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Defense Digest

A Deadly Encounter: Court Clarifies Use of Force in Police Shooting of Mentally Ill Individual

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

Key Points:

  • Use of Deadly Force: The court upheld the police officers’ use of deadly force, which is relevant for insurance coverage in similar incidents.
  • Municipal Liability: No liability for the defendant as there was no constitutional violation, impacting municipal coverage decisions. 
  • State-Law Claims: Dismissal of wrongful death and emotional distress claims highlights the importance of reasonable officer actions in defending state-law claims. 
  • Ongoing Appeal: The case is under appeal, potentially influencing future police liability coverage and claims.

On August 3, 2021, Plymouth Township police officers responded to a crisis involving Michael Paone, a 22-year-old with a history of mental illness, which tragically resulted in his death. The case addressed the complex intersection of mental health, police use of deadly force, and constitutional rights. Judge Joshua Wolson granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding the law enforcement officers acted within their rights when responding to a perceived deadly threat, thus providing crucial guidance on police decision-making in such high-stakes encounters.

The Facts of the Case
On the evening of August 3, 2021, Michael Paone was exhibiting erratic behavior and appeared to be armed with a firearm outside an apartment complex. Paone had previously been diagnosed with multiple mental health disorders, including bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Paone’s sister called 911, reporting he was armed with a knife and experiencing a mental health crisis, and she informed the dispatcher that Michael had a “fake toy gun.”

Police arrived at the scene and found Paone positioned between two buildings. Officers took positions at varying distances and instructed Paone to drop the weapon. Paone initially complied and dropped the BB gun, but when officers moved closer, he appeared to bend toward the weapon. Fearing for their safety, and believing the object was a real firearm, Officer Doe 1 fired three shots at Paone, who then briefly rose to reach for the weapon, prompting additional shots from Officer Doe 1 and other officers.

Following the incident, Paone was transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead from multiple gunshot wounds.

Legal Standard for Use of Deadly Force
The central issue was whether the officers’ use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, including excessive force. The court applied the Graham v. Connor standard, which assesses the reasonableness of force based on the circumstances at the time.

Judge Wolson found no factual dispute that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the officers violated Paone’s rights. Citing Lamont v. New Jersey, Judge Wolson emphasized that officers must prioritize their safety when faced with a lethal threat. Paone’s actions of raising and pointing a weapon—whether real or not—created an objectively reasonable belief that deadly force was warranted.

The Mental Health Factor
The plaintiff argued that Paone’s mental illness should have influenced the officers’ response. Judge Wolson acknowledged Paone’s mental health issues but clarified that mental illness does not eliminate the possibility that an individual can pose a deadly threat in a high-stress situation.

Judge Wolson explained, the case was not about Paone’s mental health or whether he had a toy gun, but whether the officers’ use of deadly force was justified. He noted that Paone’s mental illness did not grant him additional constitutional protection or remove the potential danger posed by his actions. The Constitution does not require officers to “gamble with their lives” in situations involving mental illness, especially when facing a perceived deadly threat.

Dismissal of Remaining Claims
Having determined that the police officers’ use of deadly force was justified, Judge Wolson dismissed several remaining claims. The municipal liability claim against Plymouth Township failed because there was no underlying constitutional violation. Under Section 1983, a municipality can only be held liable if a constitutional violation occurred.

The state-law claims—survival and wrongful death, assault and battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—were also dismissed. The survival and wrongful death claims failed as the officers’ actions were deemed reasonable. The assault and battery claim was dismissed because the use of force was justified. Similarly, the emotional distress claims were dismissed for lack of an underlying tort or extreme conduct.

Implications and Conclusion 
The court’s decision in this case highlights the critical balance law enforcement must strike when responding to high-risk situations, especially those involving individuals with mental health disorders. The case reinforces that police officers must act based on their assessment of an immediate threat, without the benefit of time for detailed evaluations. While mental illness is an important factor, it does not negate the potential danger posed by an individual holding a weapon.

This ruling emphasizes the need to protect both the constitutional rights of individuals and the safety of law enforcement officers. The court’s decision ensures that officers are able to make split-second decisions in the face of perceived threats, with a focus on their safety and the safety of others. 

The case is now being appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, where it may further shape legal standards surrounding police use of force in similar encounters

*Connor is a member of Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group and works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.