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Defense Digest

A Royal Assignment [of Benefits]: Ramifications for Insurers in the First-Party Property Context

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by James H. Cole

Key Points:

  • This summer, a federal court in Pennsylvania, on two separate occasions, permitted an insured to assign a bad faith claim to a vendor seeking payment for services on their property.

  • Until now, Pennsylvania courts had not previously permitted the assignment of extra-contractual tort claims, such as bad faith, in the first-party property context.

  • These recent decisions may have costly ramifications for insurers and have the potential to profoundly change the first-party property landscape in Pennsylvania.

With recent decisions in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, insurers must be braced for bad faith claims brought by their insured’s vendors. For the past 25 years, with the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute has allowed insureds to bring lawsuits against their insurance companies for improper first-party claims handling, with the primary purpose being to hold insurers accountable for good faith and fair dealing towards their insureds. See, generally, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371; see also Charter Oak Insurance Co. v. Maglio Fresh Food, 45 F.Supp.3d 461 (E.D. Pa. 2014).

Prior to the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, bad faith actions existed only under common law, and only in the third-party context, wherein an insured could sue their liability carrier for a bad faith refusal to settle a lawsuit against the insured within the policy limits, exposing him to an excess verdict. In the third-party/excess verdict context, courts have held assignments of bad faith claims, post-judgment, to be valid. See, e.g., Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 223 A.2d 8 (Pa. 1966); Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Wolfe, 105 A.3d 1181, 1188 (Pa. 2014) (carving out scenarios in which bad faith claims may be assigned by insureds).

A concept rooted in contract law, an assignment is the signing over of a claim by one party to the contract to a non-party. This has been found acceptable in the first-party insurance context when an insured assigns benefits for services rendered, such as to a physician in a PIP claim or to a mitigation vendor in a property claim, but courts stopped short of extending this concept to the assignment of extra-contractual tort claims such as bad faith.

Some states, such as Florida, have allowed vendors to secure post-loss assignments, not only for services rendered, but for extra-contractual damages such as attorney’s fees and bad faith in the first-party context, leading to what may be described as an insurance crisis. It has been widely reasoned that lawsuits involving the assignment of benefits have increased between 2004–2018. See Bethan Moorcraft, AOB Abuse in Florida Rises 70% in 15 Years, Insurance Business Mag., Mar. 28, 2019, https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/aob-abuse-in-florida-rises-70-in-15-years-163448.asp. Mostly due to the assignment of benefits, Florida is responsible for 76% of lawsuits filed against insurance companies in the United States, although the state itself only accounts for 8% of the population. David Altmaier, Florida OIR Report, Insurance Journal, Apr. 2, 2021, https://www.insurancejournal.com/app/ uploads/2021/04/Florida-OIR-Report.pdf.

In Pennsylvania, however, courts had not allowed the assignment of a bad faith claim outside the narrow third-party/excess verdict context. For example, in a case in which a disbarred attorney sought assignment of his client’s underinsured motorist-turned-bad faith claim, the Third Circuit specifically held that under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, bad faith claims can only be assigned to an injured plaintiff and judgment creditor. See Feingold v. Palmer & Barr, 831 F. App'x 608, 609 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that bad faith claims may be assigned by statutory permission, but are not “freely assignable”). Feingold reaffirmed Wolfe’s interpretation that, in the first-party property context, an insured may assign his bad faith claim only to a judgment creditor who has been injured.

On June 29, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an opinion which royally changes the Commonwealth’s interpretation of first-party property bad faith claims. In Royal Water Damage Restoration, Inc. a/a/o 1133 Columbia LLC v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., WL 2345740 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2022), the court decided that an insured’s water mitigation vendor has standing to bring a bad faith claim against the insurer—not on behalf of the insured, but directly as an injured party. Simply stated, the court has ruled, contrary to the precedent set in Wolfe and reconfirmed in Feingold, that an insured’s vendor—who is not a party to the insurance contract between the carrier and its insured—may pursue an extra-contractual claim under the Pennsylvania bad faith statute against the carrier.

On July 28, 2022, in another case involving Royal Water Damage Restoration, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania again permitted a third party’s standing to pursue a bad faith claim against an insurer. See Royal Water Damage Restoration, Inc. a/a/o Janet Thorn v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Co., WL 2985637 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2022). More pointedly, in this case, the court based its finding on the mere potential that a vendor “could potentially be” a judgment creditor, even if the property owner/named insured is the only party actually injured. It can be argued, however, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern who is permitted to bring a lawsuit, have not and were not meant to be bent for the sake of convenience. A plethora of case law since the enactment of the Federal Rules has held that a plaintiff must establish standing in order to bring any claim in suit, bad faith or otherwise. Allowing a party who has not sustained any actual injury to bring a claim for bad faith may circumvent the purpose of the federal rule on standing.

More concernedly, allowing insureds to assign their bad faith claims to vendors seeking payment for services on their property could open a floodgate of litigation directly against carriers who issue insurance policies with the specific understanding that the named insureds are the only parties to whom they owe any duties or obligations. A vendor that performs repair work on the insured property is neither an injured party nor a judgment creditor, particularly if no judgment has been rendered by a court. Widening the class of first-party bad faith plaintiffs to include vendors of insureds has the potential to significantly increase premiums.

Allowing any repair contractor—who is not a party to the contract and who was not considered in the underwriting process—to pursue a bad faith claim has the potential to profoundly change the first party property landscape in Pennsylvania. With the recent Royal Water decisions contorting Pennsylvania’s understanding of the bad faith statute, insurers should wait with bated breath for a case to reach the Third Circuit or Pennsylvania appellate courts to decide whether Pennsylvania will follow Florida down the assignment-of-benefits rabbit hole.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Legal Update for Special Education Law: Recent Positive Outcomes From the Group

Hearing Officer Confirms District Acted Appropriately Under IDEA and Section 504 William J. McPartland (Scranton) obtained a finding in favor of our client, a school district, on all issues following a due process hearing. The parent had filed a due process complaint alleging that the school district had breached its child find duty under the IDEA and Section 504, that the school district had discriminated against the student on the basis of disability in violation of Section 504, and that the school district had denied a free and appropriate public education to the student both by developing inadequate IEPs and via an actionable procedural violation.  Specifically, the student had received a Section 504 evaluation in October 2023, after a number of behavioral infractions culminating in a fight in September 2023, was identified as having anxiety and a sleep disorder, and received appropriate Section 504 accommodations. The student had never previously demonstrated signs of a learning disability, and the parent denied the school district permission to evaluate the student for special education needs in November 2023, and January 2024. The parent granted the district permission to evaluate the student in October 2024, after a private psychologist diagnosed the student with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, possible Oppositional Defiance Disorder, a learning disorder, and anxiety. The school district issued a special education evaluation report in December 2024, finding that the student had an emotional disturbance and other health impairment, and an IEP providing an itinerant level of emotional support, as well as instruction in academics and social skills, was issued in January 2025, and amended in February, March, and April 2025. The student withdrew from the school district in April 2025, to attend a cyber charter school. The hearing officer determined that the school district had not violated its child find duty to the student in violation of either the IDEA or Section 504 where the district developed a Section 504 plan for the student within a month and a half of the parent’s first request for a Section 504 evaluation and where the parent repeatedly denied consent to conduct an IDEA evaluation of the student. The hearing officer noted that the student’s sporadic record of behavioral infractions prior to September 2023, did not suggest that the student had a disability prior to the parent’s initial request for an evaluation. The hearing officer further determined that no evidence had been produced to suggest that the student was discriminated against on the basis of disability in violation of Section 504. Additionally, the hearing officer determined that the IEP offered to the student was substantively adequate and that, to the extent the social and emotional programming offered by the school district was not received by the student, this resulted from the parent’s refusal to accept the same. The hearing officer finally determined that the school district did not commit an actionable procedural violation by delaying development of an IEP for the student where the parent repeatedly denied consent to evaluate the student. Court Dismisses Three of Four Claims Against School District Christopher J. Conrad and Daniel P. McGannon (Harrisburg) achieved a significant early victory on behalf of a school district client in. The team successfully obtained dismissal of three of the four claims asserted in the plaintiff’s amended complaint. The former district superintendent brought multiple claims arising out of his alleged “forced resignation,” including age discrimination under the ADEA, a Section 1983 Equal Protection claim, a Pennsylvania Whistleblower claim, and breach of contract. On behalf of the district, the defense team moved to dismiss the complaint in part, arguing: The plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a prima facie case of age discrimination. The equal protection claim was barred because the ADEA provides the exclusive federal remedy for age-based employment claims. The breach of contract claim could not stand because the underlying employment agreement had expired prior to the alleged breach. The court agreed, dismissing the ADEA, equal protection, and breach of contract claims in their entirety. As a result, only a single claim under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law remains pending. This outcome substantially narrows the scope of the litigation and positions the client for a more efficient defense moving forward.