims against various parties following the reactivation of a landslide that damaged the Dempsey home. The Dempseys had entered into a construction contract with BrunoBuilt in 2014 for the construction of a residence on property located on a pre-existing landslide. In February of 2016, BrunoBuilt’s civil and geotechnical engineering expert observed the landslide had reactivated. BrunoBuilt continued working on the construction of the home that was mostly complete. The landslide eventually indicated earth movement and became visible on the Dempsey property. No certificate of occupancy was issued for the residence. BrunoBuilt then initiated the underlying lawsuit. 

Prior to the litigation, BrunoBuilt contracted with Randy Richardson of Richardson Insurance Services to advise on available insurance coverage and obtained a “Tailored Protection Policy” that included builders’ risk coverage, which covered “direct physical loss or damage caused by a covered peril to ‘buildings or structures’ or while in the course of construction, erection or fabrication.” The Dempsey project was added to the policy in August of 2015. At that time, the policy contained a coverage exclusion for loss resulting from landslide. The exclusion did not specify the type of landslide that was excluded. Prior to the renewal date in 2016, the agent sent an email to BrunoBuilt inquiring into whether the Dempsey home would be completed and was informed the job would likely be done by the end of March. The agent did not include the Dempsey property in the 2016 renewal, which revised the exclusion for damage resulting from landslides and provided that damage from both naturally-occurring landslides and landslides caused by human activity were excluded from coverage.

Damage to the Dempsey property from the landslide became noticeable between April and June of 2016. BrunoBuilt and Richardson filed a claim with Auto-Owners. Auto-Owners then informed BrunoBuilt that Randy Richardson deleted the Dempsey property from the renewal. BrunoBuilt claimed that was the first time they were informed that the property was not included in the 2016 renewal, and they requested that coverage be reinstated. Auto-Owners declined and closed BrunoBuilt’s claim. 

BrunoBuilt sued Richardson and Auto-Owners, asserting Randy Richardson was negligent and Auto-Owners was liable for Richardson’s negligence based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. BrunoBuilt alleged Richardson was negligent in that he failed to properly advise BrunoBuilt regarding the existence, cost, and need for landslide coverage and that he failed to include the Dempsey property in the 2016 renewal. 

The Idaho Supreme Court considered the district court’s granting of Auto-Owners’ motion for summary judgment that dismissed the claims because Richardson was not acting as Auto-Owners’ agent and Auto-Owners did not provide coverage for landslides. BrunoBuilt argued on appeal that the district court’s decision dismissing the failure-to-renew claim was erroneous because the motion only sought summary judgment on the claim related to the alleged failure to procure landslide coverage. In deciding and reviewing the district court’s decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether Richardson could have been acting as an agent of Auto-Owners for purposes of the failure-to-renew claim. In doing so, the court reviewed the holding in Bales v. General Insurance Company of America, 53 Idaho 327, 24 P.2d 57 (1933), which stated that an insurance company was an agent at the time the insurance broker failed to renew the policy. Therefore, the Idado Supreme Court held that the Bales cases suggests that once coverage is procured, an agent can be deemed to be acting as an agent of the insurer when the agent promises to renew a policy.

The court then identified “the generally accepted legal principle that, if insurers fail to provide notice of a reduction in coverage upon renewal, then coverage under the preexisting policy continues.” BrunoBuilt, Inc., 2024 WL 5250025, *8 citing, Thomas v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 804, 807 (Mont. 1998) (“[W]hen an insurer renews a previously issued policy, it has an affirmative duty to provide adequate notice to the insured of changes in coverage.”); D. C. Barrett, Annotation, Insurance company as bound by greater coverage in earlier policy where renewal policy is issued without calling to insured’s attention a reduction the policy coverage, 91 A.L.R.2d 546 § 3 (2024 update) (“The general rule is that an insurance company is bound by the greater coverage in an earlier policy where the renewal policy is issued without calling to the insured’s attention a reduction in the policy coverage.”). In their consideration, the court relied on Idaho Code Section 41-1842(5), which requires an insurer to notify a named insured of, among other things, reductions in limits or reductions in coverages. In doing so, they found that statute applied to the policy at issue here. 

The court then turned to the policies to determine whether there was a change in policy and, in doing so, applied the well-established rules of interpreting insurance contracts. The court found the policies were ambiguous as to the interpretation of landslide and looked to other courts that interpreted similar policy language to only exclude coverage for naturally occurring landslides. It, therefore, concluded that the 2016 policy reduced the coverage available for landslides by excluding human-caused landslides. 

In determining whether notice was provided, the Idaho Supreme Court found there was a requirement for something more than the delivery of an insurance policy and held, “it is a broadly accepted rule that insurers must provide adequate notice of changes in coverage to insureds in the context of a renewal because the law does not impose a duty on the insured to scour a renewal policy for changes absent notice from the insurer… .” As Auto-Owners only mailed a copy of the policy, the court held it did not fulfill the written requirement notice and the coverage provided in the 2015 policy remained in effect until 30 days after notice was given or BrunoBuilt obtained replacement coverage. 

This case demonstrates that insurance agents in Idaho can be deemed to be acting as an agent of the insurer when the agent promises to renew a policy. Further, this case sets forth the written notice requirement that can come into play that requires insurers to take additional steps above and beyond mailing a copy of the policy when there is a change in coverage in the context of a renewal. 

 



 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.