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Defense Digest

A Royal Assignment [of Benefits]: Ramifications for Insurers in the First-Party Property Context

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by James H. Cole

Key Points:

  • This summer, a federal court in Pennsylvania, on two separate occasions, permitted an insured to assign a bad faith claim to a vendor seeking payment for services on their property.

  • Until now, Pennsylvania courts had not previously permitted the assignment of extra-contractual tort claims, such as bad faith, in the first-party property context.

  • These recent decisions may have costly ramifications for insurers and have the potential to profoundly change the first-party property landscape in Pennsylvania.

With recent decisions in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, insurers must be braced for bad faith claims brought by their insured’s vendors. For the past 25 years, with the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute has allowed insureds to bring lawsuits against their insurance companies for improper first-party claims handling, with the primary purpose being to hold insurers accountable for good faith and fair dealing towards their insureds. See, generally, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371; see also Charter Oak Insurance Co. v. Maglio Fresh Food, 45 F.Supp.3d 461 (E.D. Pa. 2014).

Prior to the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, bad faith actions existed only under common law, and only in the third-party context, wherein an insured could sue their liability carrier for a bad faith refusal to settle a lawsuit against the insured within the policy limits, exposing him to an excess verdict. In the third-party/excess verdict context, courts have held assignments of bad faith claims, post-judgment, to be valid. See, e.g., Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 223 A.2d 8 (Pa. 1966); Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Wolfe, 105 A.3d 1181, 1188 (Pa. 2014) (carving out scenarios in which bad faith claims may be assigned by insureds).

A concept rooted in contract law, an assignment is the signing over of a claim by one party to the contract to a non-party. This has been found acceptable in the first-party insurance context when an insured assigns benefits for services rendered, such as to a physician in a PIP claim or to a mitigation vendor in a property claim, but courts stopped short of extending this concept to the assignment of extra-contractual tort claims such as bad faith.

Some states, such as Florida, have allowed vendors to secure post-loss assignments, not only for services rendered, but for extra-contractual damages such as attorney’s fees and bad faith in the first-party context, leading to what may be described as an insurance crisis. It has been widely reasoned that lawsuits involving the assignment of benefits have increased between 2004–2018. See Bethan Moorcraft, AOB Abuse in Florida Rises 70% in 15 Years, Insurance Business Mag., Mar. 28, 2019, https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/aob-abuse-in-florida-rises-70-in-15-years-163448.asp. Mostly due to the assignment of benefits, Florida is responsible for 76% of lawsuits filed against insurance companies in the United States, although the state itself only accounts for 8% of the population. David Altmaier, Florida OIR Report, Insurance Journal, Apr. 2, 2021, https://www.insurancejournal.com/app/ uploads/2021/04/Florida-OIR-Report.pdf.

In Pennsylvania, however, courts had not allowed the assignment of a bad faith claim outside the narrow third-party/excess verdict context. For example, in a case in which a disbarred attorney sought assignment of his client’s underinsured motorist-turned-bad faith claim, the Third Circuit specifically held that under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, bad faith claims can only be assigned to an injured plaintiff and judgment creditor. See Feingold v. Palmer & Barr, 831 F. App'x 608, 609 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that bad faith claims may be assigned by statutory permission, but are not “freely assignable”). Feingold reaffirmed Wolfe’s interpretation that, in the first-party property context, an insured may assign his bad faith claim only to a judgment creditor who has been injured.

On June 29, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an opinion which royally changes the Commonwealth’s interpretation of first-party property bad faith claims. In Royal Water Damage Restoration, Inc. a/a/o 1133 Columbia LLC v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., WL 2345740 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2022), the court decided that an insured’s water mitigation vendor has standing to bring a bad faith claim against the insurer—not on behalf of the insured, but directly as an injured party. Simply stated, the court has ruled, contrary to the precedent set in Wolfe and reconfirmed in Feingold, that an insured’s vendor—who is not a party to the insurance contract between the carrier and its insured—may pursue an extra-contractual claim under the Pennsylvania bad faith statute against the carrier.

On July 28, 2022, in another case involving Royal Water Damage Restoration, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania again permitted a third party’s standing to pursue a bad faith claim against an insurer. See Royal Water Damage Restoration, Inc. a/a/o Janet Thorn v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Co., WL 2985637 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2022). More pointedly, in this case, the court based its finding on the mere potential that a vendor “could potentially be” a judgment creditor, even if the property owner/named insured is the only party actually injured. It can be argued, however, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern who is permitted to bring a lawsuit, have not and were not meant to be bent for the sake of convenience. A plethora of case law since the enactment of the Federal Rules has held that a plaintiff must establish standing in order to bring any claim in suit, bad faith or otherwise. Allowing a party who has not sustained any actual injury to bring a claim for bad faith may circumvent the purpose of the federal rule on standing.

More concernedly, allowing insureds to assign their bad faith claims to vendors seeking payment for services on their property could open a floodgate of litigation directly against carriers who issue insurance policies with the specific understanding that the named insureds are the only parties to whom they owe any duties or obligations. A vendor that performs repair work on the insured property is neither an injured party nor a judgment creditor, particularly if no judgment has been rendered by a court. Widening the class of first-party bad faith plaintiffs to include vendors of insureds has the potential to significantly increase premiums.

Allowing any repair contractor—who is not a party to the contract and who was not considered in the underwriting process—to pursue a bad faith claim has the potential to profoundly change the first party property landscape in Pennsylvania. With the recent Royal Water decisions contorting Pennsylvania’s understanding of the bad faith statute, insurers should wait with bated breath for a case to reach the Third Circuit or Pennsylvania appellate courts to decide whether Pennsylvania will follow Florida down the assignment-of-benefits rabbit hole.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.