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Professional Liability

Defense Digest

A Shift in Wrongful Incarceration and Malicious Prosecution Lawsuits: Multi-Million Dollar Settlements Turned into Case Dismissals

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025

December 1, 2025

by Jahlee J. Hatchett

Key Points: 

  • The pleading standard for wrongful incarceration and malicious prosecution cases may gradually be shifting to require more specific allegations in order to establish such claims. 
  • The Constitution does not provide individuals with a right to have an “adequate” investigation conducted. 

In recent years, there has been a drastic shift in the way that local prosecutor’s offices handle wrongful incarceration cases, specifically as it relates to overturned homicide convictions. For instance, since 2020, the City of Philadelphia has paid in excess of $20 million in fees for settlement of lawsuits stemming from wrongful incarcerations. Separately, juries have awarded plaintiffs more than $10 million in wrongful conviction cases. 

These wrongful incarceration lawsuits have been fueled, in part, by efforts by prosecutors to hold police officers accountable for engaging in unethical practices while investigating crimes. In 2021, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office charged three long-retired homicide detectives with perjury and related charges in connection with their testimony in a criminal trial. The underlying criminal trial stemmed from the rape and murder of an elderly woman, which occurred in 1991. The defendant in that case was convicted, in part, based on a confession that he provided. The defendant was later granted a new trial, and the homicide detectives provided testimony concerning the methods used to obtain the confession. The defendant was acquitted. 

Following the acquittal, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office arrested the homicide detectives based on their testimony at the re-trial. Two of the three detectives were later convicted of perjury and related offenses. The criminal defendant later filed a civil rights lawsuit, which settled for millions of dollars. 

In another case, a former Philadelphia homicide detective, James Pitts, was arrested and convicted of felony charges for perjury and obstruction of justice in connection with the 2010 interrogation of a homicide suspect. In that case, Pitts investigated a gruesome robbery/homicide and developed O.O. as a suspect. Pitts interrogated O.O. and obtained a confession. The confession was later used to prosecute and convict O.O. for homicide and related charges. In 2021, O.O.’s conviction was overturned, in part, based on the District Attorney’s finding that O.O.’s confession was coerced. In 2022, Pitts was arrested for perjury and related charges following a grand jury indictment. Pitts was later convicted and sentenced to more than two years’ incarceration. 

Following Pitts’ incarceration, several civil lawsuits were filed against him, alleging he coerced the plaintiffs into providing false confessions and maliciously prosecuted them for crimes they did not commit. 

Prior to the case of Wallace v. City of Phila. et al., 2025 WL 2935248 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2021), the District Court routinely allowed those lawsuits to advance through discovery simply based on an allegation that law enforcement officials obtained coerced confessions and/or physically assaulted criminal defendants. However, in Wallace, District Court Judge Karen Marston ruled that barebones claims of malicious prosecution, in the absence of something more, do not establish a viable malicious prosecution or wrongful incarceration claim. 

In Wallace, the plaintiff brought claims of malicious prosecution, deprivation of due process, violation of the plaintiff’s right against self-incrimination, civil conspiracy, failure to intervene, Section 1983 Monell violations, and state law malicious prosecution. In the complaint, Wallace alleged that, in 2012, he was wrongfully convicted of second-degree murder based on Pitts’ wrongful conduct, including obtaining a false confession. In that case, Wallace claimed that he was merely present in a home when his associate shot and killed an off-duty police officer. Wallace claimed that following the shooting, Pitts obtained a coerced confession from him while he was heavily sedated and that Pitts also forcibly requested that bullet fragments be retrieved from the plaintiff’s body, against his will. Wallace was subsequently convicted of homicide and related charges and served more than a decade in prison before his conviction was overturned. 

In response to the complaint, Pitts filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds including: (1) the complaint failed to establish that he engaged in conduct that amounted to malicious prosecution; (2) the plaintiff failed to establish that Pitts fabricated evidence; (3) the plaintiff failed to establish that exculpatory evidence was deliberately withheld or suppressed; (4) the plaintiff did not establish that an adequate investigation was not conducted: (5) the plaintiff did not establish a violation of the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination; (6) the plaintiff failed to establish a civil conspiracy; and (7) the plaintiff failed to establish a claim of failure to intervene. 

In granting the motion to dismiss in its entirety, Judge Marston zeroed in on the malicious prosecution claim and found that, in order to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must establish the following: (1) the government initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the government acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with a legal seizure. Wallace, 2025 WL 2935248, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2025). 

In dismissing the claims, the court emphasized that the plaintiff did not put forth any allegations to suggest that Pitts knowingly provided false information to prosecutors in order to secure a conviction. In drawing this distinction, Judge Marston doubled down on a well-established proposition that a mere allegation of coercion, without more, is a legal conclusion that ordinarily will not survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2025). Last, Judge Marston clearly delineated that the Constitution does not provide individuals with a so-called right to have an adequate investigation conducted. Id. 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

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Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter