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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Nothing “Special” About Relationship Between PA Insurance Broker and Insurance Company

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers - November 30, 2023

November 30, 2023

by Dana A. Gittleman

In Mohanan, et al. v. Liberty Mutual Personal Insurance Company, 2023 WL 8026106 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2023), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reiterated the prevailing standard in Pennsylvania for establishing the existence of a “special relationship” between an insurance customer and an insurance broker, i.e. “ced[ing of] decision-making control or surrend[ing] substantial control.”

The court granted defendant Liberty Mutual’s motion to dismiss to strike references to a “special relationship” owed to plaintiffs premised on Liberty Mutual’s purported “cultivat[ion of] a relationship of trust and confidence.” The court agreed with Liberty Mutual’s position that the relationship between an insurance broker and an insured is an arm’s length business relationship; a fiduciary duty does not arise simply because the insurance agent or broker possesses superior knowledge or skill as compared to a lack of sophistication of the insured. 

In Pennsylvania, an insurance agent or broker is under a general duty to procure the coverage requested by a customer and has no duty to advise or recommend as to the types of amounts of coverage available, to obtain total or full coverage, or explain the policy and its coverages and/or exclusions absent evidence of a “special relationship.” Wisniski v. Brown & Brown Ins. Co., 906 A.2d 571, 577-78 (Pa. Super. 2006); Stern Family Real Estate Partnership v. Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22296 (W.D. Pa. March 27, 2007); Yenchi v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 161 A.3d 811, 820 (Pa. 2017).

The analysis of the existence of a special relationship is an important one with respect to the standard of care applied. If an insured can establish a special relationship--for example, as analyzed here, through overmastering influence and/or final decision-making power ceded to the insurance agent or broker--the insurance agent or broker is assumed to have undertaken additional, fiduciary duties. In other words, the existence of a special relationship elevates the duty owed from a duty to procure to a duty to advise or recommend. Accordingly, a viable special relationship or fiduciary duty claim asserted against an insurance producer can significantly narrow the defenses available in a professional liability lawsuit.

The Mohanan decision is a welcome addition to the existing precedent in Pennsylvania limiting the imposition of a fiduciary duty on an insurance agent or broker. Consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Yenchi, supra, the bar remains high to establish a confidential or fiduciary duty between an insurance producer and an insurance customer. 

 

 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers - November 30, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.