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Sharon A. Campbell-Suplee

Portrait of Sharon A. Campbell-Suplee

In her role as Office Managing Attorney, Sharon is responsible for the daily operations of the Mount Laurel office, including supervision of its 100-plus employees. As a member of the Health Care Department, she concentrates her practice in medical malpractice and nursing home negligence, and has represented a large number of long-term care and sub-acute rehabilitation facilities.

Sharon has tried multiple cases to verdict for health care clients. She also regularly assists clients in resolving cases through arbitration and mediation.
 
Sharon received her Bachelor of Arts degree from Rutgers College, Rutgers University. She went on to obtain her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law. Upon graduation from law school, Sharon served as a judicial law clerk for the Honorable Mark A. Sullivan, Jr., J.S.C., Law Division, Superior Court of New Jersey, in Monmouth County. After completion of her judicial clerkship, Sharon began her legal career in private practice in the area of insurance defense.  

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1995)
    • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (B.A., 1992)
    • New Jersey, 1995
    • Successfully defended a claim for failure to diagnose infectious endocarditis after a periodontal procedure. It was asserted at trial that our client, the periodontist who performed the surgery, and the co-defendant dentist failed to recognize signs and symptoms of potential infectious endocarditis in post-op interactions with the plaintiff. The claim also alleged that had the plaintiff been diagnosed sooner, he would not have required open heart surgery and could have successfully been treated with antibiotics only. We argued that the appropriate standard of care was followed and that the plaintiff’s damages were unrelated to the care and treatment provided by their client.
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • Preparing A Claim for Trial: How Recent Issues, Decisions and Trends Are Impacting Litigation Outcomes, client webinar, June 4, 2020
    • Nursing Home Mock Trial: Intricacies of an Asphyxiation Case, New Jersey Association for Justice Meadowlands Seminar, November 19, 2015

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse… Mount Laurel Office: A Cornerstone of Defense Litigation in South Jersey for Over 40 Years

June 30, 2026

Marshall Dennehey established its first office in southern New Jersey in 1984. Since that time, the “South Jersey” office, now located in Mount Laurel, has grown to be the second largest Marshall Dennehey office outside of Philadelphia. With 56 attorneys and approximately 75 support staff, this office fully services our clients across the spectrum of defense litigation in South Jersey. As one of the largest law offices primarily dedicated to South Jersey, we are able to provide our clients an unparalleled depth of experience and knowledge, reinforced by long-standing relationships with the local bar and bench.  The success of this office is based upon many factors, not the least of which is the depth of talent and experience we offer our clients. Our office is composed of many long-time residents of New Jersey, and we have the benefit of being staffed by individuals who have dedicated their careers to Marshall Dennehey, having worked for the firm for over 20, and in some cases, over 30 years. Our office administrator, Sheila Stanley, has been with the firm for 40 years and is an invaluable leader. Coupled with the broad-based resources and experience of the firm, we are able to provide our clients with the highest level of defense litigation support in areas including professional liability, health care liability, casualty, and workers’ compensation. The Mount Laurel Casualty Group makes up the largest group of attorneys in our office.  Supervised by Barbara Davis, this group includes accomplished, long-time shareholders and trial attorneys who handle cases across the casualty spectrum. They are supported by a skilled group of associates who routinely sit second chair and otherwise support trial counsel at every level. Jeffrey Rapattoni, Assistant Director of the firm’s Casualty Department, serves as Chair of both the SIU/Fraud Litigation Group and the PIP Litigation Group. Our attorneys offer our clients aggressive and specialized knowledge evidenced by their record of success. Our professional liability group, the second largest in the firm behind Philadelphia, handles a broad range of matters, from architectural, engineering, and construction defect litigation, to real estate liability, public entity and civil rights litigation, and employment law. Our PL group is supervised by Matthew Behr, and is anchored by seasoned litigators and talented associates. The Mount Laurel Worker’s Compensation Group is led by Bob Fitzgerald, who has been with the firm for 25 years. He leads a successful team of attorneys who are well known within the worker’s compensation bench and bar in South Jersey, and their longevity and high regard within the community affords our clients the highest level of service.  Our Health Care Group is led by Lynne Nahmani, who has been with the firm since law school -- over 35 years. The Health Care Group defends and routinely tries cases including medical malpractice, hospital/acute care malpractice, long term care litigation, nursing malpractice, dental malpractice, allied health professionals' malpractice, and professional board matters, among others.  Collaboration has always been a cornerstone of the culture of Marshall Dennehey, and this is nowhere more evident than in the Mount Laurel office. While our attorneys generally practice within their groups, the benefit of having a broad base of litigators allows us to work as a cross-functional team when needed. This provides our clients with the benefits of diverse expertise and collaboration and provides our attorneys with mutual resources at their fingertips. In addition, it allows for our attorneys to continue to learn from each other and work together to continue to lead the market in South Jersey.  

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.