.
Professional Liability

Defense Digest

PA Supreme Court Narrows Sexual Abuse Exception to Governmental Immunity

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2026

June 30, 2026

Key Points:

  • Stronger immunity defense: The ruling provides a clear basis to dismiss negligence claims against insured public entities in adult sexual abuse cases, reducing defense costs and settlement pressure.
  • Risk differentiation by age: Defense strategies can more confidently separate minor-victim claims (higher exposure under the exception) from adult-victim claims (generally immune).
  • Focus remains on prevention: While immunity helps limit financial liability, good training, screening, supervision, and reporting protocols are still essential to reduce incidents and defend against any claims that do proceed.
  • Legislative monitoring needed: The General Assembly could expand the exception in the future. Insurers should track any bills that attempt to broaden liability for adult victims in public settings.

Case Overview

A recent decision from Pennsylvania’s highest court has important implications for municipalities, prisons, school districts, and the insurance professionals who cover them. On March 26, 2026, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a 2019 exception to governmental immunity for sexual abuse claims applies only when the victim was under 18 years old at the time of the incident.

The case, City of Philadelphia v. J.S., 320 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2026), involved serious allegations from an adult inmate who claimed he was sexually assaulted by multiple prison employees shortly after arriving at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility in Philadelphia. He sued the City of Philadelphia, arguing the city was negligent in training, screening, and supervising its staff, and in protecting inmates from harm. The central legal question was whether the city could be held liable under the sexual abuse exception added to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) in 2019.

Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court answered clearly: No. Since the plaintiff was an adult, the exception did not apply, and the city remained protected by governmental immunity.

Understanding Governmental Immunity

Pennsylvania law provides broad protection to local governments and public agencies against most negligence lawsuits. This shield, known as governmental immunity, helps protect taxpayer dollars from wide-ranging claims that could deplete public budgets. The legislature has created only a few narrow exceptions where liability is allowed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b), et seq. 

In 2019, lawmakers added one such exception for sexual abuse, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9), which permits claims against a local agency if its negligence contributed to conduct that qualifies as one of several serious sexual offenses. However, the exception specifically refers to offenses listed in a statute (42 Pa.C.S. § 5551(7)) that eliminates the statute of limitations for those crimes only if the victim was a minor.

The Supreme Court examined the exact language of the law and concluded that the age requirement is an essential part of the exception, not an optional detail that can be overlooked. Writing for the majority, Justice McCaffery emphasized that governmental immunity is the general rule and exceptions must be interpreted strictly and narrowly. The Court also reviewed the legislative history, noting that the 2019 changes were primarily motivated by high-profile cases involving childhood sexual abuse in institutions. A proposal to remove the age limit did not pass. As a result, even serious allegations involving adult victims do not open the door to negligence claims against the public entity itself.

What the Ruling Means in Practice

This ruling has broad implications beyond just prisons. It applies to municipalities, counties, school districts, and any other local public agencies covered by the PSTCA. For cities and counties, the decision means that negligence claims arising from alleged sexual abuse of adult residents, employees, or visitors are typically protected by immunity. In school settings, while claims involving the sexual abuse of students who are still minors can proceed if negligence by the district is adequately shown, claims involving adult students, staff members, or visitors are generally barred. This ultimately provides a solid basis for dismissing negligence claims early in litigation, which can help control legal costs and reduce settlement pressure.

Individual employees may still face personal liability for intentional or criminal acts, but the public agency and its insurance coverage are largely shielded in these adult-victim scenarios.

The Court’s decision aligns with several earlier rulings from both Pennsylvania and federal courts, creating consistent guidance across jurisdictions

Looking Ahead

Critically, this decision does not mean public entities bear zero responsibility. Public agencies must still investigate serious allegations of sexual abuse thoroughly, report them properly to law enforcement, and support victims where appropriate. Individual wrongdoers can, and should, face criminal charges and personal civil liability.

However, for public agencies and the insurance policies that protect them, the ruling significantly limits exposure in a major category of cases. Insurance professionals should immediately review pending claims involving adult plaintiffs and governmental insureds. Early motions to dismiss or preliminary objections based on immunity will likely succeed more often now.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has sent a clear and forceful message: governmental immunity still carries real weight, and the 2019 sexual abuse exception remains narrower than some hoped or feared. For municipalities, counties, schools, prisons, and their insurers, this clarity delivers valuable protection in an area where claims frequently become emotionally charged and financially significant. By preserving the traditional limits on municipal liability, the Court reinforces that any broadening of exposure must come directly from the legislature—not through expansive court interpretations.

Connor works in our Philadelphia, PA office. He can be reached at (215) 575-2588 or DCWarner@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

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Result

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Result

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Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

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Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

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Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.