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Defense Digest

A Shift in Wrongful Incarceration and Malicious Prosecution Lawsuits: Multi-Million Dollar Settlements Turned into Case Dismissals

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025

December 1, 2025

by Jahlee J. Hatchett

Key Points: 

  • The pleading standard for wrongful incarceration and malicious prosecution cases may gradually be shifting to require more specific allegations in order to establish such claims. 
  • The Constitution does not provide individuals with a right to have an “adequate” investigation conducted. 

In recent years, there has been a drastic shift in the way that local prosecutor’s offices handle wrongful incarceration cases, specifically as it relates to overturned homicide convictions. For instance, since 2020, the City of Philadelphia has paid in excess of $20 million in fees for settlement of lawsuits stemming from wrongful incarcerations. Separately, juries have awarded plaintiffs more than $10 million in wrongful conviction cases. 

These wrongful incarceration lawsuits have been fueled, in part, by efforts by prosecutors to hold police officers accountable for engaging in unethical practices while investigating crimes. In 2021, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office charged three long-retired homicide detectives with perjury and related charges in connection with their testimony in a criminal trial. The underlying criminal trial stemmed from the rape and murder of an elderly woman, which occurred in 1991. The defendant in that case was convicted, in part, based on a confession that he provided. The defendant was later granted a new trial, and the homicide detectives provided testimony concerning the methods used to obtain the confession. The defendant was acquitted. 

Following the acquittal, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office arrested the homicide detectives based on their testimony at the re-trial. Two of the three detectives were later convicted of perjury and related offenses. The criminal defendant later filed a civil rights lawsuit, which settled for millions of dollars. 

In another case, a former Philadelphia homicide detective, James Pitts, was arrested and convicted of felony charges for perjury and obstruction of justice in connection with the 2010 interrogation of a homicide suspect. In that case, Pitts investigated a gruesome robbery/homicide and developed O.O. as a suspect. Pitts interrogated O.O. and obtained a confession. The confession was later used to prosecute and convict O.O. for homicide and related charges. In 2021, O.O.’s conviction was overturned, in part, based on the District Attorney’s finding that O.O.’s confession was coerced. In 2022, Pitts was arrested for perjury and related charges following a grand jury indictment. Pitts was later convicted and sentenced to more than two years’ incarceration. 

Following Pitts’ incarceration, several civil lawsuits were filed against him, alleging he coerced the plaintiffs into providing false confessions and maliciously prosecuted them for crimes they did not commit. 

Prior to the case of Wallace v. City of Phila. et al., 2025 WL 2935248 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2021), the District Court routinely allowed those lawsuits to advance through discovery simply based on an allegation that law enforcement officials obtained coerced confessions and/or physically assaulted criminal defendants. However, in Wallace, District Court Judge Karen Marston ruled that barebones claims of malicious prosecution, in the absence of something more, do not establish a viable malicious prosecution or wrongful incarceration claim. 

In Wallace, the plaintiff brought claims of malicious prosecution, deprivation of due process, violation of the plaintiff’s right against self-incrimination, civil conspiracy, failure to intervene, Section 1983 Monell violations, and state law malicious prosecution. In the complaint, Wallace alleged that, in 2012, he was wrongfully convicted of second-degree murder based on Pitts’ wrongful conduct, including obtaining a false confession. In that case, Wallace claimed that he was merely present in a home when his associate shot and killed an off-duty police officer. Wallace claimed that following the shooting, Pitts obtained a coerced confession from him while he was heavily sedated and that Pitts also forcibly requested that bullet fragments be retrieved from the plaintiff’s body, against his will. Wallace was subsequently convicted of homicide and related charges and served more than a decade in prison before his conviction was overturned. 

In response to the complaint, Pitts filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds including: (1) the complaint failed to establish that he engaged in conduct that amounted to malicious prosecution; (2) the plaintiff failed to establish that Pitts fabricated evidence; (3) the plaintiff failed to establish that exculpatory evidence was deliberately withheld or suppressed; (4) the plaintiff did not establish that an adequate investigation was not conducted: (5) the plaintiff did not establish a violation of the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination; (6) the plaintiff failed to establish a civil conspiracy; and (7) the plaintiff failed to establish a claim of failure to intervene. 

In granting the motion to dismiss in its entirety, Judge Marston zeroed in on the malicious prosecution claim and found that, in order to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must establish the following: (1) the government initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the government acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with a legal seizure. Wallace, 2025 WL 2935248, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2025). 

In dismissing the claims, the court emphasized that the plaintiff did not put forth any allegations to suggest that Pitts knowingly provided false information to prosecutors in order to secure a conviction. In drawing this distinction, Judge Marston doubled down on a well-established proposition that a mere allegation of coercion, without more, is a legal conclusion that ordinarily will not survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2025). Last, Judge Marston clearly delineated that the Constitution does not provide individuals with a so-called right to have an adequate investigation conducted. Id. 


Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.