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Georgia Permits the Discovery of Litigation Funding – Will Other States Soon Follow?

Legislative Alert for Civil Litigation – May 13, 2025

On April 21, 2025, Georgia became one of the first states to enact a statute to permit the discovery of litigation funding, paving the way, perhaps, for a number of other states to soon follow. 
 
The Georgia legislature addressed the regulation of third-party litigation funding by enacting Senate Bill 69 (amending Title 7 and Article 5 of Chapter 11 of Title 9) of the Official Code of Georgia. This amendment:
 
•    Establishes clear requirements for disclosing third-party funding agreements exceeding $25,000; 
•    Mandates that litigation financing companies register with the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance; and 
•    Limits the recovery rights of litigation funders and holds them accountable for promoting frivolous litigation. 
 
The statute does not, however, automatically permit these agreements to be admissible at trial.
 
Other states are considering similar legislation. Currently, the New York senate has passed Senate Bill S1104 regarding the regulation of third-party litigation funding. The Bill was delivered to the Assembly, where it has yet to be calendared for a vote on the Assembly Floor. This act will prohibit litigation funders from having any role in deciding whether, when and how much a legal claim is settled for, and it requires the third-party company to include certain, clear language within the contract between the company and borrower. While this bill does not permit discovery of these agreements, this proposed bill is a step forward in the right direction.
 
West Virginia has also passed legislation involving the disclosure of litigation agreements. Other jurisdictions, including Louisiana, Wisconsin, Montana and Indiana, have proposed bills to permit discovery of third-party litigation funding agreements. 
 
Impact on Civil Litigation
As we all know, litigation loan funding is problematic for the insurance industry because it can artificially inflate the value of claims and prolong litigation. When plaintiffs receive third-party funding, they may be less inclined to settle reasonably, knowing they have financial backing regardless of the case’s merits. This delays resolution, increases defense costs and may encourage frivolous lawsuits, ultimately driving up premiums and burdening the legal system with unnecessary litigation. Hopefully, this is a step in the right direction to roll back the shadow that this has cast over our industry.  

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.