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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Delaware Superior Court Decision Imparts Lessons for Insurance Agents and Brokers Regarding Policy Exclusions and Language

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – November 2024

November 1, 2024

In June 2024, the Delaware Superior Court granted a motion for summary judgment, requiring an insurance company to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in regard to underlying litigation. In doing so, the court issued a coverage decision demonstrating the importance that a policy be clear and unambiguous to avoid the contract language being construed against the insurance company. The decision also highlights the need for agents and brokers to consider the industry their clients are in and the services they offer in order to understand the reasonable expectations of those insurers when providing insurance liability policies.

In Noble Eagle Sales, LLC v. Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company, et al., 2024 WL 2830922 (Del. Super. Ct. 2024), Noble Eagle, the insured, operated a shooting range where a patron used one of its guns to commit suicide. The decedent’s family and estate subsequently sued Noble Eagle, which had requested coverage for the lawsuit under their insurance policy. The insurance company denied coverage, citing an exclusion within the policy. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, seeking a decision from the court on whether coverage applied.

The argument centered on an exclusion found within the policy excluding coverage for bodily injuries caused by sporting equipment rented out by Noble Eagle. Noble Eagle argued that the exclusion did not clearly define sporting equipment, therefore, making the exclusion ambiguous as to whether a firearm fell within the exclusion. The insurance company argued the exclusion’s plain meaning clearly conveyed what was excluded and, thus, was not ambiguous and that without any ambiguity, the exclusion must be applied in this case. 

The court determined that the term “sporting equipment” was ambiguous and the exclusion could not be enforced in this case. In doing so, the court looked to the standard for insurance contract interpretation. 

The “interpretation of a contract must rely on a reading of all pertinent provisions of the policy as a whole, and not on any single passage in isolation.” Id. citing O’Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287 (Del. 2001). Clear and unambiguous contract terms are given their plain meaning. Id. citing Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del. 1992). Ambiguity exists when the contract term is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more meanings. Id. “When ambiguity does exist, ‘the language of an insurance contract [must] be construed most strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.’” Id. In order to avoid its duty to defend its insured, an insurer must demonstrate that the allegations of the complaint are solely and entirely within specific and unambiguous exclusions from coverage. Id. citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co., 1992 WL 22690, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).

The court first addressed whether the decedent had rented the firearm. They determined the transaction unquestionably fit into the definition of “rented out” and that Noble Eagle’s decision to not charge the decedent’s estate for the rental does not transform the transaction. 

In turning to the definition of “sporting equipment” in the exclusion, the court looked to the definitions in the policy, and “sporting equipment” was not defined. Noble Eagle argued that reasonable minds could differ as to when a firearm qualifies as “sporting equipment.” The insurance company argued Noble Eagle only rented out “guns, protective eyewear, and earplugs” and that if firearms are not “sporting equipment,” the exclusion is meaningless.

The court determined that the core question it must answer hinged on whether firearms are always, definitionally, sporting equipment. The court applied Delaware decisional law and determined the exclusion could only be enforced if the sole reasonable interpretation of “sporting equipment” encompassed all of the firearms Noble Eagle rented out, regardless of the purpose for which the customer rents the firearm. The court then looked to the Merriam-Webster definition of firearm and sporting equipment. Turning to the policy language, the court determined there was more than one reasonable interpretation as to whether sporting equipment always included firearms. 

The court cannot determine from the plain language of the policy where to draw the line between firearms that can be sporting equipment, and firearms that are always sporting equipment. MUSIC, as the insurer, stood as the party best positioned to make that delineation when drafting the Policy. MUSIC’s failure to do so renders the Rental Exclusion’s application to firearm rentals ambiguous.

Id. The court further found ambiguity regarding what shooting activities would be considered sports under the policy, as firearms could be rented for either shooting practice or testing out a firearm for purchase, among others.

In finding ambiguity, the court construed the exclusion most strongly against the insurance company. The court was unable to find that all firearms were unequivocally and definitionally “sporting equipment.” According to the court, the insurance company failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the exclusion barred coverage in this case. Further, the court found the insurance company was aware, at the time of issuing the policy, that Noble Eagle rented firearms. Therefore, Noble Eagle had a reasonable expectation, as a shooting range that paid $14,000 for a liability policy, that they would have coverage in place for liability involving firearms. The court also took into consideration that the policy did define some definition of “sporting equipment,” as it explicitly referenced golf and tennis equipment. Finally, the court noted that the litigation highlighted the benefit to the insurance company of the ambiguity in the policy exclusion and the requirement under Delaware law to construe the policy against the insurer.

This case demonstrates the importance that a policy—including its exclusions—be clear and unambiguous. Further, agents and brokers must take into consideration the type of business and services being provided by an insurer, the reasonable expectations of those insurers in obtaining liability policies, and the implications of any potential exclusions that may apply.  


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.