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Case Law Alerts

Court Finds Fatal Shooting “Arises Out of” Vehicle Use for UIM Coverage

Allmerica Fin. Benefit Ins. Co. v. Hunt, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3634209 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2025).

April 1, 2026

by Christopher W. Woodward

In this tragic case, James Hunt was stopped at a red light while driving a vehicle owned by his employer when he was accidentally shot and killed by the operator of another vehicle stopped at the red light, heading in the same direction. The accidental shooter was attempting to unload a firearm which he kept in his glove compartment.

The employer-owned van that Hunt was operating at the time of his killing was insured by Allmerica Financial Benefit Insurance Company with non-stacked underinsured motorist limits of $1,000,000.00. Hunt’s family reached a settlement with the shooter’s auto insurer and demanded the UIM policy limits from Allmerica. Allmerica disclaimed the Hunts’ UIM claim and filed a declaratory action.

The Eastern District was then tasked with Allmercia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings wherein it argued that Hunt’s death did not result from the ownership, maintenance, or use of an underinsured motor vehicle, which is required for Allmerica to pay UIM benefits, per their policy. Allmerica argued that “result from” is a proximate causation standard for the payments of UIM benefits. In response, the Hunts argued that Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law codified a “but for” causal standard for the payment of UIM benefits where it requires UIM coverage “provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . . .”

Determining that the Allmerica policy language directly contradicts the MVFRL mandate, the Eastern District applied a “but for” standard to determine if UIM coverage applied. After an extensive review of precedent, the Eastern District determined that, since the shooter’s vehicle was being used to transport himself and the firearm to and from work, and since the discharge of his weapon was the result of negligent and unintentional conduct, the shooter’s use of his vehicle was the “but for” cause of the death of Hunt.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.