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Defense Digest

Novel Insurance Coverage Issue? File a Declaratory Judgment Action in Federal Court, Right? Well…

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by Vincent E. Cononico

Key Points:

  • Federal courts are reluctant to consider novel insurance coverage issues.
  • A decision to deny jurisdiction in an insurance coverage action is likely to be affirmed.

The story usually unfolds like this: the facts of the loss suggest that a policyholder may not be entitled to indemnity or a defense under the terms of the insurance policy. However, the law on the particular issue is not well settled in the jurisdiction. Therefore, the prudent decision is to file a declaratory judgment action. The state court venue is not seen as desirable, so the option of filing the case in federal court is suggested. There is diversity of citizenship among the parties and the amount in controversy is sufficient for federal jurisdiction, so there should be no obstacle to filing the action in federal court, right? Well, before charging forward in federal court and incurring the associated expenses, we should take a closer look. 

A scenario similar to the one outlined above was recently considered in Admiral Insurance Co. v. Fire-Dex, LLC, 2023 WL3963623 (6th Cir. June 13, 2023). Fire-Dex is a manufacturer of firefighting products, including clothing worn by firefighters. Many of its materials contain the chemical polyfluoroalkyl, also known as PFAS. There is some evidence suggesting that PFAS causes cancer. A number of lawsuits have been filed against Fire-Dex and similar companies by the end-users of clothing containing PFAS. Fire-Dex turned to its liability insurer, Admiral Insurance, for defense and indemnity. Admiral believed that coverage did not apply under the terms of the policy and filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 

Specifically, Admiral argued the federal court should declare that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Fire-Dex because the alleged injuries fell under the policy’s “occupational disease” exclusion. That exclusion states that there is no coverage for a “…disease arising out of any insured’s operation, completed operation or products.” Rather than addressing this issue, the federal district court dismissed the action, declining to exercise jurisdiction over the case. Believing that was an error, Admiral filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 

The Court of Appeals began its analysis by explaining that, even when a litigant has satisfied all of the traditional elements establishing federal jurisdiction, a district court’s decision to accept a declaratory judgment action is still discretionary. District courts in the Sixth Circuit are required to apply the factors set forth in Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984) when deciding whether to keep a declaratory judgment action. These factors are whether:

  • the declaration will settle the controversy;
  • the declaration will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in issue;
  • the declaration will be used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing”;
  • the declaration will improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; or
  • there is a better alternative remedy.

The parties to the Fire-Dex case agreed that most of these factors were satisfied. The declaratory judgment action would settle the controversy and would be useful in clarifying the legal relations. There was no evidence that the action was filed for an improper motive, or “procedural fencing.” In addition, a declaration of Fire-Dex’s rights under the policy seemed to be the best remedy. 

However, the parties could not agree on the fourth factor, which formed the basis for dismissal by the district court. Specifically, the lower court concluded that retaining the declaratory judgment action would encroach on the jurisdiction of the state courts, because the specific coverage issue had not been decided by the state courts previously. Admiral disagreed and challenged the district court’s ruling on appeal, arguing that similar insurance policy exclusions had been applied in the workers’ compensation setting and that those decisions provided the federal courts with the necessary guidance on state law.

The Sixth Circuit did not find Admiral’s argument persuasive and explained that “states…are the masters of their own law, subject to certain federal constitutional and statutory restraints.” The court also stated, “[b]y and large, insurance rules and regulation are reserved to the states for crafting.” Because there are no Ohio state court decisions applying this specific policy exclusion to the same or similar facts, it was concluded that the district court was correct in declining to exercise jurisdiction. The court further explained that it was reluctant to reverse the lower court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. The court explained, “It is enough that the district court has ‘taken a good look at the issue and engaged in a reasoned analysis of whether issuing a declaration would be useful and fair.’” 

At first glance, the decision in Fire-Dex might seem counterintuitive. After all, in the context of insurance coverage, litigants file declaratory judgment actions for the purpose of seeking clarification of novel coverage questions. If the coverage decision is clear, there is no need to file a declaratory judgment suit. However, the lesson to be taken from Fire-Dex is that if the issue at hand is truly, or even arguably, one of first impression in the state, the federal courts will probably not welcome the case. Further, if the federal court denies jurisdiction, that decision is very likely to be affirmed on appeal. Therefore, litigants should proceed cautiously when considering filing a declaratory judgment action in federal court that involves a novel insurance coverage question.

*Vincent is a shareholder in our Cleveland, Ohio, office. He can be reached at 216.912.3821 or vecononico@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.