.

Case Law Alerts

Court Rules that Liability Insurance Does Not Cover Claims for Civil Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act 18 U.S.C. 2333(a)

Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Chiquita Brands Internatl., Inc., 2024-Ohio-1775

July 1, 2024

by David J. Fagnilli

Several insurers sought a declaration that they were not obligated to indemnify the defendant when it resolved underlying claims alleging liability for support of Columbian terrorists. The underlying litigation was a consolidated civil action seeking to recover damages for the death of U.S. citizens in Columbia. The plaintiffs were missionary organizations and the relatives and representatives of six Americans kidnapped and killed in the 1990s by Columbian terrorists. They allege that the defendant provided financial support by funneling money to a terrorist organization. The defendant claimed it was a victim of extortion by the terrorist. The underlying case proceeding on motions for summary judgment, which were granted in part and denied in part. Thereafter, the defendant settled all of the claims in February of 2018. 

When the defendant sought indemnity for the settlements, the insurers brought a declaratory judgment action. The trial court held that, “where there is no evidence of an insured’s direct intent to cause harm and the insured denies the intent to cause any harm, the doctrine of inferred intent allows a court to infer an insured’s intent to injure, thus barring coverage for accidents as a matter of law on summary judgment where the insured’s act necessarily results in the resulting harm.” The Court of Appeals found that the trial court applied the wrong standard but reached the correct result. Citing the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 128 Ohio St.3d 186, 2010-Ohio-6312, 942 N.E.2d 1090, holding that “in cases in which the insured’s intentional act and the harm caused are intrinsically tied so that the act has necessarily resulted in the harm” intent can be inferred. The court also rejected the defendant’s affirmative defense of extortion. 

This case is significant for its application of the definition of “occurrence” in CGL policies and the standard to apply when analyzing inferred intent. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.