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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Updates Regarding Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Presented by the School Leaders’ Liability Practice Group

March 1, 2024

by Rachel Insalaco

Third Circuit affirms lower court finding that a school district did not violate the IDEA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Zachary J. through Jonathan and Jennifer J. of Lafayette Hill, PA v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 2024 WL 366180 (3d Cir. Jan. 31, 2024)

The Third Circuit affirmed a lower court disposition from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which found that the school district had not violated the IDEA or Section 504 of the RA where: (1) a privately obtained Independent Education Evaluation (IEE) had been considered in formulating the minor student’s revised Individualized Education Program (IEP), but its recommendations had not been adopted in their entirety; and (2) the minor student’s grades were progressing. 

Regarding the first consideration, the Third Circuit emphasized that “[r]etrospective review of an IEP must ‘appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.’” Id. at *5 (quoting Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017)). Regarding the second, the court noted that, while “grade advancement alone does not inherently fulfill the requirements of a FAPE,” they are “important in further assessing the success of an IEP[,]” because the grading and advancement system is designed by the public school system to monitor the educational progress of the child.” Id.

 


Third Circuit affirms New Jersey court’s finding that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not completing due process hearings prior to bringing federal suit for alleged violations of the IDEA. 
Carmona v. New Jersey Dep’t of Ed., 2023 WL 5814677 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023)

Specifically, the plaintiffs were a class of parents alleging that school districts across New Jersey had unilaterally altered their minor children’s Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) by virtue of using remote or hybrid instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Third Circuit noted that, “[t]o satisfy this [exhaustion] requirement, before filing their suit, plaintiffs must have the ‘findings and decision’ from a due process hearing in hand… Merely beginning that process is not enough.” Id. at *3 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2014)). The court further affirmed that no exception to the exhaustion requirement applied. 

Regarding the IDEA’s “systemic” exception for claims that challenge “‘procedural violations that ‘effectively deprive[] plaintiffs of an administrative forum[,]’” the court determined that this exception was inapplicable “where the Parents alleged IDEA violations that did not ‘undermine access to the administrative hearing process itself.’” Id. at *4 (citing T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 4 F.4th 179, 193 (3d Cir. 2021)). As for the IDEA’s “stay put provision,” which does not require exhaustion before initiating proceedings to determine the student’s “current” educational placement to be maintained while administrative hearings and judicial review occur, the court held this provision also inapplicable because the move of all students to remote instruction did not reflect a change in placement. Id. at **4-5.  


 

Legal Update for Special Education Law – March 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.