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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Sixth District Court of Appeals Says Fourth District Got It Wrong: Florida’s Pre-Suit Notice Requirement Does Not Apply Retroactively

Legal Update for Insurance Services - January 8, 2024

January 8, 2024

In November 2023, the Sixth District Court of Appeal of Florida, in direct conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida, found that the pre-suit notice as mandated by Florida Statute 627.70152 does not apply retroactively to insurance policies entered into before the statute’s effective date.

The Sixth District’s ruling in the case of Hughes v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company focused on the retroactive applicability of a statutory pre-suit notice requirement enacted after an insurance policy was issued, but before a breach of contract lawsuit regarding that policy was filed.

In Hughes, the insured, Rebecca Hughes, had sued Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company for breach of her property insurance policy. However, she did not file the mandatory pre-suit notice as required by Florida Statute Section 627.70152. As a result, Universal filed a motion to dismiss her lawsuit based on this failure. The lower court had granted the insurance company’s motion to dismiss based on Hughes’ failure to file this pre-suit notice, and the insured appealed the decision.

Hughes contended on appeal that the trial court had erred in requiring her to file the pre-suit notice before filing suit. She argued that the statute requiring the pre-suit notice was a substantive statute and could, therefore, not apply retroactively to a claim under an insurance policy which was entered into before the statute’s enactment. Hughes relied upon the precedent set by the Florida Supreme Court in Menendez v. Progressive Express Insurance Company to support this argument.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal’s opinion reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that Florida Statute Section 627.70152 does not apply retroactively to an insurance policy entered into before the statute’s effective date. The court concluded that there was no clear evidence of legislative intent for the statute to apply retroactively and that the statute was substantive in nature, therefore, making its retroactive application unconstitutional. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Appellate Court’s opinion.

The Hughes court noted that the ruling clearly differs from a decision handed down from the Fourth District earlier this year in another Universal case, Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co. The Cole case and others like it have looked at retroactivity differently and come to opposite conclusions. As such, the Hughes court asked the Florida Supreme Court to settle the issue. While a definitive ruling from the Florida Supreme Court could settle the issue, because there were relatively only a small number of claims filed before the 2021 statute took effect still pending, the court may decline to take up the issue.
 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Services, January 8, 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.