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Defense Digest

Driving the Workday: The Third Circuit Clarifies Compensable Travel Time Under the FLSA

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

by Michael C. Burke

Key Points:

  • Travel during the workday between clients’ homes is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
  • The key is whether the employee is considered on-duty at the time of travel—that is, whether the employee can use the time effectively for personal purposes. 
  • Travel to a job site following an off-duty period is only compensable if “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s duties. 
  • The Third Circuit’s ruling is sure to impact any industry with mobile employees engaged in providing in-home services. 

As the demand for in-home care grows, so do questions about how federal labor laws apply to the home health care workforce. In Sec’y U.S. Dep’t. of Labor v. Nursing Home Care Management, Inc., 128 F.4th 146 (3d Cir. 2025), the Third Circuit offered key guidance on the compensability of the travel time associated with the provision of at-home health care services.

In the underlying litigation, the Department of Labor sued a home health care service provider, Nursing Home Care Management, Inc. d/b/a Prestige Home Care Agency (Prestige), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting various violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a federal law regulating how employers compensate their employees for work they perform. Among other things, the FLSA codifies the federal minimum wage, right to overtime pay, and various record keeping requirements imposed upon employers relating to those obligations. 

In the instant case, the Department alleged, in relevant part, that Prestige failed to pay its Home Health Aides (HHAs) for time spent traveling between client homes. Specifically, it alleged that Prestige: (1) did not compensate HHAs for travel time from one client’s home to another during the workday; and (2) did not compensate HHAs for travel time to and from clients’ homes before and after an off-duty period. 

At the conclusion of discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of its claim regarding travel time, the Department relied on the “continuous workday doctrine,” which states that “time spent by an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job site to job site during the workday, must be counted as hours worked.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.38. By contrast, Prestige argued that travel time constitutes off-duty time under the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which provides that an employer need not compensate an employee for “. . . traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity . . . which such employee is employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254.

The District Court granted summary judgment to the Department on its FLSA claims, concluding that Prestige’s practices amounted to willful violations of the FLSA. To resolve the travel time issue, the court re-focused the question. It noted that in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that “any activity that is ‘integral and indispensable’ to a principal activity is itself a principal activity under § 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.” Thus, the court concluded that travel is a necessary, integral, and indispensable part of a HHA’s principal activities as, were an HHA not to travel, it would be impossible to provide Prestige’s services in its clients’ homes. Thereafter, Prestige appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment. 

In its analysis, the Court of Appeals took a slightly different approach, centering the discussion of travel time around two key questions—first, whether travel is compensable when the employee lacks the time to go off duty; and second, if the employee has the time to go off duty, must he still be compensated for the time necessary to travel between job sites?

In addressing the first question, the court distinguished its analysis from those of the District Court and the parties. It explained that the analysis of whether the travel time was compensable was not a question of whether travel, itself, is a principal activity. Rather, the court grounded its analysis in the federal regulations interpreting the FLSA, which make two key points clear—(1) employees are working for purposes of the law (in other words, are “on-duty”) when idle so long as “they are unable to use the time effectively for [their] own purposes,” and (2) under the continuous workday doctrine, “time spent by an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job site to job site during the work day, must be counted as hours worked.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.15, 785.38. For these reasons, the court held that HHAs are entitled to compensation when they are on duty and traveling. 

Nevertheless, on the second question, the court returned to the “integral and indispensable” analysis. It noted that, though not necessary for those HHAs who were already on duty such as in the first inquiry, the test remained appropriate for those employees who traveled to a client’s home following an off-duty period. The court explained that such employees are entitled to compensation, but only for travel that was necessary to travel between job sites. Put differently, such employees are only entitled to travel that was “integral and indispensable” to the principal activities of HHAs. On this point, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s analysis that necessary travel to a client’s home is integral and indispensable as, were an HHA not to travel, it would be impossible to provide services in clients’ homes. Still, the court took care to set boundaries. It explained that an employee’s marginal travel that is unnecessary to move between job sites, such as to travel home, to another job, or to go shopping, is not compensable under the FLSA. 

The result of this decision is twofold. First, at least with respect to travel, compensability under the FLSA is not a question of whether the activity, itself, is a principal activity or is integral and indispensable to a principal activity. Rather, the question is whether the employee is able to use the time effectively for their own purposes—or put differently, whether the employee is “on duty”—and whether the travel occurs during the broader continuous workday. Second, for employees traveling following an off-duty period, compensability turns on whether any or all of that travel is “integral and indispensable” to their job duties. Though applied here in the home health care context, employers engaged in providing any services at clients’ homes, such as real estate services, cable and utility services, landscaping, and home cleaning services, should note that such time may be compensable under the FLSA. 

*Michael is a member of our Professional Liability Department and works in our Philadelphia, PA office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.