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Defense Digest

A Royal Assignment [of Benefits]: Ramifications for Insurers in the First-Party Property Context

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by James H. Cole

Key Points:

  • This summer, a federal court in Pennsylvania, on two separate occasions, permitted an insured to assign a bad faith claim to a vendor seeking payment for services on their property.

  • Until now, Pennsylvania courts had not previously permitted the assignment of extra-contractual tort claims, such as bad faith, in the first-party property context.

  • These recent decisions may have costly ramifications for insurers and have the potential to profoundly change the first-party property landscape in Pennsylvania.

With recent decisions in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, insurers must be braced for bad faith claims brought by their insured’s vendors. For the past 25 years, with the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute has allowed insureds to bring lawsuits against their insurance companies for improper first-party claims handling, with the primary purpose being to hold insurers accountable for good faith and fair dealing towards their insureds. See, generally, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371; see also Charter Oak Insurance Co. v. Maglio Fresh Food, 45 F.Supp.3d 461 (E.D. Pa. 2014).

Prior to the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, bad faith actions existed only under common law, and only in the third-party context, wherein an insured could sue their liability carrier for a bad faith refusal to settle a lawsuit against the insured within the policy limits, exposing him to an excess verdict. In the third-party/excess verdict context, courts have held assignments of bad faith claims, post-judgment, to be valid. See, e.g., Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 223 A.2d 8 (Pa. 1966); Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Wolfe, 105 A.3d 1181, 1188 (Pa. 2014) (carving out scenarios in which bad faith claims may be assigned by insureds).

A concept rooted in contract law, an assignment is the signing over of a claim by one party to the contract to a non-party. This has been found acceptable in the first-party insurance context when an insured assigns benefits for services rendered, such as to a physician in a PIP claim or to a mitigation vendor in a property claim, but courts stopped short of extending this concept to the assignment of extra-contractual tort claims such as bad faith.

Some states, such as Florida, have allowed vendors to secure post-loss assignments, not only for services rendered, but for extra-contractual damages such as attorney’s fees and bad faith in the first-party context, leading to what may be described as an insurance crisis. It has been widely reasoned that lawsuits involving the assignment of benefits have increased between 2004–2018. See Bethan Moorcraft, AOB Abuse in Florida Rises 70% in 15 Years, Insurance Business Mag., Mar. 28, 2019, https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/aob-abuse-in-florida-rises-70-in-15-years-163448.asp. Mostly due to the assignment of benefits, Florida is responsible for 76% of lawsuits filed against insurance companies in the United States, although the state itself only accounts for 8% of the population. David Altmaier, Florida OIR Report, Insurance Journal, Apr. 2, 2021, https://www.insurancejournal.com/app/ uploads/2021/04/Florida-OIR-Report.pdf.

In Pennsylvania, however, courts had not allowed the assignment of a bad faith claim outside the narrow third-party/excess verdict context. For example, in a case in which a disbarred attorney sought assignment of his client’s underinsured motorist-turned-bad faith claim, the Third Circuit specifically held that under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, bad faith claims can only be assigned to an injured plaintiff and judgment creditor. See Feingold v. Palmer & Barr, 831 F. App'x 608, 609 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that bad faith claims may be assigned by statutory permission, but are not “freely assignable”). Feingold reaffirmed Wolfe’s interpretation that, in the first-party property context, an insured may assign his bad faith claim only to a judgment creditor who has been injured.

On June 29, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an opinion which royally changes the Commonwealth’s interpretation of first-party property bad faith claims. In Royal Water Damage Restoration, Inc. a/a/o 1133 Columbia LLC v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., WL 2345740 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2022), the court decided that an insured’s water mitigation vendor has standing to bring a bad faith claim against the insurer—not on behalf of the insured, but directly as an injured party. Simply stated, the court has ruled, contrary to the precedent set in Wolfe and reconfirmed in Feingold, that an insured’s vendor—who is not a party to the insurance contract between the carrier and its insured—may pursue an extra-contractual claim under the Pennsylvania bad faith statute against the carrier.

On July 28, 2022, in another case involving Royal Water Damage Restoration, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania again permitted a third party’s standing to pursue a bad faith claim against an insurer. See Royal Water Damage Restoration, Inc. a/a/o Janet Thorn v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Co., WL 2985637 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2022). More pointedly, in this case, the court based its finding on the mere potential that a vendor “could potentially be” a judgment creditor, even if the property owner/named insured is the only party actually injured. It can be argued, however, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern who is permitted to bring a lawsuit, have not and were not meant to be bent for the sake of convenience. A plethora of case law since the enactment of the Federal Rules has held that a plaintiff must establish standing in order to bring any claim in suit, bad faith or otherwise. Allowing a party who has not sustained any actual injury to bring a claim for bad faith may circumvent the purpose of the federal rule on standing.

More concernedly, allowing insureds to assign their bad faith claims to vendors seeking payment for services on their property could open a floodgate of litigation directly against carriers who issue insurance policies with the specific understanding that the named insureds are the only parties to whom they owe any duties or obligations. A vendor that performs repair work on the insured property is neither an injured party nor a judgment creditor, particularly if no judgment has been rendered by a court. Widening the class of first-party bad faith plaintiffs to include vendors of insureds has the potential to significantly increase premiums.

Allowing any repair contractor—who is not a party to the contract and who was not considered in the underwriting process—to pursue a bad faith claim has the potential to profoundly change the first party property landscape in Pennsylvania. With the recent Royal Water decisions contorting Pennsylvania’s understanding of the bad faith statute, insurers should wait with bated breath for a case to reach the Third Circuit or Pennsylvania appellate courts to decide whether Pennsylvania will follow Florida down the assignment-of-benefits rabbit hole.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.