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Defense Digest

Watch That First Step! New Jersey Again Addresses The Eternal Battle of Intentional injuries vs. The Exclusive Remedy Doctrine

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Robert J. Fitzgerald

Key Points:

  • The exclusive remedy doctrine bars a petitioner from filing a personal injury suit arising out of a workplace injury.
  • The exclusive remedy doctrine can be overcome if a petitioner can prove an “intentional injury.”
  • A petitioner has a high burden of proof under a multi-part analysis to succeed on an intentional injury claim.

The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court once again reaffirmed the strength of the exclusive remedy doctrine of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Statute against alleged intentional injury claims in Jonathan Little v VDM Metals USA, LLC, et al., 2025 WL 3276688 (NJ Super. App. Div. Nov. 25, 2025). In this case, the petitioner worked as a material handler for VDM, a steel manufacturer, when he sustained a compensable fall while exiting a trailer. The petitioner was clearing packing materials on a flat-rack trailer: an open trailer with only two sides – front and back. The petitioner sustained head injuries in the fall and was unable to describe the accident.

The petitioner’s supervisor, Frendly Blas, provided some details leading up to the accident, although he did not witness the fall. Blas testified that, prior to the accident, the petitioner received safety training on fall prevention. Blas estimated the flat-rack trailer bed sat five or six feet off the ground. Further, a "RollaStep Mobile Platform," intended to protect workers from falls whenever they accessed a surface at least four feet off the ground, was near the truck, but not used at the time of the fall. Blas was responsible for ensuring the use of the RollaStep, but did not remember why it was not used during the incident.

An OSHA report confirmed the RollaStep was positioned nearby the trailer. OSHA determined the primary cause of the accident was complacency, as it appeared the RollaStep was generally not used when there were only a few steel plates being unloaded. The petitioner’s expert report in the personal injury case indicated that training records did not show the petitioner received specific training on flat-rack trailers.

The petitioner filed a personal injury action for negligence, gross negligence, and intentional wrongs against the employer, VDM. More specifically, the petitioner asserted VDM failed to provide adequate training, safety measures, and protective equipment, along with not providing enough staff to safely operate the facility. After discovery concluded, VDM won a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that

VDM’s conduct was an intentional act sufficient to surmount the Act's high bar, and dismissed the petitioner’s complaint.  The court employed the two-part standard test in Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884, 894-896 (N.J. 2002): the court determined the petitioner had not established his injuries were substantially certain to occur or fell outside the "facts of life" attendant to industrial employment.

On appeal, the petitioner argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, as he established sufficient facts to show the defendant's intentional conduct. The petitioner contended that the record contained facts sufficient to show that adequate training was not provided related to unloading the flat-rack trailer or protecting his safety by using the RollaStep safety measure. Thus, claiming the fall from an elevated surface could not be a fact of industrial life for someone that finished and packed material.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, noting that the intentional wrong exception in Laidlow is interpreted very narrowly so that as many work-related injury claims as possible can be processed exclusively within the workers' compensation system. Thereunder, to successfully prove an intentional injury claim the petitioner must prove:

  1. that the employer knew that its actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee; and
  2. the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be

(a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond

anything the legislature intended the Act to immunize.

Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 894.

Further, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing both the "conduct" and "context" prongs. To satisfy the conduct requirement, a petitioner must show a defendant acted with "substantial certainty” that injury or death would result. Again, mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk is insufficient.

In this case, the court noted VDM failed to utilize the RollaStep during small unloading jobs, and that OSHA concluded that the defendant failed to provide the RollaStep due to "complacency."  However, the court also noted there was no evidence to suggest any employees previously fell from a trailer while unloading it. Further, the petitioner was not unloading the truck, but exiting the trailer after the work was completed. Thus, even presuming his inexperience with “unloading," the petitioner was not handling or removing the metal sheets when the fall occurred.

Additionally, the petitioner was trained to avoid falls, albeit not specifically to avoid falls from flat-rack trailers. Without evidence that VDM was aware of a known or heightened danger, any lack of training, even considered together with VDM’s failure to use a RollaStep, did not demonstrate that the defendant was substantially certain that harm would arise from its actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant deliberately and deceptively removed the safety device from the location.

Even if VDM knew that the failure to use the RollaStep created some degree of danger, mere knowledge by an employer that a workplace is dangerous does not equate to an “intentional wrong."  The court noted that it had rejected the idea that a longstanding negligent or reckless practice should be deemed an intentional wrong under the Act simply because the risk posed by an ongoing wrongful practice will eventually occur.

While this case does not necessarily add anything new to the “intentional injury” test, it is a great reminder as to the court’s analysis of such claims. Again, a petitioner has a very high burden of proving both the “conduct” and “context” prongs under Supreme Court’s Laidlow decision.

The purpose of the exclusive remedy doctrine is to keep work claims in the workers’ compensation forum, while only the most egregious cases dealing with poor employer conduct can pierce the bar. Regardless of this decision, employers and carriers should always take great strides in insuring workplace safety. If you have any questions about your workplace safety program and procedures, please reach out to your TPA carrier and counsel for advice before the next potential work injury. 

Robert Fitzgerald works in our Mount Laurel, NJ office. He can be reached at (856) 414-6009 or RJFitzgerald@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.