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Defense Digest

Jane Doe: Navigating Gender Identity and Law

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Carly P. Edman

Key Points:

  • To proceed anonymously in a court proceeding, a plaintiff must show a reasonable fear of severe harm.
  • Under the principle that open and transparent proceedings are imperative to equitable outcomes, citizens have a right to know who is using their courts and defendants have a right to confront their accusers.
  • With regard to transgender people specifically, courts in the Third Circuit have allowed anonymity due to the private and intimate nature of being transgender as well as the widespread discrimination, harassment and violence faced by these individuals.

The legal profession has not been exempt from the increasingly debated topic of gender identity taking place in the United States. A recent 2021 case involving a transgender individual in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Doe v. Genesis HealthCare, 535 F. Supp. 3d 335, 337 (E.D. Pa. 2021), demonstrates that courts in the Third Circuit recognize the importance of preserving the anonymity of transgender people in order to protect them from scrutiny or threats.

The plaintiff in Doe, a transgender woman, brought discrimination claims on the basis of her sex/gender identity and disability—gender dysphoria—against her former employer. The plaintiff began working as a certified nursing assistant for the defendants in February of 2019. She alleged that during her employment she was repeatedly discriminated against, harassed, and ultimately terminated because of her gender identity. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged her supervisors would misgender her by referring to her with incorrect pronouns and telling patients to do so. The plaintiff sought to proceed in her employment discrimination lawsuit under the pseudonym “Jane Doe.”

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, every pleading must have a caption with the court’s name, a title, file number and Rule 7(a) designation. The names of all parties must be listed in the caption of the complaint. Courts have explained that this level of specificity is necessary because of the long-held principle that “open and transparent proceedings are imperative to equitable outcomes.” However, courts have long recognized that the circumstances of a case, particularly when litigants may suffer extreme distress or danger from their participation in the lawsuit, may justify allowing a party to proceed under a pseudonym.

To proceed anonymously, a plaintiff must show a reasonable fear of severe harm. The courts then apply a balancing test to determine if the plaintiff’s reasonable fear of severe harm outweighs the public’s interest in open litigation. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider. The factors favoring anonymity include:

(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential;

(2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these bases;

(3) the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant’s identity;

(4) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants’ identities;

(5) the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; and

(6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives.

By contrast, three factors disfavor anonymity:

(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants;

(2) whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigants’ identities, beyond the public’s interest which is normally obtained; and

(3) whether the opposition to pseudonym by counsel, the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated.

With regard to transgender people specifically, courts in the Third Circuit have allowed anonymity due to the private and intimate nature of being transgender as well as the widespread discrimination, harassment and violence faced by these individuals. Courts have balanced the need for a public trial with the need for anonymity by requiring plaintiffs to disclose their legal names for the limited purposes of conducting discovery and depositions.

In Doe, the court determined that the plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable fear of severe harm through her allegations of discrimination and significant harassment in her workplace based, in part, on her gender identity. The court opined that by using a pseudonym, the plaintiff also avoided additional threats or future harmful interactions with co-workers based on her transgender status of a kind similar to those that allegedly marked her employment with the defendants. This factor weighed in favor of anonymity because the potential harm to the plaintiff in that situation was that to reveal her identity presented a reasonable and justifiable fear.

Regarding the public interest factor, the plaintiff was not a public figure, which decreased the public’s interest in knowing the plaintiff’s identity. Forcing the plaintiff to reveal her identity risked placing her in danger, and if her identity were to be revealed, the plaintiff stated she would instead choose not to continue pursuing her claim. Because of this, the court determined it was also likely that other similarly situated litigants would be deterred from litigating these types of claims for the same reasons. Ultimately, the court concluded that the threat of verbal and possible physical harm risked deterring a significant number of potential litigants, which would lead to claims being unresolved. The Doe court, therefore, allowed the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym, confirming the recognized importance of protecting transgender individuals from the threats of harmful scrutiny caused by public disclosure. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.