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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Court finds contract invoking direction to pay is an assignment and subject to requirements for assignments in Florida Statute § 627.7152.

Holding Insurance Companies Accountable, LLC. A/A/O Stephen Wells v. American Integrity Insurance Company of Florida, Circuit Court, 5th Judicial Circuit in and for Lake County, Civil Division, Case No. 2021-CA-00523

December 1, 2024

by Danielle N. Robinson

The plaintiff, Holding Insurance Companies Accountable, LLC (HICA), brought an action against American Integrity Insurance Company of Florida, alleging it was an assignee of insurance benefits under a policy issued by the carrier for services provided on a claim with a date of loss of February 6, 2020. The insured filed a claim seeking benefits for wind damage to their property. 

An issue arose as to whether the plaintiff’s “direction to pay” constituted an assignment of benefits under Florida law, as assignments of benefits were subject to certain requirements under §§ 627.7152 (2019). Under § 627.7152(l)(b) (2019), an “assignment agreement” means “any instrument by which post-loss benefits under a residential property insurance policy or commercial properly insurance policy, as that term is defined in Florida Statute § 627,0625(1), are assigned or transferred, or acquired in any manner, in whole or in part, to or from a person providing services to protect, repair, restore, or replace property or to mitigate against further damage.” 

The insured submitted a Direction to Pay and Estimate created by Noland’s Roofing and an assignment to HICA, seeking payment in the amount of the Direction to Pay and Estimate. Additionally, the court noted the plaintiff answered an interrogatory, stating: “Plaintiff is seeking the fair market value of services which were required to place the property back in pre-loss condition.” 

The court ruled the plaintiff’s assignment constituted an assignment agreement, as defined by Florida Statute § 627.7152. According to the court, the plaintiff’s assignment provided a service to protect, repair, restore or replace property as contemplated by Florida Statute § 627.7152, and the purpose of funds sought by the plaintiff were to protect, repair, restore, or replace properly or to mitigate against further damage. Therefore, the court found the assignment was required to comply with the requirements of Florida Statute § 627.7152, and it failed to do so. As such, the assignment was invalid, and the court granted the carrier’s motion for final summary judgment and dismissed the action. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – December 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

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