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Defense Digest

Adequate Notice Requires More Than the Delivery of a Policy

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

Key Points:

  • Supreme Court of Idaho on December 31, 2024, reversed and remanded district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of builder who asserted negligence claims against its insurance company and sought damages for the insurance agent’s failure to include the real property at issue in renewal of insurance policy. 
  • In BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2024 WL 5250025 (Idaho 2024), court held, once coverage is procured, an agent can be deemed to be acting as an agent of the insurer when the agent promises to renew a policy, and that something more than the delivery of an insurance policy is required to satisfy notice of policy change. 

A recent decision from the Supreme Court of Idaho on December 31, 2024, reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a builder who asserted negligence claims against its insurance company and sought damages for the insurance agent’s failure to include the real property at issue in the renewal of the insurance policy. 

In BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2024 WL 5250025 (Idaho 2024), BrunoBuilt asserted claims against various parties following the reactivation of a landslide that damaged the Dempsey home. The Dempseys had entered into a construction contract with BrunoBuilt in 2014 for the construction of a residence on property located on a pre-existing landslide. In February of 2016, BrunoBuilt’s civil and geotechnical engineering expert observed the landslide had reactivated. BrunoBuilt continued working on the construction of the home that was mostly complete. The landslide eventually indicated earth movement and became visible on the Dempsey property. No certificate of occupancy was issued for the residence. BrunoBuilt then initiated the underlying lawsuit. 

Prior to the litigation, BrunoBuilt contracted with Randy Richardson of Richardson Insurance Services to advise on available insurance coverage and obtained a “Tailored Protection Policy” that included builders’ risk coverage, which covered “direct physical loss or damage caused by a covered peril to ‘buildings or structures’ or while in the course of construction, erection or fabrication.” The Dempsey project was added to the policy in August of 2015. At that time, the policy contained a coverage exclusion for loss resulting from landslide. The exclusion did not specify the type of landslide that was excluded. Prior to the renewal date in 2016, the agent sent an email to BrunoBuilt inquiring into whether the Dempsey home would be completed and was informed the job would likely be done by the end of March. The agent did not include the Dempsey property in the 2016 renewal, which revised the exclusion for damage resulting from landslides and provided that damage from both naturally-occurring landslides and landslides caused by human activity were excluded from coverage.

Damage to the Dempsey property from the landslide became noticeable between April and June of 2016. BrunoBuilt and Richardson filed a claim with Auto-Owners. Auto-Owners then informed BrunoBuilt that Randy Richardson deleted the Dempsey property from the renewal. BrunoBuilt claimed that was the first time they were informed that the property was not included in the 2016 renewal, and they requested that coverage be reinstated. Auto-Owners declined and closed BrunoBuilt’s claim. 

BrunoBuilt sued Richardson and Auto-Owners, asserting Randy Richardson was negligent and Auto-Owners was liable for Richardson’s negligence based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. BrunoBuilt alleged Richardson was negligent in that he failed to properly advise BrunoBuilt regarding the existence, cost, and need for landslide coverage and that he failed to include the Dempsey property in the 2016 renewal. 

The Idaho Supreme Court considered the district court’s granting of Auto-Owners’ motion for summary judgment that dismissed the claims because Richardson was not acting as Auto-Owners’ agent and Auto-Owners did not provide coverage for landslides. BrunoBuilt argued on appeal that the district court’s decision dismissing the failure-to-renew claim was erroneous because the motion only sought summary judgment on the claim related to the alleged failure to procure landslide coverage. In deciding and reviewing the district court’s decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether Richardson could have been acting as an agent of Auto-Owners for purposes of the failure-to-renew claim. In doing so, the court reviewed the holding in Bales v. General Insurance Company of America, 53 Idaho 327, 24 P.2d 57 (1933), which stated that an insurance company was an agent at the time the insurance broker failed to renew the policy. Therefore, the Idado Supreme Court held that the Bales cases suggests that once coverage is procured, an agent can be deemed to be acting as an agent of the insurer when the agent promises to renew a policy.

The court then identified “the generally accepted legal principle that, if insurers fail to provide notice of a reduction in coverage upon renewal, then coverage under the preexisting policy continues.” BrunoBuilt, Inc., 2024 WL 5250025, *8 citing, Thomas v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 804, 807 (Mont. 1998) (“[W]hen an insurer renews a previously issued policy, it has an affirmative duty to provide adequate notice to the insured of changes in coverage.”); D. C. Barrett, Annotation, Insurance company as bound by greater coverage in earlier policy where renewal policy is issued without calling to insured’s attention a reduction the policy coverage, 91 A.L.R.2d 546 § 3 (2024 update) (“The general rule is that an insurance company is bound by the greater coverage in an earlier policy where the renewal policy is issued without calling to the insured’s attention a reduction in the policy coverage.”). In their consideration, the court relied on Idaho Code Section 41-1842(5), which requires an insurer to notify a named insured of, among other things, reductions in limits or reductions in coverages. In doing so, they found that statute applied to the policy at issue here. 

The court then turned to the policies to determine whether there was a change in policy and, in doing so, applied the well-established rules of interpreting insurance contracts. The court found the policies were ambiguous as to the interpretation of landslide and looked to other courts that interpreted similar policy language to only exclude coverage for naturally occurring landslides. It, therefore, concluded that the 2016 policy reduced the coverage available for landslides by excluding human-caused landslides. 

In determining whether notice was provided, the Idaho Supreme Court found there was a requirement for something more than the delivery of an insurance policy and held, “it is a broadly accepted rule that insurers must provide adequate notice of changes in coverage to insureds in the context of a renewal because the law does not impose a duty on the insured to scour a renewal policy for changes absent notice from the insurer… .” As Auto-Owners only mailed a copy of the policy, the court held it did not fulfill the written requirement notice and the coverage provided in the 2015 policy remained in effect until 30 days after notice was given or BrunoBuilt obtained replacement coverage. 

This case demonstrates that insurance agents in Idaho can be deemed to be acting as an agent of the insurer when the agent promises to renew a policy. Further, this case sets forth the written notice requirement that can come into play that requires insurers to take additional steps above and beyond mailing a copy of the policy when there is a change in coverage in the context of a renewal. 

 



 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.