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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Household Vehicle Exclusion Lives on When Insured Validly Waives Inter-Policy Stacking

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – January 4, 2022

January 4, 2022

by Christopher W. Woodward

In Gramaglia-Parent v. Travelers Home and Marine Ins. Co., 2:20-cv-03480 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2021) (Rice, Mag. J.), the insured, Gramaglia-Parent, was involved in an accident while occupying a vehicle owned by her husband which was insured on its own policy of insurance. She submitted an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim under her own personal auto policy, issued by Travelers, which did not insure the vehicle in which she was occupying. Travelers denied the claim based upon an exclusion in the policy that encompassed both a household vehicle exclusion and a regular use exclusion. Litigation ensued.

Travelers subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the breach of contract/coverage claim. Travelers argued that coverage for UIM benefits did not extend to Gramaglia-Parent’s claim because, at the time of the accident, she was occupying a vehicle owned by a household member but which was not insured by the Travelers Policy, and thus the household vehicle exclusion applied. Travelers further argued that since the vehicle was available for her regular use, the regular use exclusion also applied.

Gramaglia-Parent argued that the household vehicle exclusion was invalid after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Gallagher v. GEICO. She further argued that the stacking waiver she had signed at the inception of the Travelers Policy was invalid because it included language (in addition to the statutorily-mandated language) which rendered the waiver ambiguous and, as such, she could not have made a knowing waiver of stacking.

The Eastern District first determined that the stacking waiver signed by Gramaglia-Parent was valid and that the additional language, while perhaps itself ambiguous, did not render the entire stacking waiver void. Distinguishing this case from both Gallagher and Donovan (which had been issued after the parties had submitted their principal briefs in this case), the Eastern District held that, since Gramaglia-Parent had executed a valid stacking waiver on a single-vehicle policy—and had never added a vehicle in a manner requiring execution of a new stacking waiver—she could not seek to stack inter-policy benefits. As such, the household vehicle exclusion remained valid and applied to preclude her claim.

As the application of the household vehicle exclusion was dispositive of the motion, the court did not reach whether the regular use exclusion applied to this claim.

Since Gallagher, some insureds have argued that the household vehicle exclusion was entirely dead. This case demonstrates that the household vehicle exclusion is very much alive—albeit under a specific set of circumstances.
 

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – January 4, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.