.

Legal Updates for New Jersey Public Entity & Civil Rights

Attorney General Role Limited to Cases Alleging Tortious Damages

Legal Updates for New Jersey Public Entity & Civil Rights, December 10, 2024

December 10, 2024

In Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office v. Office of the Atty General, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the Office of the Attorney General’s (OAG) denial of the petitioner’s request for representation in a legal action in lieu of prerogative writs filed by a retired deputy police chief. The Superior Court found the respondent’s duty to defend arose from the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA) as he was only charged with defending a state employee to the extent required under N.J.S.A. § 59:10A-1. The TCA mandates a defense only in tort actions seeking damages, and the respondent had discretionary authority in other cases. In this case, the former police chief’s claim did not seek tort damages; therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the OAG’s discretionary denial of the petitioner’s request for representation.

The petitioner, Township of Marlboro Police Department, received a complaint regarding its Deputy Police Chief, Frederick Reck. As mandated by the Internal Affairs Policies and Procedures (“IAPP”) and the Attorney General’s directive, the petitioner initiated an internal investigation into the allegations, and two were sustained against Reck. He then elected to retire in lieu of proceeding through a disciplinary hearing.

Reck’s written agreement memorializing retirement included a provision whereby he retained the right to challenge findings made by the petitioner relating to the investigation. In June of 2023, Reck’s counsel requested a copy of the formal procedures by which he could challenge the report and a copy of the petitioner’s complete investigation report. The petitioner responded that Reck was precluded from challenging its findings through the administrative process post-retirement pursuant to Section I.E. of Directive 2019-6.

Reck then filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, against the petitioner, requesting de novo review of the findings in the report. Specifically, he alleged the petitioner improperly sustained two allegations charged against him and that the petitioner never identified the particular administrative process by which he could challenge the findings of the report as demanded.

The petitioner forwarded a copy of Reck’s complaint to the OAG with a letter requesting representation in accordance with Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001). The OAG denied the petitioner’s request for representation, positing the duty only obligates the OAG to provide defense and indemnification to employees when they are being sued in civil actions seeking damages for conduct that is tortious and/or violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As a result of Reck’s complaint, self-titled as an action in lieu of prerogative writs, sought only non-statutory equitable remedies and did not assert any claims for monetary damages, the OAG determined it was not required to provide a defense.

The Appellate Division found the OAG is only charged with defending a state employee to the extent required under N.J.S.A. § 59:10A-1, which provides that “the Attorney General shall, upon a request of an employee or former employee of the State, provide for the defense of any action brought against such State employee or former State employee on account of an act or omission in the scope of his employment.” However, the court found the OAG’s duty to defend solely arises from the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. § 59:1-1 to -12-3. The legislative mandate only applies in the context of civil actions seeking damages for tortious conduct. Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 431 (1999). 

It’s important to be aware that the decision to represent an employee in any action not arising under the TCA falls within the discretion of the OAG. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 59:10A-3 is characterized as “a catch-all” provision which permits the OAG to “cover actions not arising under the [TCA], including civil actions not seeking damages, as well as criminal actions.” However, the OAG is only charged with defending a state employee to the extent required under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1. See Helduser v. Kimmelman, 191 N.J. Super. 493, 508 (App. Div. 1983) (emphasis added). As such, the OAG is not mandated to defend in cases other than those which fall under the TCA. 

As the action in lieu of prerogative writs did not seek damages for tortious conduct, the Appellate Division affirmed the OAG’s discretionary denial of the petitioner’s request for representation. 


 

Legal Updates for New Jersey Public Entity & Civil Rights, December 10, 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.