.

Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Third DCA Holds a Three-Year Delay is Too Long To Wait

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – March 2026

March 1, 2026

Camacho v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 3D24-1974, 2026 WL 216413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2026)

Under Florida law, a long, unexplained delay in reporting a claim creates a presumption of prejudice to the insurance carrier, which the policyholder must overcome in order to ultimately succeed in pursuing their case. In January, the Third District Court of Appeals, in upholding the summary judgment in favor of the insurance carrier, found that an insured’s almost three year delay in reporting a claim to their insurance carrier “insurmountably stymied” the insurance carrier’s ability to investigate the claim, constituting a breach of the policy's prompt notice requirement.

In the underlying case, the insured claimed Hurricane Irma caused damage to her home but did not report the loss to their insurance carrier until almost three years after the storm. The insurance carrier subsequently denied claim arguing that the extreme delay in reporting prevented it from being able to timely and adequately evaluate and adjust the claim. The insured filed a breach of contract claim alleging that the insurance carrier’s denial of the claim constituted a breach of the insurance contract. The insurance company subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the insured could not overcome the presumption of prejudice as a result of their delayed reporting.

This case highlights the significant importance of the timeliness of an insured’s reporting of a claim when evaluating a coverage determination with the Third DCA underscoring the fact that post-loss obligations are not mere technicalities, they can present favorable case-dispositive scenarios for a carrier.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.