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Defense Digest

Your Residence Is Not Necessarily Where You Live

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Christopher W. Woodward

Key Points:

  • Determining residency in the context of an insurance policy, while reliant on facts, can be resolved as a matter of law.
  • Dual residency can be extended beyond the typical factual situations to homes, even if the insured is not actively living in the home, so long as they can prove “regular and habitual” ties.

In Isenberg v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2022 WL 1720334 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 2022) (Schwab, J.), a fire destroyed the plaintiff’s recently-purchased home. The defendant insurance carrier investigated her claim and ultimately rescinded the homeowner’s policy it had issued to her for the home. During its investigation, the defendant concluded that Isenberg had not been using the insured home as a “residence” because, from the date of her purchase of the home to the time of the fire, she continued to live in a separate apartment with her children.

Litigation ensued, and after the close of fact discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that, since Isenberg was not using the insured home as a “residence,” she was not entitled to coverage under the homeowners’ policy. The defendant cited, among other facts, that Isenberg’s children attended the school district associated with the apartment rather than the school district associated with the home.

Isenberg admitted she was living in the apartment but argued she had “daily contact” with the home as she was in the process of renovating the home for her family. She also argued that she ate some meals there, stored personal possessions there and slept there from time to time.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania interpreted the defendant’s argument as limiting a person to only one residence. The court interpreted Isenberg’s argument as positing that a person many have more than one residence. The court observed that Pennsylvania and federal courts within the Third Circuit “have agreed or at least assumed” that a person is not limited to one residence.

The court looked to previous decisions from the District Courts of the Third Circuit and noted that the term “residence,” when used in homeowners’ insurance policies, has been determined to be unambiguous even if undefined by the policy. Case law provides that “residence” refers to factual place of abode evidenced by a person’s physical presence in a particular place which requires, at minimum, some measure of permanency or habitual repetition. Residence is a question of “physical fact,” and the intentions of the purported resident are not relevant.

The court ultimately determined that the facts before it supported a finding that Isenberg resided at the home (and, therefore, was entitled to coverage under the homeowner’s policy for the fire claim). The court pointed to the fact that Isenberg was physically present in the home almost daily while rehabbing it for her family. The court found it significant that Isenberg ate some meals at the home, occasionally slept at the home, and that she and her children had a significant number of personal possessions at the home. Thus, the court determined that Isenberg had “regular and habitual” ties to the home such that it qualified as one of her residences under the terms of the homeowner’s policy.

Determinations relating to whether an insured has more than one residence for the purposes of an insurance policy typically arise in the context of minor children with divorced parents (residence at both parental households) or adult children attending college (despite living at college, they can remain residents of the parental household). The Isenberg case is unique because the court found that the home was one of (adult) Isenberg’s residences, despite her admission that she had never lived at the home, despite her sending her children to the school district associated with the apartment where they were actually living and not the school district associated with the home, despite her only having “some” meals at the home, and despite her and her family storing “numerous”—but not all—personal possessions at the home.

Ultimately, in cases such as these, it’s not necessarily where you actually live that may be considered your residence. A person is not limited to one residence.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.