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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Pennsylvania Superior Court Finds Appellants’ Position Unreasonable

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – June 2025

June 1, 2025

by Dana A. Gittleman

In Hespen v. Erie Insurance Company, Levy Insurance Company, LLC and Thomas Levy, 332 A.3d 1229 (Pa. Super. 2024), the Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the appellants’ assertion of the applicability of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 

The appellants entered into a stipulated judgment with the company of a tortfeasor driver who injured Mr. Hespen, accepting an assignment of rights of the company, Karalis Mechanical Services, LLC, against its insurer, Erie, and insurance agency, Levy Insurance Agency, LLC, and insurance agent Thomas Levy. Karalis Mechanical had a commercial general liability policy procured by Levy and underwritten by Erie and had obtained an umbrella business catastrophe policy (BCL) with Erie after the subject automobile accident occurred. Karalis Mechanical had a separate commercial automobile policy with State Farm at the time. 

Erie denied coverage for the accident under the CGL policy, which excluded automobile liability, and under the BCL policy, which was not in effect on the date of loss, and the coverage only applied to automobiles insured by Erie. The trial court granted Erie’s and Levy’s motions for summary judgment, and the appellants appealed on the basis of the reasonable expectations doctrine. That is, whether the trial court had erred in refusing to consider the expectations of the insured, Karalis Mechanical, and in finding that Karalis Mechanical did not have an expectation of coverage as a matter of law.

In evaluating this claim, the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered the plain language of Erie’s policies themselves, as well as Mr. Levy’s conduct regarding insurance procurement. Approximately one year prior to the accident, Mr. Levy provided an Erie Business Auto Policy quote, which would have covered the vehicle involved in the accident. Karalis Mechanical opted to continue its auto insurance coverage with State Farm based on price and emailed Mr. Levy with this decision and rationale.

The doctrine of reasonable expectations is designed to protect “a non-commercial insured from policy terms which are not readily apparent, and to protect non-commercial insureds from deception by insurance agents.” Hespen, 332 A.3d at *4 (citing Matcon Diamond, Inc. v. Penn Nat. Ins. Co., 815 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Here, Karalis Mechanical was a commercial insured, and there was no deception. Indeed, the terms of the Erie policies were unambiguous: Mr. Levy provided a BCL quote as requested; Mr. Karalis never responded to the quote until after the accident occurred; and even if the BCL policy had been in effect, Erie would not have covered the loss as Mr. Karalis had rejected Erie’s auto quote (and, thus, the auto involved in the accident was not insured by Erie). Moreover, the court was unconvinced by Mr. Levy’s note in his computer system about “adding auto” to the commercial policy.

Given the court’s rejection of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the appellant’s claims against Erie, Levy Agency and Mr. Levy lacked support, and the court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment rulings.

With respect to the claims against Mr. Levy specifically, this case is a reminder of the oft-cited best practice to contemporaneously memorialize customer interactions and communications. Here, Mr. Levy offered auto insurance for Karalis Mechanical with Erie, which was rejected, and the offer to procure BCL coverage was not accepted until after the accident, despite repeated follow-up by Mr. Levy. These communications evidenced Mr. Karalis’ intentions regarding auto insurance and did not support a finding of deception. 

This case also bolsters the existing case law governing the application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, reiterating the criteria articulated in Matcon, supra: “This Court has noted that, generally, courts cannot invoke the reasonable expectation doctrine to create an ambiguity where the policy itself is unambiguous. Our Supreme Court has identified only two limited exceptions to this principle: (1) protecting non-commercial insureds from policy terms which are not readily apparent; and (2) protecting non-commercial insureds from deception by insurance agents.”

Insurance agents should be cognizant of their insurance customer audience and provide clear communication and access to information to mitigate against potential claims of deception under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. When this doctrine is invoked, liability may attach for the insurance agent. 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers- June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

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Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.