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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Florida’s Fourth DCA certifies conflict to the Florida Supreme Court on when a jury should consider replacement cost value v. actual cash value.

Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Qureshi, et. al., Fla. 4th DCA, 4D2023-1338, July 24, 2024

September 1, 2024

The plaintiffs filed a suit due to Universal’s alleged breach of the homeowners’ insurance policy when it paid only the $10,000 policy limit for the mold damage without making any payment for the damage caused by the water leak which resulted in the mold. Thereafter, the plaintiffs sold the property without repairing the damaged items described in the estimate they submitted for payment to Universal. 

Prior to trial, Universal moved in limine to preclude the plaintiffs from presenting any evidence related to either the cost of any repairs not performed prior to the sale of the property or any diminution in value to the property resulting from the covered loss. In support of its motion, Universal relied on the policy’s loss settlement provision, which does not provide payment for any diminution in value. In addition, the provision tracks Fla. Stat. § 627.7011(3)(a), which provides the insurer must initially pay at least the actual cash value of the insured loss, less any applicable deductible and, thereafter, shall pay any remaining amounts necessary to perform such repairs as work is performed and expenses are incurred. The court granted Universal’s motion with respect to any evidence of diminution in the property but denied the remainder of the motion, which allowed the plaintiffs to present evidence concerning the estimated cost for damages caused by the loss (the replacement cost value). 

At trial, Universal renewed its motion in limine and objected to the plaintiffs’ introduction of the estimate reflecting repair costs to areas in the property that were never repaired prior to the sale, both of which the court denied. This appeal followed. 

The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with Universal that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiffs to introduce into evidence at trial the estimated repair costs for work that was never performed, even though both the policy’s terms and Fla. Stat. § 627.7011(3)(a) require payment by the insurer only “as work is performed and expenses are incurred.” Further, the District Court did not rely on the Tio, from the Third District Court of Appeal, which stands for waiver or estoppel of the provision since payment was not made by the insurer. 

In addition, the court found the language in the policy is clear and unambiguous, and therefore the policy should be enforced according to its terms and declined to create insurance coverage by utilizing the doctrines of waiver or estoppel. 

The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages to only those damages for which recovery is permitted under the policy’s clear and unambiguous terms. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – September 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.