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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Opinion in Donovan Does Little to Clarify the Long Line of Post-Gallagher Opinions

Legal Updates for Insurance Services - August 24, 2021

August 24, 2021

by Christopher W. Woodward

Donovan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., --- A.3d ---, 2021 WL 3628706 (Pa. Aug. 17, 2021).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has issued another opinion in the long line of post-Gallagher opinions that yet again seems to muddy the waters rather than clarify.

After a motor vehicle accident between a motorcycle operated by Donovan and another vehicle, Donovan made claims against (1) the liability policy of the other driver, (2) the policy issued to him insuring his motorcycle, and (3) the automobile policy issued to his mother by State Farm. Donovan received full limits under the liability policy and the policy insuring his motorcycle. State Farm, however, denied based upon the household vehicle exclusion and the signed stacking waiver signed by his mother at the inception of the policy.

After Donovan filed suit, State Farm removed to federal court in the Eastern District where the parties filed a joint stipulation of facts and then filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues. Donovan argued that the stacking waiver only waived intra-policy stacking—stacking of the multiple vehicles on his mother’s policy—and not inter-policy stacking—stacking of the coverages available on multiple policies.

Therefore, Donovan argued, the stacking waiver was invalid as to stacking between his motorcycle policy and his mother’s auto policy with State Farm. He further argued that the household vehicle exclusion could not operate as an unacknowledged waiver of stacking. Finally, Donovan argued that the coordination of benefits provision did not apply as it only applied to unstacked UIM coverage.

The Eastern District granted summary judgment in favor of Donovan and denied State Farm’s cross-motion. The Eastern District agreed that the stacking waiver signed by Donovan’s mother was only sufficient to waive intra-policy stacking, not inter-policy stacking. The Eastern District then followed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Gallagher v. GEICO, which was issued while the cross-motions for summary judgment were pending, and determined that the household vehicle exclusion was void since the stacking waiver was invalid. Finally, the Eastern District determined that, since the stacking waiver was invalid, the policy reverted to stacked coverage and the coordination of benefits provision in the stacked coverage portion of the policy applied.

State Farm appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and requested that these issues be certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed to review these questions.

First, the Supreme Court considered the issue of the stacking waiver and whether it was sufficient to waive inter-policy stacking as well as intra-policy stacking. It looked to its previous decision in Craley v. State Farm and reiterated its decision that when a stacking waiver is signed at the inception of a policy insuring a single vehicle, that stacking waiver is sufficient to waive inter-policy stacking. Resolving the question left unanswered in its Craley decision, the Supreme Court—for the first time—determined that a stacking waiver signed at the inception of a policy insuring multiple vehicles is only sufficient to waive intra-policy stacking since the insured could not be making a knowing waiver of inter-policy stacking based upon the language in the waiver itself. The court recognized that the stacking waiver form used by State Farm in this case was strictly compliant with the mandated language set forth by the Motor Vehicle Financial Regulation Law. It once again implored the General Assembly to amend the language of the MVFRL to provide for waiver of inter-policy stacking on multi-vehicle policies.

Next, the Supreme Court rejected State Farm’s contention that Gallagher was inapplicable because Donovan’s mother had rejected stacking and paid lower premiums as a result, while Gallagher had purchased stacking on his policies. The Supreme Court determined that the “logic” of Gallagher was indistinguishable from the case before it. It stated that while in Gallagher the insured did not sign a stacking waiver at all, in Donovan the insured signed a waiver defective as to inter-policy stacking—and thus, the result is the same: the household vehicle exclusion was void.

Finally, the Supreme Court reviewed the coordination of benefits provision issue and determined that, since the stacking waiver was invalid as to inter-policy stacking and the policy defaults to stacking coverage, the coordination of benefits provision in the UIM coverage for stacked benefits applies. The Supreme Court further stated that the coordination of benefits provision contained within the UIM coverage for unstacked benefits was just the kind of de facto waiver of stacking that the court had previously negated in Gallagher.

Justice Wecht filed a concurring but scathing opinion. He stated that, though he was bound to agree with the result and reasoning of the majority, he continues to believe that Gallagher was wrongly decided and the majority opinion in Donovan is another in the long line of fallout from that “blunder,” as Justice Wecht put it.

Justice Saylor filed a dissenting opinion, reiterating his dissent from Gallagher. While he recognizes that Gallagher is binding precedent, he disagrees with the majority’s extension of Gallagher to a situation where two different individuals purchased the policies in question.

Moving forward, in the absence of clarification from the General Assembly to the MVFRL, it is unclear what exactly the court expects insurers to do with regard to stacking waivers. On the one hand, the Donovan decision now makes it clear that exactly what type of stacking the insured is waiving is dependent on how many vehicles are on the policy at the time of the signing of the waiver. On the other hand, insurers are still required to strictly comply with the wording for stacking waivers set forth in the MVFRL.
 

Legal Updates for Insurance Services - August 24, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.