Professional Liability

The plaintiffs contracted with a builder to construct a 5,000 sq. ft. home. In accordance with the Uniform Construction Code, the local township contracted with a privately-owned company to serve as a code enforcement and permit officer. The company issued a building permit, inspected the home at several points during construction, and eventually issued a certificate of occupancy. However, the plaintiffs claimed that the home had significant structural and aesthetic defects, and the code enforcement officer failed to conduct proper inspections during the construction process. The plaintiffs sued their builder, the code enforcement officer and the township. The township was alleged to have negligently hired and/or negligently supervised the code enforcement officer. Preliminary objections were filed in response, raising governmental immunity as a clear defense to the negligence claims against the township. Following oral argument, the court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the township from the action, finding there were no plausible claims for negligence based upon application of the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

Resolved a FINRA matter involving four private placement investments for a portion of the costs. ​At issue were alleged losses exceeding $200,000. Leveraging the panel’s favorable decision on an earlier Motion for Eligibility (untimeliness), we convinced claimants’ counsel of the futility of proceeding further. Claimants’ counsel agreed to resolve the case for his filing costs only, split among three respondents.

Our appellate attorneys succeeded in convincing the Pennsylvania Superior Court to vacate a $40.2 million medical malpractice verdict and remand for a new trial. ​In its unanimous, precedential decision, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court had erroneously allowed plaintiffs’ counsel to utilize hearsay medical literature as substantive evidence. The case involved a spinal cord birth injury and was tried in Delaware County.

We initially successfully defended a bifurcated claim petition filed by the claimant, an independent contractor. Opposing counsel appealed, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed and remanded the decision for evidence on the medical component of the claim. However, contrary to the defendant’s argument, on remand, the judge granted the claim petition, finding she was “constrained” to reaffirm the Board on the independent contractor issue. The defendant once again appealed, and the Board re-affirmed the claim petition. We took the case up on appeal, and the Commonwealth Court agreed that the record did not demonstrate a “high level of control” such that an employment relationship has been established. Accordingly, the court reversed the order affirming the claim petition.

We obtained an order of Dismissal in favor of a municipality in connection with a lawsuit filed by a worker. ​The worker sustained catastrophic injuries as a result of a mishap on the job which caused him to fall from the roof of a condominium project under construction. This was a multi-party action in which our client, the municipality, issued the permits but failed to carry out the inspections. Notwithstanding, we were able to demonstrate immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, and the court entered the order of dismissal.

This was a high-stakes FINRA arbitration case, motion to vacate the defense award in federal district court, and a precedential decision in the First Circuit following oral argument. The claimant retired early with a pension and 401(k) and rolled the funds into a securities account in 2002. On a tip from a friend, he invested his nest egg with a registered representative who years later was charged by the SEC and convicted of securities violations. Through the registered representative’s bad advice and improper conduct between 2002 and 2016, the claimant’s retirement account was drained to zero, though the total amount was distributed to the claimant himself. The claimant sued the registered representative and the rep’s former broker-dealers through whom the representative was affiliated (prior to his residency with the Bureau of Prisons). The FINRA arbitration panel granted a complete defense award in favor of our broker-dealer client, seeing no improper or negligent conduct on the broker dealer’s part, and finding all improper conduct of the registered representative to be outside the scope of his affiliation with the broker-dealer. The claimant then moved to vacate the award in favor of our broker-dealer client in federal district court in Boston, which was denied. He then appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In both courts, Shane briefed and orally argued the case. The First Circuit handed down a published opinion even stronger than the district court victory, adopting word-for-word many of the arguments Shane made so as to secure confirmation of the FINRA award in its entirety for the benefit of our client.

In this employment law lawsuit, the plaintiff was a former employee who filed suit against our non-profit agency client, asserting claims of gender discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act. This matter involved a long and contested period of discovery, including extensive discovery demands, complex e-discovery and extensive motion practice. During the course of discovery, we were successful in obtaining a motion for reconsideration concerning the production of e-discovery data and other documentation lacking in relevance and proportionality to the matter. We thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment as to both counts in the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination on the basis of gender, as the plaintiff failed to present any evidence demonstrating discrimination or mistreatment on the basis of gender. We further argued that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim of retaliation under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act because the plaintiff failed to establish any nexus between the termination and the filing of a workers’ compensation claim. Our motion for summary judgment was granted in its entirety, with the court finding that the plaintiff was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

The agents/agency represented the buyer/plaintiff in his purchase of a home in Dauphin County. ​The plaintiff claimed the agents failed to disclose to him prior to settlement that there were alleged defects in the A/C system and heat pump, and that the roof was old and needed to be replaced. The plaintiff paid for a home inspection report of the property, which noted the age and condition of the A/C, heat pump and roof, but the plaintiff claimed he never received the report, even though he discussed the report with one of the agents and authorized the agent to reply to the report on his behalf. The reply specifically asked the sellers to make repairs to the roof. As part of the defense, we argued that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the release language in the agreement of sale, which specifically stated that the plaintiff agreed to release the agency and its agents from claims relating to any defects or conditions on the property, and that the release by its terms survived settlement. In addition, we argued that the plaintiff waived his claims, at least as to the costs to replace the A/C and heat pump, when he declined in writing a home warranty plan that was offered to him prior to settlement by the agents. By signing the home warranty application form stating he was declining the plan, the plaintiff agreed in writing not to hold the agency and agents liable for the repair or replacement of a system that would otherwise have been covered by the plan. We introduced testimony that that the A/C and heat pump would have been covered if they did need to be repaired or replaced. The court found for the agency and agents and entered judgment in their favor.

Marshall Dennehey’s appellate attorneys filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and Pennsylvania Association of Defense Counsel in a case pending in the Pennsylvania Superior Court that involved interpretation of a “regular use” exclusion that commonly appears in underinsured motorist coverage in automobile policies. The Superior Court enforced the exclusion, as PDI and PADC had requested. The plaintiff regularly used a company vehicle for his daily work. But one or two days before the accident, the specific vehicle he had been driving was taken out of service for repairs, and his employer rented a replacement vehicle for the plaintiff’s use. The insurer denied the UIM claim, based on the “regular use” exclusion, because the plaintiff was driving a company vehicle, which was his regular practice. The plaintiff countered that the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident had not, in fact, been made “regularly” available to him because he only began using it a day or two prior. Relying on its prior decision in Brink v. Erie Ins. Group, 940 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2008), which held that the “regular use” exclusion properly barred coverage for a plaintiff injured in a “fleet vehicle,” even though the plaintiff may have driven a different specific vehicle each day, the Rawl court held that the employer’s temporary rental of a replacement vehicle triggered application of the “regular use” exclusion and barred coverage. “Stated simply,” Rawl explains, “it does not matter whether Mr. Rawl had regular use of a particular vehicle furnished by his employer, but whether he regularly used a vehicle supplied by his employer.” The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the carrier.

Marshall Dennehey succeeded in having the Pennsylvania Superior Court reverse, as excessive, a $10 million wrongful death award. ​The jury had also awarded $10 million in survival damages, but that award was reversed in post-trial motions.

We obtained a per curiam affirmance in the Fourth District Court of Appeal in a suit against a campground/RV park. The suit alleged that the campground negligently maintained the campsite and failed to keep the electrical up to code, forcing an RV owner to abandon her RV at the site. The campground countersued for writ of distress to remove the unsightly vehicle from the campsite. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings and declined to amend the complaint, finding an amendment would be futile. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of the campground on the main claim as well as the counterclaim. The court also conditionally granted the campground’s motion for appellate attorney's fees and remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the validity of the unaccepted proposal for settlement.

​The homeowners claimed the homeowners association’s response to their request to mediate the dispute violated the applicable mediation statutes. They sued the association for declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, had affirmed the final judgment in favor of the association and awarded it appellate attorney’s fees and costs. The homeowners then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, alleging the circuit court deprived them of due process and committed an error of law that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Fifth District Court of Appeal denied the petition and awarded the association its appellate attorney’s fees. This prompted the homeowners to dismiss another pending appeal and resolve all claims for attorney’s fees in favor of the association without further litigation.

We obtained a defense verdict after a one-week trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case involved alleged race, gender and/or “intersectional” (race and gender) discrimination claims by two women against a Philadelphia area school district.

Marshall Dennehey successfully argued pre-trial motions to dismiss in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County in a matter involving a $10 million tortious interference and defamation case filed on behalf of investors against an attorney and bank counsel arising out of a multi-million dollar loan for a commercial land transaction. The allegations against the attorney included slander and a claim for tortious interference, with prospective economic advantage for a contract that the plaintiff entered into with the investor. With regard to slander, we argued that the established case law in New Jersey holds that the subject pejorative was simply name calling and did not rise to the level of actionable defamation or slander in New Jersey. The court agreed and dismissed the defamation claims. Additionally, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim, rejected the plaintiff’s claims of willful misconduct of the bank’s attorney and found that the plaintiff’s damages claims, although supported by expert reports, were speculative. The court agreed with the defense argument that the plaintiff’s claims for lost profits were barred by New Jersey’s New Business Rule. Under the New Business Rule, prospective profits of a new business are considered too remote and speculative to meet the legal standard to recover damages. As a result, the court entered a dismissal of the entire case.

The plaintiff was named as a defendant in a debt collection action for failing to pay her attorney’s legal bills. Judgment was entered against her but never fully enforced. More than five years later, our client filed a Praecipe to Issue Writ of Revival and then mistakenly filed a Praecipe for Writ of Execution before the judgment was revived by the court. Although the Sheriff’s Sale of the plaintiff’s home never proceeded, she nonetheless sued our client for due process violations, abuse of process, conspiracy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act. Most of the claims were dismissed early in the proceedings. Thereafter, we successfully argued in a summary judgment motion that the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that our client acted in a manner to harass, oppress or abuse her, or that our client engaged in any other activity in violation of the FDCPA or FCEUA. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Marshall Dennehey was successful in the New Jersey Appellate Division, which affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act. The defendant operated a shelter for battered women, their dependent children and the homeless. The plaintiff and her child were residents at the shelter and beneficiaries of its charitable goals when the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on the shelter’s property. She argued that she was not a beneficiary of the charity because she did administrative tasks and volunteered in the charity’s thrift store. However, the trial court and Appellate Division rejected those arguments, holding that the plaintiff’s presence on the defendant’s property was due to her being a resident beneficiary of the charity, not as a result of any volunteer work she may have performed for the defendant. Thus, because her volunteer activities were incidental to her residency at the shelter, the Charitable Immunity Act applied and the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.

The plaintiff’s wife reported to police that the plaintiff tried to kill her by firing a shotgun at her while she slept. Following a thorough investigation and witness interviews, police arrested the plaintiff and charged him with attempted murder. The next day, the wife recanted her story and told police that she was the one who fired a shotgun in the couple’s home in an effort to frame her husband for attempted murder. Police immediately had the plaintiff released from prison. The wife was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, making false statements to authorities. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the police department and arresting officer, claiming the defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause in violation of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Following discovery, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the defendants. The court found that the undisputed facts of record clearly showed the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.

We successfully defended a legal malpractice claim where the plaintiffs alleged their former attorneys caused them to sustain more than $1.3 million in damages. ​The plaintiffs, a collection of property developers, were named as defendants in a series of debt collection actions brought by their lender. Our attorney client represented them in those matters and sought to renegotiate the debt; however, they were unsuccessful, and the lender prevailed. In the legal malpractice matter, the plaintiffs sought to recover amounts they were required to reimburse the bank for its legal fees, their own expert witness fees and the legal fees they paid to our client. In a matter of first impression, the Delaware Superior Court held that a legal malpractice plaintiff who was a defendant in an underlying matter must demonstrate that it was caused to lose a judgment in order to prevail on its legal malpractice claim. It was insufficient to suggest that the attorneys should have settled the cases before the attorneys’ fees escalated. Because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that they would have prevailed in the underlying cases, they could not prevail on their subsequent legal malpractice claim.

A water heater leak in a garage caused direct physical damage to the property, and our client paid the plaintiffs $956.95 for damages sustained to the garage, after applying the $1,000 policy deductible. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant breached the contract of insurance by failing to fully indemnify them for all the property damage caused by the water leak. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed: (1) the defendant underpaid for the garage by not allowing for “detach and reset of the water heater” in the amount of $600; (2) water from the water heater leak into the garage traveled through the crawlspace of the garage and caused the master bathroom vanity to warp; and (3) there was damage to “one” loose tile located on the toe-kick of the vanity that cannot be matched, requiring the replacement of the entire continuous tile in the home. The plaintiffs claimed total damages in the amount of $52,930.95. We defended the case at trial, arguing that the damages were limited to only the garage. Furthermore, we presented a case to the jury premised upon science, that is, water could not have traveled through the crawlspace of the garage for nine feet and caused damage to the master bathroom vanity, as the plaintiffs claim, without defying the laws of gravity.

We won dismissal of a professional negligence case against a surveyor filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. ​This action was filed by two title companies that had paid a title insurance claim to a property purchaser and sought subrogation from our client, a surveying company. They alleged that a defective survey was the cause of the title insurance claim. Ohio has a four-year statute of limitations for professional negligence claims against surveyors, and this case was filed more than four years after the allegedly defective survey was completed, rendering it untimely. The plaintiffs attempted to avoid dismissal by captioning their claims as claims for breach of contract, in order to take advantage of a longer limitations period. We argued that, despite how the claims were captioned, they were, in substance, claims for professional negligence and time-barred. The court agreed and dismissed the case.

In this medical malpractice action, the defendant, a New York doctor with no connection to New Jersey, was sued in New Jersey by a former patient who was a New Jersey resident. The court first found that the defendant did not waive consideration of the issue by waiting until after a dispute concerning the sufficiency of the affidavit of merit was resolved. The court then found that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was simply insufficient to establish either general or specific jurisdiction. The fact that the doctor had no connection to New Jersey and that the treatment occurred in New York were key to the decision, as the advertising activity by the New York hospital where the doctor is on staff, which the plaintiff relied upon, was insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the physician, especially as those activities had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s decision to treat with the defendant. In a published decision, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

We were successful on a motion to dismiss an action against a financial planning and investment firm and its employee, a certified financial planner, filed in Federal District Court in Maryland. The plaintiffs claimed that the financial planner advised them to purchase a life insurance policy that was indexed to the stock market and that he made certain representations about the expected return on investment, which never came to fruition. Instead, according to the plaintiffs, the value of the policy plummeted, and they lost significantly on their investment. The court dismissed all claims against the firm, agreeing that the company could not be liable for the alleged advice given to the plaintiffs by the financial planner, inasmuch as the firm did not exist at the time the alleged advice was given. Also, the court dismissed a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the financial planner, agreeing that both federal and state courts in Maryland do not recognize a standalone cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when only monetary damages are sought. As well, the court dismissed a conversion claim against the financial planner, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate the financial planner wrongfully exercised ownership or dominion over their finances.

We obtained a ruling granting summary judgment in favor of an insurance broker and two Lloyds syndicates in a case pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. ​The case involved a claim arising from a fall from a tree stand at a hunting camp. The plaintiff suffered spinal fractures when he fell out of the tree stand. He obtained judgment against the owner of the hunting outfitter business and then sought to recover under two policies of insurance issued to the business and a hunting club operated by the same individual. There was a stipulated judgment of $2 million, and a supplemental complaint was brought where the only issue was coverage under two $1 million policies. Accepting Marshall Dennehey’s arguments, the court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the grounds that the broker had no obligations under the policies and that the policies were not written to insure commercial hunting activities or the premises where the accident occurred.

Prevailed at trial in Broward County in defense of a property management company of a tax-credit housing community in Lauderhill. The plaintiff, the corporate owner of the property, brought claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory breaches in the management and operation of the property. The case was litigated over seven years, and the plaintiff had sought millions of dollars in damages. After a week of the plaintiff’s testimony, and eviscerating cross-examinations, we were successful in obtaining a directed verdict.   

The decision was later affirmed by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, and we successfully argued both the summary judgment motion and the appeal. The plaintiff, a condominium association, filed suit against the sponsor of a newly constructed mixed-use residential and commercial building in Hoboken, New Jersey. The plaintiff also sued the property management company, the general contractor and various subcontractors involved in the construction. A temporary certificate of occupancy was issued in March 2004 and the plaintiff did not commence litigation until June 2014—more than ten years after substantial completion. Therefore, the claims were barred by the ten-year Statute of Repose, N.J.S.A. § 2A14-1.1. The former property manager for the building and the sponsor entity had common ownership. The plaintiff argued the sponsor maintained control of the property by virtue of its continued involvement through the property management entity, and that the Statute of Repose did not apply to a party in actual possession and control of the property at the time that the defective and unsafe condition caused the injury or damage at issue. The Appellate Division held that the plain language of the Statute of Repose precludes any “action, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise, to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, surveying, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property, [and] any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury . . . more than [ten] years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction.” N.J.S.A. 2A14-1.1(a). The court found that the claims were also barred by the six-year statute of limitations as the plaintiff alleged that the first repairs at the building were undertaken in 2004, and the complaint was not filed until 2014.

We obtained a dismissal of a legal malpractice action arising from a Law Against Discrimination and Conscientious Employment Practices Act action against a municipality and its School Board. In this complex multi-party action, our client, an expert in school law, was retained by the school district to handle a hearing against the plaintiff, a teacher and coach. The plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among the lawyers and the school board to oust the plaintiff. There were also allegations of malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process against the town and its attorneys. The court granted our motion and dismissed based on the litigation privilege.

The plaintiff, a suspended high school principal, claimed that the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act had been violated when the doors to the administration building had been locked at the start of the first day of her termination hearing. The court considered the issues of whether a plaintiff is denied a right under the Pennsylvania School Code when access to the hearing room by the public is barred, and whether a public hearing qualifies as “official action” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act. The court found that the public hearing required by the school code is not concurrently a “meeting” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act and subject to its provisions. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district.

The defense prevailed on a motion for summary judgment in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on behalf of a local school district. The plaintiff, a former teacher, asserted claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defense argued in their motion that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim or retaliation claim because she could not establish that she suffered from an adverse employment action. The court agreed and determined that the plaintiff's transfer to a new grade level, placement on an improvement plan, and voluntary resignation did not constitute adverse employment actions in order to establish her claims. Consequently, the court granted the school district's motion and dismissed all claims.

We obtained a defense verdict in a legal malpractice case affirmed on appeal. Our client was an attorney who represented a plaintiff in a civil rights case against a New Jersey municipality. The underlying facts were complex, involving fraud claims against the municipality, and claims based on contract, inverse condemnation, civil rights and negligence. In the legal malpractice case, the jury found deviation but no proximate cause. In the legal malpractice case, the plaintiff sought recovery of the legal fees and punitive damages to which he claimed he was entitled in the underlying case, plus prevailing party counsel fees, which can be recovered in a legal malpractice case in New Jersey. We also successfully handled the appeal, which involved all of the issues from the underlying case and the malpractice trial. 

The defense prevailed on a motion to dismiss our real estate agency client. The plaintiff filed counts of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, conspiracy, conversion, invasion of privacy-false light, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel against the agency regarding an allegedly fraudulent transfer of a private residence by the co-defendant seller of the property. We filed preliminary objections, arguing that the plaintiff's claims lacked sufficient specificity and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court dismissed all claims against our client.