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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Where a windstorm loss occurs during a 'hurricane occurrence,' the loss must bear at least some causal nexus with the hurricane for the policy’s hurricane deductible to apply.

Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company v. Linda Williams, 5D23-0183 (Fla. 5th DCA, Apr. 9, 2024)

May 1, 2024

In this case, Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeals addresses proper application of a hurricane deductible. The insured presented a claim to Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company (Farm) for damage to her property resulting from a hail storm on August 4, 2020, less than 72 hours after the expiration of last hurricane warning in Florida for Hurricane Isaias. However, at the time of the reported hailstorm, Hurricane Isaias was located over Vermont, with none of its rain bands near Florida. Nevertheless, Farm extended coverage and paid the claim but subtracted the hurricane deductible. 

The insured then filed suit for breach of contract, arguing the hurricane deductible did not apply to her loss. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the lower court ruled in the insured’s favor, and Farm appealed. Thus, the issue in Williams surrounded whether the policy’s hurricane deductible was appropriately applied by the insurer for a windstorm loss (which includes hail) occurring during a “hurricane occurrence,” as defined by the policy, but not caused by or resulting from a hurricane. 

Notably, on appeal, both parties agreed that the hailstorm loss occurred during a “hurricane occurrence”; however, they disagreed as to whether there needed to be a causal nexus between the loss and an actual hurricane for the hurricane deductible to apply. Farm argued that, based on the policy, the hurricane deductible applies to any windstorm loss that occurs during a “hurricane occurrence,” whether or not the windstorm had any connection with the hurricane. Conversely, the insured argued that there must be some causal link between the loss and the hurricane for the hurricane deductible to apply. 

In reviewing the case de novo, the Fifth District held in favor of the insured’s interpretation of the policy and further noted that, while the hurricane deductible endorsement’s language is “imprecise,” Farm’s interpretation of this language was not reasonable and “would mark a substantial re-write” of the endorsement. Therefore, the Williams court held that, even where a windstorm loss occurs during a “hurricane occurrence,” the loss must bear at least some causal nexus with the hurricane for the policy’s hurricane deductible to apply. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – May 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

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