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Defense Digest

Your Residence Is Not Necessarily Where You Live

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Christopher W. Woodward

Key Points:

  • Determining residency in the context of an insurance policy, while reliant on facts, can be resolved as a matter of law.
  • Dual residency can be extended beyond the typical factual situations to homes, even if the insured is not actively living in the home, so long as they can prove “regular and habitual” ties.

In Isenberg v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2022 WL 1720334 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 2022) (Schwab, J.), a fire destroyed the plaintiff’s recently-purchased home. The defendant insurance carrier investigated her claim and ultimately rescinded the homeowner’s policy it had issued to her for the home. During its investigation, the defendant concluded that Isenberg had not been using the insured home as a “residence” because, from the date of her purchase of the home to the time of the fire, she continued to live in a separate apartment with her children.

Litigation ensued, and after the close of fact discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that, since Isenberg was not using the insured home as a “residence,” she was not entitled to coverage under the homeowners’ policy. The defendant cited, among other facts, that Isenberg’s children attended the school district associated with the apartment rather than the school district associated with the home.

Isenberg admitted she was living in the apartment but argued she had “daily contact” with the home as she was in the process of renovating the home for her family. She also argued that she ate some meals there, stored personal possessions there and slept there from time to time.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania interpreted the defendant’s argument as limiting a person to only one residence. The court interpreted Isenberg’s argument as positing that a person many have more than one residence. The court observed that Pennsylvania and federal courts within the Third Circuit “have agreed or at least assumed” that a person is not limited to one residence.

The court looked to previous decisions from the District Courts of the Third Circuit and noted that the term “residence,” when used in homeowners’ insurance policies, has been determined to be unambiguous even if undefined by the policy. Case law provides that “residence” refers to factual place of abode evidenced by a person’s physical presence in a particular place which requires, at minimum, some measure of permanency or habitual repetition. Residence is a question of “physical fact,” and the intentions of the purported resident are not relevant.

The court ultimately determined that the facts before it supported a finding that Isenberg resided at the home (and, therefore, was entitled to coverage under the homeowner’s policy for the fire claim). The court pointed to the fact that Isenberg was physically present in the home almost daily while rehabbing it for her family. The court found it significant that Isenberg ate some meals at the home, occasionally slept at the home, and that she and her children had a significant number of personal possessions at the home. Thus, the court determined that Isenberg had “regular and habitual” ties to the home such that it qualified as one of her residences under the terms of the homeowner’s policy.

Determinations relating to whether an insured has more than one residence for the purposes of an insurance policy typically arise in the context of minor children with divorced parents (residence at both parental households) or adult children attending college (despite living at college, they can remain residents of the parental household). The Isenberg case is unique because the court found that the home was one of (adult) Isenberg’s residences, despite her admission that she had never lived at the home, despite her sending her children to the school district associated with the apartment where they were actually living and not the school district associated with the home, despite her only having “some” meals at the home, and despite her and her family storing “numerous”—but not all—personal possessions at the home.

Ultimately, in cases such as these, it’s not necessarily where you actually live that may be considered your residence. A person is not limited to one residence.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.