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Suzanne M. Utke

Portrait of Suzanne M. Utke

Suzanne defends physicians, nurses, and all manner of health care professionals and corporate health care facilities against medical and psychiatric malpractice claims and lawsuits. She also focuses her practice on the defense of behavioral health claims and claims involving medical devices and associated liability. In addition, she represents physicians and physician practice groups in negotiation with health care systems for employment matters and mergers. Suzanne has also handled cases involving peer and credentialing reviews and State Board investigations. 

Prior to earning her law degree, Suzanne was a Critical Care Nurse working in clinical settings at some of Philadelphia’s most prestigious medical hospitals. She also was a Nursing Administrator for several years, tenured in area hospitals’ Intensive Care Units, Emergency Rooms and Obstetric Departments. Suzanne maintains her Nursing license in Pennsylvania and is an active volunteer for the local medical community. 

An experienced trial attorney, Suzanne draws from her Nursing background and institutional knowledge of health care systems and operations to guide clients in managing litigation efforts. She has an intimate understanding of the unique issues involved in defending medical professional liability claims and leverages this knowledge to achieve successful results. 

Suzanne is rated AV-Preeminent by Martindale-Hubbell, the highest rating for an attorney’s professional and ethical competence. Among her numerous professional affiliations, she is a member of the New Jersey Trial Attorneys Association, Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel, Society of Healthcare Risk Managers (Philadelphia chapter), Defense Research Institute (Medical Liability & Health Care Law, and Drug and Medical Device Committees), and the National Association of Professional Women.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D.)
    • Saint Joseph's University (MHA)
    • Widener University School of Nursing (BSN)
    • Thomas Jefferson University College of Nursing (RN)
    • New Jersey
    • Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 5th Circuit
    • Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • Cambridge Who’s Who Among Executive and Professional Women in Nursing Healthcare
    • National Academy of Jurisprudence – Premier 100
    • National Association of Excellence in Jurisprudence: Top 100 - Judicial Appointment – Pennsylvania
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • American Association of Critical Care Nurses
    • Defense Research Institute, member, Medical Liability and Health Care Law, Drug and Medical Device Committees
    • National Association of Female Professionals
    • National Association of Professional Women
    • New Jersey Trial Attorneys Association
    • Philadelphia Area Society of Healthcare Risk Managers
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Trucking Industry Defense Association
    • Medical Legal Issues for Physicians Assistants, Thomas Jefferson University School of Physicians Assistants Program, East Falls, PA and Voorhees, NJ campuses, November 10, 2022  
    • Received a defense verdict in a binding arbitration, representing a doctor and her practice group in Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. This was a Wrongful Death / Survival Action alleging malpractice against the primary care physician (PCP) and her practice, as well as numerous other physicians and two hospitals. The plaintiffs' decedent was a 42-year-old female with chronic respiratory problems including asthma, sinusitis, hypertension, morbid obesity, diabetes and other issues. The doctor was the plaintiff's long-standing PCP and saw the plaintiff three days prior to her emergent admission to the Emergency Department where she was diagnosed with a PE. When the plaintiff was seen by the PCP, she showed no signs of leg swelling, which would be consistent with deep vein thrombosis (DVT). While in the hospital, the plaintiff suffered a massive event which left her pulseless. She was coded without success. The PCP and her practice group were sued for allegations of a failure to diagnose a DVT and/or evolving PE. Suzanne negotiated a transfer from the Civil Trial Attachment in January to Binding Arbitration. After a two-day arbitration, she received a defense verdict. Plaintiff's demand immediately preceding the trial attachment was $4 million, which included a $1.3 million future wage loss. No offer was ever extended. (We negotiated a high low with the low being $30,000.)

Results

Defense Verdict After Five-Day Jury Trial in Medical Malpractice Action Where Initial Demand was $5 Million

We received a defense verdict in a five-day jury trial in Philadelphia County involving multiple defendants. We defended the medical malpractice claim alleging a violation of HIPAA privacy and an intrusion upon plaintiff's seclusion resulting in his eviction and severe emotional distress. The plaintiff claimed an anonymous email he sent to our client, a social worker, purporting to seek mental health therapy was a "mental health record" and subject to HIPAA privacy laws. When it was discovered that the email was from the same individual stalking and harassing the client’s sister who worked at the apartment complex where he lived, our client provided the email to her sister, who then gave it to her employer to support legal action against the plaintiff. The email was used in an eviction proceeding, and the plaintiff claimed that the disclosure of the email violated his privacy rights under HIPAA and that he suffered humiliation and severe emotional distress as a result. The claim involved counts for medical and legal professional negligence, negligence per se, intrusion upon seclusion, conspiracy to commit an intrusion upon seclusion, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a plea for punitive damages. The initial demand of $5 million was reduced to $125,000 before trial. No offer was made and a unanimous defense verdict was rendered in less than three hours.

Summary Judgment Secured in 10-Year-Old Medical Malpractice Case

We won a very hard-fought motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute in a matter that is now 10 years old. Suzanne won oral argument to dismiss the suit, based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute his case, by proving both actual prejudice to the client, a psychologist, and an inexcusable seven-year delay in any activity by the plaintiff. This medical malpractice claim was brought in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and was related to a psychological evaluation conducted of the plaintiff’s three children, whom he physically and psychologically abused for years.   

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

February 25, 2026

When I was young with asthma, my hero was never a doll or TV character, it was my pediatrician. He made house calls multiple times per day with his black bag, a multidose vial of epinephrine, and a reusable syringe. He quickly taught me how to draw up my own injection, and from that moment I knew I wanted to become a doctor to help save kids’ lives. I studied math, science, and Latin like a religion so I could excel in school. I had finished every AP math and science course that my high school had to offer by the end of my sophomore year, so the school partnered with Penn State to provide me with pre-med courses in the five-year Jefferson-Penn State pre-med/medical school program. In 1976, as an early admission candidate, I was one of very few women to be accepted into that med school program. Keeping in mind that this was the 70s, my parents and guidance counselors instructed me that “girls” are supposed to be nurses, teachers, and secretaries – not doctors. So I transferred to the Diploma Nursing program at Jefferson and managed expenses by working as a manager at an ice cream store in the Gallery. As a nurse in a Pediatric ICU, and then in an Emergency Department (ED), I worked with prominent physicians in numerous specialties. Details matter, especially when working with infants and children, and I have always been a stickler for details. It was my goal to always provide the best care possible, but sometimes even the mightiest efforts were not enough. After one especially tough and heartbreaking incident surrounding the death of a child, a mother came into the ED screaming at us, and eventually filed a lawsuit. We knew we had exceeded the standards of care, so we did not understand why the hospital settled the lawsuit. After the settlement, the Attending of the ED bought me an LSAT book and said “If you want to do more for the profession, go to law school.” So I did. Now, as an attorney, I bring the same meticulous care to my clients that I once brought to my patients. I take an assertive, detail-driven approach to achieving successful outcomes. I remain a Registered Nurse licensed in Pennsylvania and continue to volunteer in disaster-relief when needed. That dual identity—nurse and attorney—shapes how I advocate: with compassion, an understanding of the stress litigation creates, and unwavering attention to detail. My clinical background gives me an invaluable advantage throughout the litigation process, from understanding the medicine to working effectively with my clients, our experts and cross-examining opponents’ experts. Communicating fluently with healthcare professionals across specialties has strengthened my practice and continually reminds me of the pediatrician who once taught me to draw up my own epinephrine injection—an act that set the course for my future.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.