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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Litigating Civil Cases at Lightning Speed: The Impending Florida Civil Procedure Rule Changes

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – July 2024

July 1, 2024

by Kimberly Kanoff Berman

Civil litigation in Florida is time-consuming. It always has been. Florida civil rules of procedure do not contain the procedural safeguards, like speedy trial rules, afforded to criminal defendants to expedite the process.

But that’s all about to change. 

The Florida Supreme Court is on a path to make amendments to the civil procedural rules with an intended purpose of prompt, efficient resolution of civil cases. On May 23, 2024, the court released two opinions announcing amendments to multiple civil rules and the creation of a new conferral requirement. In short, these changes were to: (1) case management; (2) discovery; and (3) motion practice.

Case Management 

Now, within 120 days of the filing of a lawsuit, trial judges must designate a case as complex, general or streamlined. Complex cases will be governed by amended rule 1.201, which allows courts to hold a hearing to determine whether a case should be designated as complex. 

Rewritten rule 1.200 will govern general and streamlined cases. For those cases, the trial court must issue a case management order that specifies the track and sets forth at least eight specified deadlines for: 

1.    service of complaints; 
2.    service under extensions; 
3.    adding new parties; 
4.    completion of fact discovery; 
5.    completion of expert discovery; 
6.    resolution of all objections to pleadings; 
7.    resolution of all pretrial motions; and 
8.    completion of alternative dispute resolution. These deadlines “must be strictly enforced unless changed by court order.”

In addition to case management orders with prescribed deadlines, trial courts will be able to fix the trial period without waiting for a party to declare that the case is “at issue.” Rewritten rule 1.440 now eliminates the “at issue” requirement. Instead, trial courts can issue orders fixing the trial period 45 days before any projected trial period in a case management order. 

This will likely result in cases being set for trial much sooner than previously. Prompt claims investigation will help ensure that the cases are tried with all of the necessary evidence to support the claims and defenses.

Another issue that has held up the resolution of cases involved availability of hearing time. Setting a motion for hearing in some circuits had become exceedingly difficult. Without resolution of the motion, it often adversely affected key issues in the case. 

With the rule amendments, hearing time may be easier to obtain. Rewritten rule 1.200 encourages the use of case management conferences on all motions, except for motions for summary judgment and evidentiary hearings. A court may set a case management conference on its own motion or by proper notice by a party. If a party notices the case management conference, then the party must identify specific issues to be addressed as well as a list of pending motions. 

Proper use of case management hearings may encourage judges to rule on pending motions instead of allowing the motions to languish. A prompt resolution of a critical motion may prompt a change in the evaluation of a claim. This could require claims professionals to look at the case in another light at any time in the litigation.

Discovery

Once a case is on track and in active litigation, the tenor of discovery often depends on the type of case and/or the lawyer litigating it. The new rules will eliminate some gamesmanship as it relates to who takes the lead in discovery. 

Parties will now be required to make initial disclosures within 60 days after service of the complaint. This rewritten rule 1.280(a)(1) models the initial disclosure requirement in federal court. 

Parties will have to disclose:

1.    the names and contact information of individuals likely to have discoverable information and the subject of that information; 
2.    a copy or a description by category and location of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the party’s possession; 
3.    a computation of each category of damages and evidentiary support unless privileged; and 
4.    a copy of any insurance policy or agreement where an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a judgment. 

Initial discovery disclosures will be based on information readily available. A party will not be excused from making its initial discovery disclosures because it has not fully investigated the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party’s initial discovery disclosures or because another party has not made its initial discovery disclosures. 

Although this might seem burdensome at the outset of the case, rewritten rule 1.280(c) now limits the scope of discovery to any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense, but it must be proportional to the needs of the case. To determine proportionality, courts will consider the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. 

Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. This language supplants the prior rule’s language that, “it is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

Requiring initial disclosures will likely get the case off to a running start. Plaintiffs typically have the advantage in discovery. After all, they have investigated the claim to be able to file the complaint within the statute of limitations period. However, with these new disclosure requirements for all parties, early investigation will be critical. The more investigation that is done pre-suit, the easier it will be to comply with this requirement at the onset of the case. 

If the investigation does not reveal everything, then rewritten rule 1.280(g) now requires a party to timely supplement interrogatory answers, requests for production, or requests for admission in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response was incomplete or incorrect. It also requires supplemental responses as ordered by the court. This should help eliminate some unnecessary motions to compel better answers or responses.

In the event new information becomes available, it should be sent to the attorney immediately. That way the attorney can supplement the discovery. This is a big change from the previous rules, where there was no duty to supplement discovery once the initial response was made.

It is also noteworthy that, pursuant to rewritten rule 1.280(k), all initial disclosures, discovery requests, responses and objections must be signed by at least one attorney of record. The rule also provides that, “no party has a duty to act on an unsigned disclosure, request, response, or objection until it is signed.” In signing the discovery responses, attorneys and pro se litigants will be certifying as to the accuracy and compliance with the rules.

Motion Practice

To move cases along, parties will now be required to confer before filing certain motions. New rule 1.202 requires conferral with opposing counsel in a good-faith effort to resolve the issues raised in the motion before filing any motion, except for: motion for injunctive relief; motion for judgment on the pleadings; motions for summary judgment; motion to dismiss; motion to permit maintenance of class action; motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or motion to involuntarily dismiss an action.

This conferral requirement may result in less motion practice. It will also likely narrow the scope of disputes that are ultimately brought to the court’s attention.

One of the exceptions to the conferral and case management requirements involves the summary judgment motion. Amended rule 1.510(b) will align the deadline for responses to summary judgment motions with the case management orders. Before the change, the deadline was tied to a hearing date, which was often impossible to obtain. This resulted in a logistical nightmare and often gave non-movants excessive amounts of time to respond. Now, pursuant to amended rule 1.510(c)(5), non-movants will be required to file a response and any counter evidence no later than 60 days after the service of a motion for summary judgment. 

This new requirement will provide another opportunity to review the strengths and weaknesses of a case well in advance of a hearing. This is a welcome change and will prevent the last-minute filings of counter-evidence that is often used to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Depending on what is filed, this might prompt an updated evaluation and could give claims professionals some more time to resolve the claim before the hearing, if desired.

Finally, since the deadlines will govern the case through trial, parties will have to move for a continuance under rewritten rule 1.460 to make any modifications. Rewritten rule now expressly states that, “motions to continue trial are disfavored and should be rarely granted and then only upon good cause shown.” Parties are expected to make efforts to avoid continuances. This means it will be next to impossible to get a continuance. 

With strict adherence to this continuance rule, cases will most likely move at lightning speed to trial. This might trigger settlements in cases that would not have settled had the parties had more time to work up the case. Failure to get a continuance of the trial or any deadline will provide yet another opportunity to evaluate the value of the claim and potential for an excess exposure. 

Conclusion

The new amendments alter case management, discovery and even motion practice requirements. Since the court amended the rules without allowing an opportunity for full comment, interested parties have until August 6, 2024, to express their views. These changes will take effect on January 1, 2025, and, if adopted in their entirety, will likely alter the way civil cases are handled in the future—litigation at lightning speed. Buckle up!  


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials

Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026). The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such.  Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged.  The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority.  The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.”  Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition.  The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.