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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Florida Fourth DCA Clarifies Limits of Attorney Liability in Third‑Party Opinion Letters

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Jonathan E. Kanov

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal recently affirmed that an attorney who prepares an opinion letter on behalf of the borrowers for the benefit of the lender in an arms-length transaction does not owe a duty to the lender. In this case, a $7.5 million loan was issued to the operators of ultra-luxury auto dealerships, and its cars, such as a 2019 McLaren Senna, were used as collateral for the loan.

The defendant issued an opinion letter on behalf of the borrowers, which was required by the claimant as a condition for funding the loan. The opinion letter contained representations based on the loan documents, such as that the borrowers had no known pending or threatened claims, no other encumbrances, and that claimant would have a valid security interest in the autos used as collateral. After the borrowers defaulted on the loan, claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty were brought against the defendant for alleged misrepresentations in the opinion letter. The claimant demanded $9,000,000 in damages, contending that it wouldn’t have made the loan if not for the defendant’s misrepresentations.

The claimant filed competing summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the judge agreed with the defense argument that despite stating in the opinion letter that the claimant could rely on his representations, there is no duty imposed on a party or its counsel to act for the benefit or protection of the opposing party in an arms-length commercial transaction. If the claimant chose to rely on such representations, that is a calculated risk with no recourse against the defendant for its own failure to investigate further. A final judgment in favor of the defendant with an award of costs was entered. The claimant appealed to the 4th DCA, who affirmed the judgment. This case expands past precedent and is highly instructive for attorneys issuing third party opinion letters and those that choose to rely upon them.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.