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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

Legal Update for Special Education Law – August 2024

August 1, 2024

by Rachel Insalaco

Third Circuit remands matter to the district court to conduct a factual analysis as to whether the school district had violated its Child Find obligations under Section 504.
Brooklyn M. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 103 F.4th 956 (3d Cir. 2024)

Brooklyn, a thirteen-year-old student who attended the defendant school district until sixth grade, and her mother filed an administrative special education due process complaint against the school district, alleging it had failed to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of her academic and emotional needs until her fourth grade year, despite her display of social-emotional problems as early as kindergarten. 

During Brooklyn’s kindergarten year, the school district refused to conduct a full Section 504 evaluation because she had performed satisfactorily on classroom-based assessments and the Dynamic Indicators of Basic Early Literacy Skills; however, she was evaluated for speech and language needs and found eligible for special education services in the form of speech and language therapy under the IDEA, which she received until second grade.

From kindergarten through fourth grade, Brooklyn scored below average on standardized assessments related to her reading, writing and math capabilities. Beginning in second grade, she also allegedly began to exhibit emotional difficulties, including expressions of suicidal ideation and depression; however, the record before the administrative hearing officer was unclear as to whether her diagnoses were shared with the school district at this time. In Brooklyn’s fourth grade year, she was diagnosed with disruptive mood regulation disorder, after which her mother requested that the school district provide her daughter with a 504 plan. Brooklyn thereafter received a comprehensive psychoeducational evaluation; while the psychologist who conducted the examination did not find that Brooklyn met the IDEA criteria for specific learning disability or emotional disturbance, she did recommend that the school district develop a 504 plan to address Brooklyn’s educational, social and emotional needs. Brooklyn continued to exhibit troubling behavior in her home following the implementation of her 504 plan. 

Brooklyn and her mother averred in their administrative due process complaint that the school district failed to satisfy its Child Find requirement under both the IDEA and Section 504 insofar as it had not timely evaluated Brooklyn for special education services. The administrative hearing officer determined that the school district’s evaluation of Brooklyn during her kindergarten year was sufficiently timely and thorough to satisfy its Child Find obligations, as was its issuance of a 504 plan during her fourth grade year. The officer further determined, however, that Brooklyn’s 504 plan was too general to adequately address her social-emotional challenges and ordered a revision of the plan, as well as compensatory education. 

Upon Brooklyn and her mothers’ filing of a federal complaint, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a memorandum opinion and order affirming the hearing officer’s decision in its entirety.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals faulted the district court for treating Brooklyn’s Section 504 claims as subsumed within her IDEA claims, given that the two statutes, while similar, have important differences, including, e.g., their definitions of what constitutes a disability and the administrative exhaustion requirements to bring a claim under them. The administrative hearing officer and, subsequently, the district court determined as a matter of course that the school district had met its Child Find obligations under Section 504 because it had done so under the IDEA. However, the Third Circuit pointed out that Section 504 covers a broader swath of students than the IDEA and that Brooklyn had received special education services under the IDEA from kindergarten through second grade, but under Section 504 in fourth grade, thus illustrating that her claims under each law were distinct. As such, the Third Circuit remanded the matter to the district court to conduct a factual analysis as to whether the school district had violated its Child Find obligations under Section 504. 


 

Legal Update for Special Education Law – August 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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