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Defense Digest

I’ve Got Your Papers Right Here! New Jersey Appellate Division Reverses Extending Workers’ Compensation Coverage to Owner Based on Alleged Producer and Carrier Errors

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2022

April 1, 2022

by Robert J. Fitzgerald

Key Points:

  • In New Jersey, business owners can elect to be covered as employees for purposes of workers’ compensation coverage.
  • A workers’ compensation carrier is not required to ensure that business owners be included on a policy. 
  • Even if an insurance producer errs in failing to select insurance coverage for a business owner, the carrier is not required to cover the loss.

The New Jersey Superior Court addressed the latest attempt to expand workers’ compensation insurance coverage for business owners in Kearton v. E. W. Millwork, LLC, 2022 WL 244043 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 27, 2022). The underlying facts of the case were undisputed. On August 27, 2003, the petitioner, Kearton, sustained injuries while working at E.W. Millwork, a manufacturer of wooden railings and moldings. Kearton had formed E.W. Millwork, a limited liability company, with his equal owner, Brigante. 

In March 2005, Kearton filed both a claim petition and a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits. Almost eight months later, E.W. Millwork’s carrier, Zurich American Insurance, filed a motion to deny the claim petition for lack of insurance coverage. Specifically, Zurich argued that coverage was not provided to the two owners, Kearton and Brigante, because the application for coverage did not request coverage for the owners. In January 2008, the Workers’ Compensation Judge issued a bench decision denying the motion. The judge determined that the insurance producer, Pawlak, made a mistake on E.W. Millwork’s workers’ compensation insurance application and should have elected coverage for the owners. The court also somehow found that Zurich was negligent and should have ensured that coverage was provided to the owners.    

Zurich filed a timely motion for reconsideration, arguing that the policy “clearly and unambiguously” did not provide coverage for the owners and that there was no such endorsement listed on the declaration page. Since there was no affirmative choice for members’ coverage––such coverage having been declined twice on the application—Zurich argued that Kearton was not covered as an employee. A different Workers’ Compensation Judge denied reconsideration, stating in his bench decision that he was “taking the coward’s way out” by not deciding the merits and that, for him to do so, would require retrying the matter.

Kearton suffered a second workplace injury in April 2009, resulting in an additional claim petition that was consolidated for trial on the nature and extent of permanency. In May 2017, a third Workers’ Compensation Judge presided over the trial. In December 2020, the matter was concluded by a fourth Workers’ Compensation Judge, who issued a final order of judgment regarding the 2003 work-related accident, awarding 46.5% of partial total.

On appeal, Zurich made several arguments, including that the compensation court erred in not granting its motion to dismiss Kearton’s claim for lack of workers’ compensation coverage. In a very detailed opinion, the court found that the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s findings were not supported by credible evidence in the record and that, therefore, the legal finding of insurance coverage was void. Under Section 36 of the Workers’ Compensation Act: 

…members of a limited liability company, ‘who actively perform services on behalf of the’ company, ‘shall be deemed an ‘employee’ of the’ company ‘for purposes of receipt of benefits and payment of workers’ compensation insurance premiums pursuant to the [Workers’ Compensation Act], if the ’company ‘elects, when [its] workers’ compensation policy … is purchased or renewed, to obtain coverage for the’ company’s members. ‘[T]he election may only be made at purchase or at renewal and may not be withdrawn during the policy term.’ Ibid. For any member of a limited liability company to opt in for workers’ compensation coverage, all members must do so. 

The court went into further detail on the lack of credible evidence given the insurance application process and testimony of the insurance producer, Pawlak:

Based on the record before us, we conclude E.W. Millwork did not obtain workers’ compensation coverage for Kearton. Both Brigante and Kearton testified that they were supposed to be covered under their company’s workers’ compensation coverage. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that E.W. Millwork’s application did not request such coverage. Pawlak testified he informed Brigante, who was responsible for securing insurance coverage for the company, of the consequences of not electing coverage for the company’s members. He told Brigante that without coverage for members, if there was an ‘on[]the[]job or occupational injury, illness, sickness[,] or disease, there would be no coverage for neither he nor []Kearton.’ Notwithstanding that advice, he stated Brigante chose not to select coverage for the members.

The court also thoroughly analyzed the insurance application process and the applicable waivers:

A separate document to the insurance application titled ‘NOTICE OF ELECTION - PROPRIETORS AND PARTNERS,’ included an ‘x’ within a box stating that ‘COVERAGE IS REJECTED.’ In addition, a section titled ‘COMPLETE THIS SECTION ONLY WHEN COVERAGE IS ELECTED’ had Kearton’s and Brigante’s names filled in underneath, but the sections for ‘ESTIMATED ANNUAL WAGE[S]’ and ‘DUTIES,’ which was required to provide coverage for them, was not completed. Although the application listed E.W. Millwork having six employees for a total wage of $155,000, it did not specify the amount of the members’ wages. According to Pawlack, the member’s names were only included in the section in case Brigante chose to elect coverage prior to signing, and if he did so, the form could be completed––which it was not.

The Appellate Division also addressed the lack of validity of the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s rational for extending coverage based on the alleged mistakes of Pawlek and Zurich Insurance.

Despite the clear fact that E.W. Millwork’s application did not request workers’ compensation coverage for its members, the judge justified finding there was coverage based on Pawlack’s mistake in not selecting coverage for members. The judge also found that Zurich was negligent and should have looked at the policy to make sure coverage was provided for the members. Without further explanation, the judge determined that Kearton was a covered employee. This was error. 

Even accepting Pawlack erred, there was no legal basis cited by the judge for imputing liability on Zurich—by finding coverage that was not requested—based on that error. Any mistake by the producer should be borne by him. There is no evidence to support the finding that Zurich was responsible for Brigante’s failure to secure workers’ compensation coverage for Kearton and himself. Contrary to the judge’s finding, there is nothing ambiguous about the application that warrants imposing coverage for Kearton. It clearly provided how the company’s members had to obtain workers’ compensation, and the completed application plainly showed coverage for the members was not requested.

Finally, the court even went on to address any public policy arguments which are sometimes used to inappropriately extend insurance coverage:

We recognize the Workers’ Compensation Act is social legislation that is liberally construed ‘to implement the legislative policy of affording coverage to as many workers as possible.’ Nevertheless, we cannot authorize coverage where there is a clear disregard of a statutory requirement as was the case here.

Following its opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s award of benefits and remanded the case for entry of an order finding a lack of insurance coverage for Kearton’s claim petitions. 

While this decision does not change the current state of the law, it is helpful in reminding us that, when it comes to issuing insurance policies, there are specific procedures that business owners and insurance carriers must go through in confirming coverage for the business owners/employees. As indicated here, it is not the responsibility of the carrier and/or broker to require business owners elect workers’ compensation coverage for themselves. However, carriers/brokers must make it clear when coverage is being rejected in response to the pubic policy position of finding coverage exists as much as possible. 

If you are a business owner, or an insurance broker/carrier, and you have questions about whether there is proper workers’ compensation coverage, it is recommended that you contact your counsel as soon as possible. Business owners who fail to provide proper workers’ compensation coverage can be subject to both civil and even criminal penalties in New Jersey. Complete your due diligence before it is too late.

*Bob is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. He can be reached at RJFitzgerald@mdwcg.com or 856.414.6009.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.