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Defense Digest

PA Supreme Court Narrows Sexual Abuse Exception to Governmental Immunity

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2026

June 30, 2026

Key Points:

  • Stronger immunity defense: The ruling provides a clear basis to dismiss negligence claims against insured public entities in adult sexual abuse cases, reducing defense costs and settlement pressure.
  • Risk differentiation by age: Defense strategies can more confidently separate minor-victim claims (higher exposure under the exception) from adult-victim claims (generally immune).
  • Focus remains on prevention: While immunity helps limit financial liability, good training, screening, supervision, and reporting protocols are still essential to reduce incidents and defend against any claims that do proceed.
  • Legislative monitoring needed: The General Assembly could expand the exception in the future. Insurers should track any bills that attempt to broaden liability for adult victims in public settings.

Case Overview

A recent decision from Pennsylvania’s highest court has important implications for municipalities, prisons, school districts, and the insurance professionals who cover them. On March 26, 2026, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a 2019 exception to governmental immunity for sexual abuse claims applies only when the victim was under 18 years old at the time of the incident.

The case, City of Philadelphia v. J.S., 320 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2026), involved serious allegations from an adult inmate who claimed he was sexually assaulted by multiple prison employees shortly after arriving at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility in Philadelphia. He sued the City of Philadelphia, arguing the city was negligent in training, screening, and supervising its staff, and in protecting inmates from harm. The central legal question was whether the city could be held liable under the sexual abuse exception added to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) in 2019.

Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court answered clearly: No. Since the plaintiff was an adult, the exception did not apply, and the city remained protected by governmental immunity.

Understanding Governmental Immunity

Pennsylvania law provides broad protection to local governments and public agencies against most negligence lawsuits. This shield, known as governmental immunity, helps protect taxpayer dollars from wide-ranging claims that could deplete public budgets. The legislature has created only a few narrow exceptions where liability is allowed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b), et seq

In 2019, lawmakers added one such exception for sexual abuse, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9), which permits claims against a local agency if its negligence contributed to conduct that qualifies as one of several serious sexual offenses. However, the exception specifically refers to offenses listed in a statute (42 Pa.C.S. § 5551(7)) that eliminates the statute of limitations for those crimes only if the victim was a minor.

The Supreme Court examined the exact language of the law and concluded that the age requirement is an essential part of the exception, not an optional detail that can be overlooked. Writing for the majority, Justice McCaffery emphasized that governmental immunity is the general rule and exceptions must be interpreted strictly and narrowly. The Court also reviewed the legislative history, noting that the 2019 changes were primarily motivated by high-profile cases involving childhood sexual abuse in institutions. A proposal to remove the age limit did not pass. As a result, even serious allegations involving adult victims do not open the door to negligence claims against the public entity itself.

What the Ruling Means in Practice

This ruling has broad implications beyond just prisons. It applies to municipalities, counties, school districts, and any other local public agencies covered by the PSTCA. For cities and counties, the decision means that negligence claims arising from alleged sexual abuse of adult residents, employees, or visitors are typically protected by immunity. In school settings, while claims involving the sexual abuse of students who are still minors can proceed if negligence by the district is adequately shown, claims involving adult students, staff members, or visitors are generally barred. This ultimately provides a solid basis for dismissing negligence claims early in litigation, which can help control legal costs and reduce settlement pressure.

Individual employees may still face personal liability for intentional or criminal acts, but the public agency and its insurance coverage are largely shielded in these adult-victim scenarios.

The Court’s decision aligns with several earlier rulings from both Pennsylvania and federal courts, creating consistent guidance across jurisdictions

Looking Ahead

Critically, this decision does not mean public entities bear zero responsibility. Public agencies must still investigate serious allegations of sexual abuse thoroughly, report them properly to law enforcement, and support victims where appropriate. Individual wrongdoers can, and should, face criminal charges and personal civil liability.

However, for public agencies and the insurance policies that protect them, the ruling significantly limits exposure in a major category of cases. Insurance professionals should immediately review pending claims involving adult plaintiffs and governmental insureds. Early motions to dismiss or preliminary objections based on immunity will likely succeed more often now.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has sent a clear and forceful message: governmental immunity still carries real weight, and the 2019 sexual abuse exception remains narrower than some hoped or feared. For municipalities, counties, schools, prisons, and their insurers, this clarity delivers valuable protection in an area where claims frequently become emotionally charged and financially significant. By preserving the traditional limits on municipal liability, the Court reinforces that any broadening of exposure must come directly from the legislature—not through expansive court interpretations.

Connor works in our Philadelphia, PA office. He can be reached at (215) 575-2588 or DCWarner@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.