.

Case Law Alerts

Regular use exclusion lives—for liability claims, at least.

Burton v. Progressive Advanced Ins. Co., No. 3:21-CV-01522-MEM, 2023 WL 2577237 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2023) (Mannion, J.)

Progressive’s insured, Frisbie, had been driving her brother’s vehicle for approximately a month while her own vehicle was experiencing mechanical issues. During this time, Frisbie had possession of her brother’s vehicle for seven days a week, 24 hours a day, and had parked it at her home. While operating her brother’s vehicle, she was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which she was at fault and injured a third party, Burton. 

Progressive investigated and determined that Frisbie’s use of her brother’s vehicle implicated the regular use exclusion. Burton sued Frisbie, and Progressive disclaimed liability coverage to Frisbie under its policy on the basis of Frisbie’s operating a vehicle furnished for her regular use at the time of the accident. 

Following a verdict in favor of Burton, Frisbie assigned her rights to pursue claims against Progressive to Burton who, in turn, filed a lawsuit against Progressive. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

In her motion, Burton argued that the Pennsylvania Superior Court had abrogated the regular use exclusion in the case of Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch., 265 A.3d 794 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021), and the regular use exclusion in this case limited the scope of liability coverage required by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). Progressive argued in response that the Rush court was considering a regular use exclusion in the context of an underinsured motorist claim and, thus, whether the exclusion was contrary to § 1731—the provision of the MVFRL that governs UIM claims. The court noted that Burton did not present any case law in support of extending Rush to abrogate the regular use exclusion in the context of liability claims—nor could it find any. As a result, the court refused to extend the Rush holding and denied Burton’s motion. The court also determined that Frisbie’s brother’s vehicle was furnished for her regular use and granted Progressive’s motion. Burton has filed an appeal to the Third Circuit.
 

 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.