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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Sixth DCA Rejects Prejudice Requirement for Excluding Late‑Disclosed Expert Opinions, Certifies Conflict with Sixteen DCAs

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – June 2026

June 11, 2026

by Danielle N. Robinson

Michael John Crecelius v. Mildred Rizzitano; (February 27, 2026)

Crecelius involved an appeal by a defendant of the trial court’s exclusion of its late disclosed experts at trial. The defendant was involved in a vehicle accident, in which he made a left turn into an intersection and collided with the plaintiff, killing him. Plaintiff’s estate sued for negligence.

The defendant disclosed two experts after the deadline imposed by the court. The disclosure described each expert’s anticipated scope of work, but did not contain their respective substantive opinions. Approximately three-weeks before trial, both expert reports were provided. The plaintiff moved to strike the experts’ testimony, arguing it was prejudiced because their expert had insufficient time to prepare rebuttal testimony before trial. The defendant argued the late disclosures were due to the experts’ not diligently providing reports and opinions to the defendant and there was no bad faith. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The plaintiff obtained a verdict in its favor, finding the defendant 100% at fault, to which the defendant appealed.

The defendant argued on appeal that the experts’ opinions were received three weeks before trial, so any prejudice to the plaintiff was insufficient to warrant exclusion of his experts, and any prejudice could have been cured by a brief continuance. The defendant argued that he suffered extreme prejudice, as striking his witnesses left the plaintiff’s experts uncontradicted.

In reaching its decision in Crecelius, the 6th DCA addressed the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981) at length, which addressed late disclosed experts. The Crecelius court found that its sister courts have consistently misapplied the Binger opinion, which “has severely ambered the ability of trial judges to effectively manage civil lawsuits and . . . prevent surprises at trial and to assist arriving at the truth.” The court wrote, “if the trial court finds that the undisclosed witness will not prejudice the other party after considering the factors listed in Binger, then the witness should be allowed to testify – as binding holding,” highlighting that its sister courts improperly expanded the Binger opinion to apply to undisclosed opinions of disclosed experts.

The court criticized this approach, finding it meant that a trial judge could not enforce pretrial orders and exclude undisclosed testimony without first finding that the opposing party was prejudiced. The court noted that approach puts the burden on the opposing party to make an adequate showing of prejudice, potentially in the middle of trial and with no notice, which is inappropriate and incentivizes non-disclosure. The court explained that completing a last-minute deposition prior to trial to cure any prejudice also places a burden on the non-offending party, and even offering a continuance, puts that party in a position of having to choose between inadequate time to prepare or delay the trial, none of which is proper.

The Crecelius court found that “Binger concerned undisclosed witness testimony that was improperly allowed and should have been excluded due to prejudice to other party. Binger did not concern undisclosed testimony that was improperly excluded or what the trial court should have considered before excluding undisclosed testimony.” Additionally, the Crecelius court found the statement in the Binger opinion “about what a trial court considers before excluding an undisclosed witness’s testimony was pure dictum” and that nothing in that statement led to the judgment, and thus, was not binding on it or on trial courts. The court noted that Binger expressly stated trial courts can issue pretrial orders that prohibit the introduction of undisclosed opinions, and those orders do not derogate from its decision. Trial courts are permitted to strictly enforce pretrial orders and to require them to make a finding of prejudice before doing so makes the ability to enforce court orders meaningless.

The court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s order, striking the defendant’s witnesses, finding that Binger imposes no requirement that a trial court find that the opposing party would be prejudiced by the introduction of an undisclosed or late-disclosed expert opinion before excluding the opinion and certified conflict with 16 decisions out of the 1st DCA, 2nd DCA, 3rd DCA and 4th DCA.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.