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Defense Digest

Win for Employers: Florida Appellate Court Limits Negligence Claims

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025

September 1, 2025

by Erica R. Cagan

Key Points:

  • Vicarious liability requires employee negligence: Since the jury found the employee was not negligent, the employer could not be held vicariously liable for his actions.
  • Direct negligence claims (like negligent training/supervision) against an employer only apply if the employee acted outside the scope of employment.
  • Claims for negligent supervision may still apply to individual supervisors, but not the corporate employer. 

The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently addressed the interplay between vicarious liability and direct negligence claims against an employer. The case arose from injuries sustained by a hotel guest during an altercation with a hotel employee, leading to claims against the hotel operator for both vicarious liability based on the employee’s conduct and direct negligence for alleged negligent training and supervision. The court ultimately clarified that these theories cannot be pursued simultaneously when the employee’s actions are within the scope of employment and the jury finds no underlying negligence.

In Gabor v. Remington Lodging & Hospitality LLC and Robert Henderson, 413 So.3d 261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025), the plaintiff filed suit against Remington Lodging and Hospitality, LLC, the company that operated the hotel, as well as Henderson, the employee involved in the altercation. The complaint alleged two separate causes of action against Remington: (1) vicarious liability based on Henderson’s conduct and (2) direct negligence by Remington in the form of negligent training and negligent supervision of Henderson. The complaint additionally alleged a claim of action against Henderson for direct negligence.

During the course of litigation, all parties stipulated that Henderson’s actions occurred within the course and scope of his employment with Remington. Based on this fact, Remington moved for a directed verdict on the negligent training and supervision claims. They argued, because Henderson was acting within the course and scope of his employment, they could not be held liable under negligent training and supervision, a theory that is typically reserved for situations in which the employee acts outside the scope of employment. The trial court denied the motion, allowing all three claims to proceed to the jury.

The jury found there was no negligence on the part of Henderson that was the legal cause of damage to the hotel guest, the plaintiff – Michael Gabor. The jury separately found that both Remington and Gabor were the cause of Gabor’s injury, apportioning 80% fault to Gabor and 20% to Remington. Notably, the jury was not asked to specify under which theory of negligence Remington was found liable. 

Remington appealed, challenging the trial court’s refusal to grant its motion for directed verdict on the negligent training and supervision claims. The Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed how these claims function when an employer is also facing a vicarious liability theory.

The appellate court first examined the vicarious liability claim. Under Florida law, an employer can be held liable for an employee’s negligent acts committed within the course and scope of employment. However, this theory is wholly dependent on the employee being found negligent. Since the jury found that Henderson was not negligent and did not cause Gabor’s injuries, Remington could not be vicariously liable for his conduct.

The court then turned to the negligent training and supervision claims. These are considered direct negligence claims against the employer and are typically viable only when an employee acts outside the scope of employment. The rationale is that if an employee is acting within the scope of their job duties, the employer’s liability, if any, should fall under vicarious liability rather than a separate claim for negligent supervision. As the parties had stipulated, and the evidence confirmed, that Henderson was acting within the scope of employment, Remington could not be held directly liable under these theories either.

Importantly, the appellate court addressed a common point of confusion in employer liability cases. It explained that, although a corporate employer cannot be held liable for negligent training or supervision where the employee’s actions fall within the scope of employment, a different rule applies when the claim is brought against an individual supervisor. In such cases, Florida law permits claims for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or training even if the underlying conduct occurred during the course of employment. In this case, however, Gabor did not assert any claim against Henderson’s direct supervisor. As the court noted, this might have been a missed opportunity, but it had no bearing on the outcome of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that the trial court erred by denying Remington’s motion for a directed verdict on the negligent training and supervision claims. Because the jury found no negligence on Henderson’s part, and because Remington could not be liable under either theory advanced by Gabor, the appellate court reversed the final judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Remington.

This case serves as a significant reminder of the legal distinctions between vicarious liability and direct negligence claims against employers. Plaintiffs often seek to assert both, hoping that at least one theory will succeed. However, Gabor v. Remington underscores that these claims are not always compatible, especially when an employee’s conduct is undisputedly within the scope of employment and the jury finds no underlying negligence.

Erica is an associate in our Casualty Department. She can be reached at (904) 358-4227 or ERCagan@mdwcg.com. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.